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ABSTRACT





This dissertation presents an examination of congressional oversight of administrative
agencies. In order to exert control and ensure that legislative mandates are faithfully
carried out, Congress needs its members to act as overseers of the bureaucracy. I
characterize congressional control of agencies as an institutional public good and
argue that the chamber faces a collective action problem in providing it. The problem
for the chamber is that it relies on the voluntary efforts of individual members to
help advance collective goals, creating incentives for those members to shirk their
oversight responsibilities. Despite these incentives, existing studies show that the
chamber regularly performs oversight, suggesting that concerns about congressional
control may be overstated. The explanation for oversight provided in this dissertation
suggests that such conclusions would be hasty.
I depart from most literature on congressional control by focusing on the choices
made by individual members, attempting to more clearly specify the individual-level
incentives that lead (or do not lead) to oversight. First, I provide new evidence
from individual-level behavior that members regularly make the choice to involve
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themselves in oversight of agencies. Next, I propose an explanation for oversight.
Instead of advancing chamber goals, I argue that members use oversight to advance
the policy goals of organized interests, receiving electoral support in exchange. What
appears to be active oversight is actually members selectively applying pressure to
agencies in an effort to ensure that policy benefits go to key interest groups. The
following two chapters take up the task of testing that explanation, looking at how
the oversight agenda is set within committees and which members actively choose to
engage in oversight.
By highlighting a disconnect between the needs of Congress as an institution
and the incentives faced by individual members of Congress, this dissertation calls





“Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administra-
tion”
- Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, 1885
“When the incentive isn’t there, you are simply not going to get over-
sight.”
- Richard Fenno, Testimony at Hearings of the Bolling Committee, 1973
Delegation of policymaking authority to agencies involves a fundamental trade-off
between administrative efficiency and political control. A rich literature is devoted to
understanding how congressionally designed rules and procedures can aid the cham-
ber in achieving control of administration. Rules and procedures, however, are not
self-executing. Congress depends on the voluntary effort of its members to mon-
itor agencies, enforce congressional mandates, and if necessary, alter the terms of
delegation set out in statute. What, if anything, drives members to perform this
institutional maintenance is the focus of this dissertation.
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1.1 Oversight and Political Control
In 1946, Harry Truman signed into law the Legislative Reorganization Act, an
attempt to fix a committee system that was overly complex and lacked clear jurisdic-
tional boundaries. Among the reasons for this re-organization was the fact that the
internal organization of Congress was ill-equipped to go toe-to-toe with an Executive
Branch that was steadily gaining in power and administrative responsibility. While
Congress continued to be responsible for passing laws and appropriating funds, the
rapid expansion of the federal government into policy areas in which it had previously
been uninvolved brought with it a reliance on unelected actors within the Executive
Branch to make important choices about how policies would be implemented. As part
of the LRA, Congress directed its newly reorganized committees and subcommittees
to engage in “continuous watchfulness” of the implementation of laws by agencies in
their jurisdiction. The primary designers of that bill noted that “without effective
legislative oversight of the activities of the vast executive branch, the line of democ-
racy wears thin,”1 suggesting that rigorous oversight of administration was necessary
to avoid a complete concentration of power in the Executive Branch.
The Madisonian solution to problems of encroachment is simply to create institu-
tional procedures by which one branch can assert authority over the other. Given the
authority to check the actions of another branch, it was thought that each would act
to protect their constitutionally defined authority against the advances of the other
branches. Congress clearly has such powers, being in control of both the statutes from
which agencies derive authority and the budgets from which agencies get the funds
necessary to implement policies. Further, members of Congress value their authority.
Scher (1963) describes members of Congress speaking of a need to maintain congres-
sional prerogatives and ensure that agency interpretation of statutes is in line with
what the chamber intended. The question that has plagued Congress for the past 70
1Quoted in Galloway (1951, p. 59)
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years is whether it is up to the task of exerting control, a substantial undertaking
that observers have regularly charged is beyond the chamber’s grasp. If members
of Congress have both the means and the motivation to protect against ambitious
agencies, why has Congress struggled to exert meaningful control over agencies?
The focus on oversight both in the LRA and beyond reflects what many see as the
major issue factor that undercuts Congress’ ability to exert control: poor information
about agency activities. The LRA’s call to “continuous watchfulness” is an acknowl-
edgment of the fact that Congress is ill-equipped to monitor all but a small fraction
of agency activities. This was true in 1946 and is even more true today, as the scope
of regulatory, distributive, and redistributive policies primarily implemented by Ex-
ecutive Branch agencies has only increased. Making matters worse, bureaucrats face
pressure from the President and career and policy-minded bureaucrats have strong
incentives to conceal information and actively mislead Congress about their actions.
Absent the ability to observe and evaluate the actions of federal agencies, congres-
sional threats to invoke their ex post mechanisms of control ring hollow. If Congress
was able to effectively monitor agencies, it was thought that the chamber could use its
checks over the Executive Branch to ensure that the policies implemented by agencies
reflected the demands of the chamber.
While oversight aimed at helping the chamber gather information and protect
legislative prerogatives is in the interest of the chamber, it is not necessarily in the
interest of the individuals who serve in that chamber to perform this service. Control
of administration is problematic because it requires the effort of individual members to
provide. In effect, the chamber delegates the responsibility to monitor the Executive
Branch and enforce acts of Congress to its members, but lacks any formal means
to ensure that this activity takes place. Oversight requires high costs in terms of
member time and staff, both of which can be put toward other uses, and returns
little in the way of electoral benefits. Oversight is classic “work horse” behavior in
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which individuals act on behalf of the chamber because it is the right thing to do.
Unfortunately, that makes it exactly the kind of activity that Mayhew (1974) says
that legislators will avoid.
Congressional control of the bureaucracy is an institutional public good, enjoyed
by all members even when they take no part in making sure that control is main-
tained. Control over agencies is a broad term that can encompass a number of related
but distinct goals. Dodd and Schott (1979, p. 156) identify five such goals, all of
which reformers of the 1970’s believed to be attainable if Congress actively performed
its oversight function. These goals include agency adherence to legislative intent, en-
suring that policies were having their intended effect, preventing waste and fraud,
and ensuring that relationships between agencies and their clientele groups did not
become overly cozy. Every member benefits when they know that their legislation will
be faithfully implemented or they learn whether or not a bill passed by the chamber
is solving the problem it was intended to solve, but taking the costly actions to pro-
vide these goods does not provide the individual member with any kind of selective
benefit. This kind of situation where individuals in an organization are expected to
act in the collective interest despite having to bear individual costs are exactly the
situations in which incentives to free-ride arise (Olson, 1965). Why should any one
member use their own time and staff to advance the goals of the chamber when they
could wait for their colleagues to do it?
By the late 1970’s, a strong consensus had emerged around the idea that agency
decisions occurred largely independent of Congress. Dodd and Schott (1979, p.2)
summarize this position well, describing the federal bureaucracy as a “prodigal child,”
that had “taken on a life of its own and ... matured to a point where its muscle and
brawn can be turned against its creator.” According to this view, there was simply
no way in which Congress could match wits with the large and highly technical
agencies it had created, making oversight and congressional control something of a
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pipe dream. As such, it became something of a stylized fact that oversight was a
“neglected function” of the chamber, a collective responsibility that the individuals
within the chamber systematically failed to carry out (Bibby, 1968).
1.2 The Institutional Foundations of Political Control
Around the time of Fenno’s testimony quoted at the beginning of the chapter, the
tone of scholarship on the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy began
to change markedly. Scholars re-emphasized the ability of Congress to leverage its
institutional powers to create incentives for agency responsiveness. Early empirical
work in this domain convincingly showed that whatever Congress’ deficiencies in
oversight, agencies did seem to make decisions with key members of Congress in mind
(Ferejohn, 1974; Arnold, 1979). Why this would happen in the face of a dysfunctional
monitoring system was unclear, but early works in what came to be known as the
“congressional dominance” literature suggested that Congress’ ex post powers must
have been credible enough to induce ex ante responsiveness. If this was the case, and
agencies were highly responsive to the chamber, it was thought that control could be
maintained even in the presence of low levels of oversight, and that what appeared
to be neglected oversight was actually an indication that Congress was pleased with
agency performance (Weingast and Moran, 1983).
This initial wave of congressional dominance papers provided the basis for an
institutional explanation for congressional control, but still had to wrestle with the
problem that threats to use ex post sanctions require active monitoring. Changing
statutes or engineering a major change to budgets is a costly endeavor for members of
Congress which they are unlikely to undertake absent information regarding a strong
need for change and a clear legislative fix to the problem. As such, the chamber is
unlikely to respond with any of its major punishment mechanisms absent an effective
means of detection. If the principal cannot monitor their agent and collect information
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about the agent’s actions, there is no credible threat of punishment.
Building on the findings of bureaucratic responsiveness, scholars began to em-
phasize Congress’ ex ante powers in tandem with its ability to punish ex post. In a
series of influential articles, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast articulated the theory of
control via administrative procedures, focusing on the procedures that bureaucrats
must follow when they attempt to change status quo policies (McCubbins, Noll and
Weingast, 1987, 1989). Whereas the literature on ex post controls focused on the tools
available to punish agencies conditional on a violation being detected, the adminis-
trative procedures literature focused on the ability of ex ante tools to aid in detection.
By putting in place procedures such as notice-and-comment, reporting requirements,
or requirements that key interest groups be consulted in the process of rulemaking, it
was argued that Congress could “stack the deck” in favor of its preferred outcomes,
all without having to engage in rigorous oversight. Instead, the time and effort needed
for oversight could be saved for the out-of-equilibrium cases where agencies ran afoul
of the preferences of key congressional informants (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).
Discussion of ex ante controls soon expanded to questions of statutory design,
acknowledging the ability of laws to limit the feasible range of actions of agencies.
Ultimately, decisions to delegate are made by Congress and, if the chamber controls
little of what happens after delegation, it can simply choose not to delegate or add
restrictions on what agencies can do. For example, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999)
find that when control of government is divided (meaning congressional-executive
preferences diverge), Congress chooses to delegate less. Likewise, Huber and Shipan
(2002) show that legislatures with higher capacity to design specific legislation are
less inclined to delegate their power.
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1.2.1 Is Oversight Necessary?
The past 50 years have seen oversight go from Congress’ one and only hope for
achieving control to an afterthought. By choosing the right levels of delegation and
correctly specifying administrative procedures, it is thought that oversight is largely
incidental to congressional control. While administrative procedures assist in ensuring
bureaucratic responsiveness, to conclude that they obviate the need for oversight
would be premature.
First, while administrative procedures are often portrayed as a way to put adher-
ence to congressional goals on auto-pilot, the very procedures intended to constrain
bureaucrats are administered by those same bureaucrats. Potter (2014) is the first
to note this crucial limitation on the power of administrative procedures, noting that
just as administrative procedures were a strategic innovation by Congress to con-
strain agencies, bureaucrats have themselves innovated to structure the process of
rulemaking to their own liking. Bureaucrats have the ability to make highly con-
sequential procedural decisions to help shield their decisions from scrutiny, a check
on administrative procedures that may imply that the effect of those procedures has
been overstated.
Even in a world where administrative procedures are implemented faithfully, over-
sight is a necessary part ensuring that the chamber’s mandates are carried out. Del-
egation begins with Congress passing a law that sets out terms for what an agency is
to accomplish, how they will accomplish it, and what resources they will have at their
disposal. Congress chooses to delegate to achieve a specific policy goal, but makes
these choices (budget, statutory authority, administrative procedures) with imperfect
information about the mapping between the terms they dictate to the agency, and the
ultimate policy outcomes that will occur. This problem of incomplete information is
similar to that examined in Krehbiel (1992), but with the added element that policy
outcomes are also a function of choices made by agencies.
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After policies are implemented, Congress needs to detect whether or not the terms
of delegation set out in statute have resulted in the intended outcomes. This stage,
where Congress attempts to detect problems, has been the primary focus of the lit-
erature on congressional control, and is where administrative procedures are most
effective. Administrative procedures aid in detection by structuring the information
available to the chamber through requirements on what groups must be consulted by
agencies and the set of information that agencies must make public before proceeding
with a major regulatory action. Empowering groups to engage in “fire-alarm” over-
sight allows for Congress to be confident that any violation of legislative intent with
potential electoral ramifications is brought to their attention.
Detection, however, is only the first step for the chamber. Upon learning of an
alleged violation, the chamber faces a choice about how (or whether) to use their
legislative power to address that problem. The chamber finds itself back where it
started, needing to make a set of choices about delegation that they hope will better
accomplish their goals. Again, the chamber requires information about what mea-
sures to take so as to produce better outcomes. Unfortunately for Congress, fixing
agency policies is not a simple process. The mapping between intended outcomes
and actual policies can be distorted for a number of reasons, each of which suggests
a different congressional response. Policies may be ineffective because ideologically
minded bureaucrats disagreed with the aims of the policy, because the bureaucrats
charged with implementing policy were lazy and wasteful, or it may simply be the
case that the policy was poorly designed. Some of these problems would necessitate
narrowing the bounds of statutory authority or reducing budgets, but some problems
require exactly the opposite.
The fundamental point in this discussion is that when it comes time to do some-
thing about violations of legislative intent (intentional or unintentional), the chamber
requires information about what the bureaucracy did, why they did it, and how things
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would be different if the chamber were to alter the terms of delegation. They need
to know which agencies, bureaus, or offices can or cannot be trusted to carry out
Congress’ objectives. It is oversight, either taking place preemptively or in response
to a problem, that provides provides these crucial pieces of information and, by cre-
ating the conditions that make informed collective choice possible, make threats to
alter statutes credible. So while oversight may not be the most efficient way to detect
problems in the first place, it is an important part of congressional decisions about
how to remedy problems once they have been detected.
1.3 The Puzzle of Oversight
While the chamber needs the labor of its members to help control the bureaucracy,
no one member has any specific responsibility to provide that labor. Loose jurisdic-
tional rules have evolved over time, but having the ability to perform oversight is
different from actually choosing to do it. Oversight is the product of individual de-
cisions about allocation of effort and our best understanding of how members make
those decisions suggest that oversight should be ignored.
And yet, oversight is a routine part of congressional activity. Despite the concerns
and stylized facts, individual members regularly choose to partake in the oversight
of federal agencies, doing so over a range of policy areas and agencies. Chapter 2
goes into more depth on how much oversight is performed and how different com-
mittees organize oversight activity, but suffice it to say that the type and amount of
oversight that we observe is inconsistent with the kinds of Olsonian free-rider incen-
tives outlined above. If it is the case that either members willingly act to protect the
chamber’s legislative prerogative or that a mysterious set of congressional institutions
provide sufficient incentives to do so, the normative problems underlying delegation
are substantially reduced.
One potential explanation would be that the oversight we observe is merely the
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kind of fire-alarm oversight described by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), aimed
less at providing public goods for the chamber than ensuring that powerful interests
receive policy benefits. That seems not to be the case, however, as the accumulated
empirical evidence demonstrates that fire-alarm oversight is a small part of oversight
activity (Aberbach, 1990; Balla and Deering, 2013). Most oversight is simply not
aimed at putting out fires. Oversight is often speculative, positive in tone, and highly
technical, all things that reformers have long demanded and that make little sense in
the classical principal-agent framework.
1.4 Overview of the Argument
If members of Congress are choosing to contribute to chamber-wide efforts at
monitoring agencies and ensuring that agency actions align with congressional intent,
we might conclude that the prospects for political control are substantially rosier than
is often believed. The evidence collected previously and presented here in Chapter 2
shows that oversight is routine, occurring across a wide variety of contexts and with
degrees of participation similar to non-oversight hearings. If, as Aberbach (1990)
argues, oversight is not simply a reaction to previously identified problems but a wide
(if overly complex and uncoordinated) effort to engage in substantive monitoring, our
evaluation of Congress’ ability to act in its own collective interest should improve.
The purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate whether such conclusions are ten-
able. Instead of assuming that observed patterns in oversight are the product of
members selflessly contributing to the good of the chamber, I attempt to explain
those patterns in a framework that is consistent with our beliefs about the sources
from which legislators derive their utility.
My argument for oversight activity relies on electoral incentives, arguing that
oversight in the forms we observe can have substantial electoral benefits for members.
Unfortunately for the chamber, those benefits come from outside of the chamber, not
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within. Members, I argue, perform oversight of agencies in order to attract electoral
support from the interest groups affected by the policy decisions of those agencies.
Thus, their priorities when conducting oversight are not to advance the goals of the
chamber, but to advance the goals of key interest groups. This leads oversight to be
highly selective, with active oversight of agencies dominated by a handful of members
who are both highly intense and likely to be unrepresentative of the chamber. While
the argument that members want to direct policy benefits to powerful supporters is
not new, I suggest that oversight, even in the puzzling forms we observe, plays a key
role in ensuring agency responsiveness to the demands of individual members and, by
extension, to the groups they represent.
I argue that instead of oversight serving as an attempt to monitor and publicly
reveal information about agency performance, that oversight should be thought of as
a means of signaling by members both to agencies and interest groups. By engaging in
costly oversight, members can signal to agencies that they are concerned with agency
policies and that decisions made by the agency will have consequences down the line.
In cases where agencies believe those threats to be credible, they will respond and
tailor policy so as to minimize costs (or maximize benefits) from the member. Interest
groups provide the crucial link between oversight and re-election, as their desire to be
represented by members who have the power to deter harmful decisions by an agency
leads them to offer electoral support in exchange for the member’s costly signaling.
Insofar as the interests incentivizing oversight are unrepresentative of the chamber’s
preferences broadly speaking, oversight may serve as a mechanism by which agency
policies are made less representative of the chamber.
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation
Due to the fact that the study of oversight has largely fallen out of favor in the past
three decades, we have little in the way of simple empirical facts about the conduct
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of oversight. Chapter 2 sets out to remedy this lack of knowledge, introducing a new
source of data and investigating some potential ways in which oversight might be
said to be neglected. I use the texts of hearings to train a set of machine learning
algorithms to automatically code hearings, finding that oversight is a major part
of congressional activity, but one that varies within and across units. In addition, I
attempt to provide evidence that the puzzle of individual oversight activity is actually
a puzzle, providing the first quantitative attempt to examine patterns of member
participation in oversight. While I do find some evidence that oversight hearings are
less well-attended than non-oversight hearings, the rate of participation in oversight
hearings is far too high to support the stylized fact of widely neglected oversight.
Having established that oversight does occur, chapter 3 turns to the issue of ex-
plaining why. I argue that regular oversight activity need not imply that members of
Congress actively work to provide public goods for the chamber. The theory empha-
sizes that members do have selective incentives to engage in oversight, but that those
benefits come from outside Congress, not from within it. Members are driven to per-
form oversight to advance the policy goals of key interest groups and obtain electoral
resources from those groups. What appears to be congressional oversight is intended
to serve the constituency demands of individual members, resulting in oversight of a
given agency being dominated by the members representing high-demanding interest
groups affected by that agency’s policies.
Chapters 4 and 5 set out to test two implications from the theory. First, I examine
the process by which agencies come to be salient targets of oversight for committees,
a subject that is central to the study of oversight but has received little empirical
attention due to limitations in previously available data. I argue that we should
think of committee and subcommittee chairs as key agenda setters in the oversight
process who can use their scheduling power to emphasize agencies that are high
constituency priorities, finding evidence that committee agendas change in response
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to the demands of the committee or subcommittee chair.
Chapter 5 sets out to test what I take to be the key implication of the theory - that
oversight of a given agency will be attended to primarily by members representing
politically active organized interests affected by that agency. I test this proposition
using a case study of oversight of the agencies tasked with regulating the financial
services sector, finding that oversight of these agencies is attended to by a highly
unrepresentative subset of the chamber. The members who attend to oversight of
these agencies are extreme relative to both the chamber and the Committee on Fi-
nancial Services, suggesting that the patterns are not simply a function of sorting onto
committees. This result highlights the importance of focusing not only on whether
oversight is being performed, but who is performing that oversight.
I conclude the dissertation with a discussion of the implications of this theory and
findings for the ability of Congress to collectively protect itself against bureaucratic
drift, and evaluate various proposals for reforming oversight. Most attempts to reform
oversight are aimed at encouraging more oversight by making it easy for members to
do. The findings here suggest that the problem may not be finding members willing to
perform oversight, but incentivizing oversight for members whose interests are better




Oversight is critical if Congress is to maintain control over policymaking, but mem-
bers face weak incentives to perform oversight. This has led decades of scholars to
presume that oversight is neglected, with foundational literatures in political science
aiming primarily to explain how congressional control of agencies can be maintained
in the absence of oversight. Members, it is argued, simply are not capable of keeping
track of all of the things that the bureaucracy does, and even if they could they lack
the expertise necessary to design policies better than those to whom policymaking
authority was delegated. As the bureaucracy has grown in size, power, and techni-
cal complexity, the mismatch in the bureaucracy’s ability to make policies and the
chamber’s ability to oversee them has only become more pronounced, creating even
greater incentives to abandon efforts to monitor agencies. It would seem, then, that
the chamber is ill-equipped to protect its legislative prerogative.
In response to increasingly pessimistic evaluations of Congress’ performance, the
congressional dominance literature emerged and emphasized the powers that Congress
has to affect the utility of bureaucrats, as well as institutions designed to make threats
to use those powers more credible. Agreeing that oversight was unlikely to turn up a
great deal of valuable information, scholars in this literature emphasized institutional
solutions intended to act as substitutes for oversight. These ex ante controls make
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the prospects for political control of the bureaucracy substantially rosier as they
can reduce the costs of monitoring and restrict the levels of flexibility enjoyed by
bureaucrats. According to this literature, Congress’ power comes from the ability to
set levels of discretion within a law and to select administrative procedures, the rules
the bureaucracy must follow as they attempt to alter the status quo(McCubbins and
Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, 1987, 1989; Bawn, 1995; Epstein and
O’Halloran, 1999). These mechanisms, combined with a series of findings that federal
agencies do appear responsive to the demands of Congress, suggest that Congress
has been able to use its institutional powers to affect the decisions of bureaucrats
and that a lack of formal oversight may not be equivalent to Congress abdicating its
oversight responsibilities (Arnold, 1979; Weingast and Moran, 1983; Shipan, 2004).
While the past three decades have largely focused on explaining how both political
control and a lack of oversight can coexist in equilibrium, what evidence we do have
suggests that oversight is not neglected to the degree that many believe. It may be
true that the levels of oversight we observe are insufficient to the task of controlling
the bureaucracy, but they are not trivial. Aberbach (1990) shows that each Congress
features hundreds of non-legislative hearings and that the number of non-legislative
hearings rose along with the size and scope of bureaucratic power in the 1960’s and
1970’s. Expanding his analysis through the 1990’s, Aberbach (2002) finds that while
the increase in oversight hearings slowed through the 1980’s and 1990’s, the decline in
Congress’ legislative productivity led to oversight hearings increasing as a proportion
of all hearings. The same patterns hold in McGrath (2013), who uses a key word
search to identify oversight hearings in the post World War 2 period and finds that
modern congresses conduct between 400 and 800 days of oversight hearings in each
two-year session.
The accumulated evidence suggests that the stylized facts are incomplete, if not
totally wrong. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a further examination of
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the stylized fact of neglected oversight, examining different ways in which oversight
might be neglected and evaluating whether those find any support in the data. The
disconnect between perception and reality may be less about whether oversight occurs,
but how, where, and on what topics it is performed. It may be the case that previous
studies have overstated the amount of oversight, that oversight is concentrated in
a small number of committees, or that generally poorly attended and avoided by
members. In the following section I introduce a method to identify oversight hearings
using a set of supervised learning algorithms and the texts of over 12,000 hearings. I
use this data to subject each of the above explanations to data, finding them wanting.
Oversight is regularly performed across all committees, involves a range of agencies,
and, most importantly, is not ignored by members.
2.1 Data
To begin to investigate how oversight is conducted I turn to the Government
Printing Office’s (GPO) Federal Digital System (FDSYS). The FDSYS is a collection
of government data that includes the texts of congressional bills, the Congressional
Record, the Code of Federal Regulations, and various Presidential documents. For
my purposes the most important part of FDSYS is the collection of congressional
hearings, which contains the full text transcripts of a large and growing number of
hearings. Included in these texts are pieces of information such as which members
were present, which non-congressional actors were called to testify, which members
made floor speeches, and generally what was said by each actor in the hearing.
Hearings are what most people think of when they consider oversight and the over-
sight conducted through congressional hearings is the source of most of our stylized
facts regarding how (and how much) oversight is conducted. Empirical investigations
have also relied primarily on hearings to measure oversight, generally focusing only on
broad information about hearing topics, or going into detail on a very small number
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of hearings in a specific policy area (Aberbach, 1990; Hall and Miler, 2008; Minta,
2011). However, by exploiting new technologies and advances in computing power,
we can extract useful and extremely detailed information from hearing texts without
having to take the time to hand code all of the information provided in the tran-
scripts. This data offers a means by which we can learn about how members choose
to engage in oversight and the conduct of oversight more broadly without incurring
the substantial costs associated with hand-processing a large number of documents.
While hearings are the most frequently analyzed form of oversight, they are only
one way in which members of Congress oversee the bureaucracy. In the absence of
hearings (or as a substitute for hearings), members can contact bureaucrats directly
to ask questions or offer recommendations. In addition, a member wanting to learn
about the activities of a specific agency or department can enlist the Congressional
Research Service to summarize information about a program in a way that makes
program specifics easier for members to comprehend.
The fact that hearings are not exclusive among forms of oversight may be a prob-
lem both for the claims of this chapter (that oversight is not neglected), and the claims
going forward (that oversight is driven by constituency demands). Given my data,
I cannot say whether or not alternative (and potentially more effective and there-
fore normatively desirable) forms of oversight are neglected in a meaningful sense.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that contact between congressional staff and agencies is
common (Arnold, 1979; Aberbach, 1990), and casual conversation with congressional
staffers suggests much the same, but there is simply no publicly available data that
allows researchers the ability to observe things like direct contact by members to
agencies. All I can show here is that one particularly prominent form of oversight is
seen to regularly.
Whether ignoring different forms of oversight is a problem for evaluating the effect
of constituency demands depends on the degree to which one believes that those
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pressures would effect one kind of oversight and not another. For example, perhaps
members who contact agencies directly differ in some way from the kinds of members
who take part in oversight hearings. Lacking data on alternative forms of oversight,
I cannot test whether this is the case, but there is little reason to suspect that the
patterns uncovered through hearings should differ substantially from alternative forms
of oversight. The members who want to signal a high degree of intensity through
hearings should be the same members who want to signal intensity through alternative
avenues. Patterns observed in the chapters to come should be discounted insofar as
the reader believes that these non-observable forms of oversight would produce a more
representative group of overseers.
Alternative measures could potentially derived from reports by government re-
search agencies like the Congressional Research Service or Government Accountabil-
ity Office, but in both cases reports cannot be linked back to an individual member.
Instead, reports are addressed to a committee or committee leadership, making these
a potentially good measure of committee oversight activity but unusable for individ-
uals. Contacts from members to bureaucrats about specific programs would be an
appealing way to measure oversight activity, but these records can be obtained only
through a Freedom of Information Act request that bureaucrats as well as members
of Congress would prefer to keep from being revealed publicly1.
The GPO collection of hearings goes back as far as 1993 and is regularly updated
to include new hearings, usually within a few months of being held. FDSYS contains
12,665 House hearings and 7,605 Senate hearings, though I focus here on the House.
For the House, the data contains hearings held by 25 different standing (Agriculture,
Transportation, etc...) and ad hoc (Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming) committees. In
1As an example, the cost to obtain a set of applications for the TIGER grant program along
with copies of member emails in support of the applications was estimated by a Department of
Transportation to be $65,000.
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addition to the texts of the hearings, each hearing carries an accompanying page
of .xml code containing the name of the hearing, the committee or subcommittee
holding the hearing, the date, and the identities of all witnesses called in to testify at
the hearing.
2.1.1 Coding
In order to investigate how oversight is conducted it is important to be able to
identify oversight hearings, which is more difficult than it may initially seem. Most
hearings are either focused on design of new legislation or review of existing programs,
though there are hearings that do not fit neatly into either. Some are both legislative
and oversight. Many involve reviews of general problems involving agencies, but are
looking to agencies more for suggestion than scrutiny. The purpose of this section is
to make the case for the operationalization of oversight used in the dissertation and
to make the case for why using supervised learning methods can aid researchers in
the process of classification.
A basic condition for a definition of oversight is that it involves actions by members
of Congress, acting collectively or on their own, to review (either pre-emptively or
as a reaction to) agency decisions. This could involve review of the implementation
or effectiveness of an existing program or it could be examining what an agency has
announced that they will do in the future. The breadth of this definition allows for
Agriculture Committee hearings on proposed groundwater regulations to count as
oversight, just the same as Financial Services Committee hearings on the observed
effects of rules promulgated under Dodd-Frank. It could be investigating an agency’s
performance in a natural disaster or financial crisis. It could also be an attempt to
learn not about the effect of decisions, but simply what decisions were made that led
to some outcome. In any of these cases, members of Congress are interacting with
agencies in response to a decision or a set of decisions made by the agency.
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Ogul (1976) employs a definition that is in some ways broader than standard
definitions, but adds a condition that the oversight actions of Congress involve “an
impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic behavior.” While Ogul’s definition allows
for a range of behaviors that are not normally considered oversight, the requirement
of an observable effect is troubling. Whether any oversight activities have an effect
on Congress is an open question and, in terms of member’s motives, it is not clear
that they must see an effect for oversight to be important. For the purposes of this
dissertation, Aberbach’s (1990) definition of oversight as “congressional review of the
actions of federal departments, agencies, and commissions and of the programs and
policies they administer,” is sufficient. It requires no assumed effect and captures
a range of activities from hearings to formal investigations to direct contact with
agencies.
In terms of measuring oversight, there are three primary strategies used in the
literature. The first, implemented by Aberbach (1990) is to simply hand code each
hearing as being primarily devoted to oversight or not. This generally involves reading
a summary of the hearing and making a judgment call about the probability that the
observed hearing is intended to perform an oversight function. The drawback to
this method is that it is extremely time consuming, requiring substantial outlays
of time and research assistants to apply codes and verify that the codes are being
applied uniformly. Even if one goes to the trouble of organizing such an effort, it
is still the case that many of the cases are judgment calls and subject to reasonable
disagreement. One strategy for getting around hand coding large number of hearings
is to choose a specific case that the researcher knows to be oversight and analyze only
those hearings (Hall and Miler, 2008). The advantage of this approach is that it allows
one to go more in depth on the hearings chosen, measuring features of the specific
hearing transcripts. The drawback is that conclusions drawn involve a specific case
either bound by time, subject, or both, making it difficult to apply the conclusions
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to other policy areas.
Finally, McGrath (2013) uses a key-word search, looking through hearing sum-
maries for specific words like “oversight” or “review.” This allows for efficient clas-
sification and for analysis of a wide variety of topics, but requires an extremely high
level of confidence that the words chosen actually capture the underlying concept. Mc-
Grath (2013) uses the following set of words to identify oversight hearings: “oversight,
review, report, budget request, control, impact, information, investigation, request,
explanation, president, administration, contract, consultation, or examination.” If
any of the words in the list shows up in the hearing summary, the hearing is coded
as oversight. This strategy falls into a category of text analysis described by Grim-
mer and Stewart (2013) as “dictionary” methods, which entail pre-selecting a group
of words to search for, with various strategies for weighting and setting thresholds
for how codes will be assigned. The strategy employed by McGrath is a dictionary
method at its most basic, where one appearance of any of the words means that the
hearing is classified as oversight.
The problem with this approach is that if any of the words are regularly used
outside of an oversight context, hearings that are not actually oversight will receive
the wrong code. While many of these words may appear innocuous, each is commonly
used in settings that we would not traditionally think of as oversight. Even the word
“oversight” is commonly used in Congress to discuss oversight of businesses or markets
without reference to any specific agency2. Simply put, there is no easy way to employ
this kind of simple dictionary method while also adequately protecting against type
1 errors.
My strategy attempts to build on strategies that take advantage of text informa-
tion and can be applied to a wide set of contexts, but to do so without assuming to
2As an example, see the 2009 hearing by the Committee on Energy and Commerce ti-
tled “Oversight of Cemeteries and Other Funeral Services: Who’s in Charge?,” available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg74092/html/CHRG-111hhrg74092.htm
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know the text patterns that signify oversight. To code the hearings I use a set of
supervised learning algorithms designed to take a set of texts and and use patterns in
the text to uncover an implicit coding scheme that can be applied to other documents.
These methods require the researcher to hand-code a subset of documents to train
the classifier, which then runs on the remaining documents. For example, if it turns
out that words like “oversight” or “review” are common in hearings being classified as
oversight while “markup” or “legislation” are not, the algorithms will look for those
words in the unclassified documents and assign a code based on their frequency. This
differs from dictionary methods in that it does use key words to determine codes,
but those key words are determined by the algorithm and not the coder. This allows
for key words to be in the document, but for the document to be coded either way
based on what else appears in the text. If the word oversight comes up in a hearing
that is otherwise about the funeral industry or oversight practiced at the state level,
these methods allow for the prominence of other words to override the information
provided by the appearance of that word.
Automated coding methods are less efficient than simple dictionary methods, but
are substantially more efficient than hand-coding, making the results easier to repli-
cate. The GPO’s data currently contains approximately 20,000 hearings, with new
and old hearings being added daily. Some hearings make their purpose immediately
apparent, specifying in the title that they are legislative or in response to a specific
rule or regulation. Others require a substantial amount of work, with no guarantee
that the primary purpose of the hearing is easily categorized even after digging deep
into the proceedings. These cases require a non-trivial amount of time and it would be
difficult to implement a program of standardization across coders. Given the difficult
coding decisions involved in classifying the hearings, coding the complete collection
of hearings along with new hearings as they are added would be a substantial un-
dertaking. The supervised learning algorithms, however, require only a fraction of
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the hearings to be coded in order to train the classifiers, making the entire process
feasible without resorting to a team of undergraduate coders.
The second improvement coming from use of supervised learning methods is one
of transparency. As alluded to above, the data are full of close cases, requiring what
are ultimately judgment calls by the coder. As such, replication of the coding should
be actively encouraged and made as easy as possible for future scholars. While the
classification algorithms are statistically complex and computationally intensive, the
work required by humans is fairly minimal. In order to reproduce the codes exactly
the individual would have to hand code only a small percentage of the total corpus,
making it feasible for interested parties to replicate and potentially critique the process
and results.
To carry out the automated coding I use a set of five algorithms3 implemented in
the RTextTools package in R (Jurka et al., 2012). The procedure begins by splitting
each document into words and applying a set of data cleaning procedures to remove
common “stop words” such as “and,” “it,” or “the,” remove punctuation, and reduce
words to their stems so that words with the same roots are not classified differently
based on tense. Having broken down each document into a collection of terms, the
next step is to create a term-document matrix, a quantitative representation of a
linguistic corpus in which each row in the matrix corresponds to a document (in this
case a hearing), and each column being a word that appears in the corpus. Unless
otherwise specified, the term-document matrix contains every word that shows up in
any document in the corpus. As is standard, I applied a filter to remove any words
that appeared in less than one percent of the documents, which substantially reduces
computational costs while removing only highly uncommon words. Finally, to control
for document length I applied a weighting scheme to change the matrix entries from
word counts to the word count divided by the total number of words in the document.
3The algorithms: Support vector machine, GLMNET, Maximum Entropy, Boosting, and Random
Forests
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Each algorithm uses a different weighting and assignment scheme, but in general
the algorithms identify the words that best distinguish between the the two types of
documents and use those words to assign each hearing a code as well as a measure
of uncertainty about that code. I assign hearings a code by averaging the probability
given by each algorithm, putting more weight on the algorithm’s decision when it
reports a higher level of certainty. This means that if two algorithms were to disagree
but one said that the hearing was an oversight hearing with probability .99 and
the other said that the hearing was not an oversight hearing with probability .55 the
hearing will be coded as an oversight hearing as the combination of the two averages to
a prediction of oversight with a probability of .77. Use of multiple algorithms increases
computational costs, but has been shown to improve accuracy in other applications
and makes the coding less tied to document-specific idiosyncrasies interacting with
the specifics of any one of the machine learning algorithms (Jurka et al., 2013).
To begin the analysis of broad patterns in oversight, I reduced the sample to
a subset of standing committees, each of which has primary oversight jurisdiction
over one or more agencies4. Some important committees such as Ways & Means
and Appropriations are responsible for legislation that affects budgets and programs
implemented by the bureaucracy, but are excluded because they are not expected to
conduct the same kind of programmatic oversight. Doing so reduced the total sample
of hearings being coded to 4901.
To train the classifier, 950 hearings were coded into one of two categories: oversight
or non-oversight. I coded hearings as oversight if their primary purpose was to review
the operation of an existing program, the performance of an agency in a specific
situation, the implementation of a law, or a proposed action by the bureaucracy
(such as a proposed rule that had not yet been finalized). In some cases, the aims
4Committees included: Agriculture, Armed Services, Financial Services, Education and the
Workplace, Energy and Commerce, Natural Resources, Public Works and Transportation, and Small
Business.
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of these oversight hearings was a specific action or proposed action. An example
of this would be the Department of Agriculture’s hearing “Hearing to Review the
U.S. Forest Service’s Proposed Groundwater Directive,” in which a forthcoming rule
handed down by the Forest Service pertaining to the management of groundwater
and “non-navigable streams” in national parks was reviewed for its potential effect on
livestock and crops 5. In other cases, like the Financial Service Committee’s hearing
titled “Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,” there was no
specific objective, but a range of topics relevant to the agency’s operations6. Most,
but not all, oversight hearings also featured an agency representative as one of the
witnesses, though there are several examples of committees holding hearings to learn
about the effectiveness of a program or regulation and inviting only witnesses from
the private sector or interest groups. Non-oversight hearings were primarily legislative
in nature, including attempts to solicit ideas for future legislation from bureaucrats
and industry representatives, discuss pending legislation, or mark up legislation that
is in the process of being amended and brought to the floor. Here, I classify hearings
as being only oversight or non-oversight, putting aside the variation in other types of
hearings7.
Evaluating the accuracy of the automated coding requires comparing the results to
some benchmark, which is usually the set of codes assigned manually. Such testing is
important for establishing that some underlying dimension exists that is differentiable
by the text in the document, as well as being able to fully evaluate whether the gains in
efficiency from supervised learning outweigh any losses in accuracy. If the supervised
learning codes are effectively no better than random then it may be the case that
the text is not a useful guide for coding the documents. 800 of the 950 hand-coded
documents were randomly selected to be the training set with the remaining 150
5http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg89799/html/CHRG-113hhrg89799.htm
6http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg75091/html/CHRG-112hhrg75091.htm
7Adding additional categories for hearing such as budgetary hearings or legislative hearings caused
a decrease in the accuracy of the classifiers.
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being assigned codes using the information gained from the training set8. Next, I
split the documents so that the text for a hearing consisted of the title of the hearing
and the first 200 lines of the text document, which greatly improved computational
efficiency when compared to using the entire document. An average hearing contained
3,927 lines of text while the longest had 121568 lines. Using the entirety of the texts
substantially increases the time required for coding and render some of the more
computationally intensive algorithms effectively unusable. One potential solution
would be to use a higher standard of word frequency for keeping words in the term-
document matrix, but given the lack of substantive difference I report the results with
only the first 200 lines here.
The text-prediction methods produced codes that were somewhat disappointing,
agreeing with my own codes only 74% of the time. This is well below optimal and in
the future I plan to address this shortcoming by augmenting the text with additional
hearing covariates which will hopefully produce better prediction rates. As a robust-
ness check, I carried out all of the analyses below with the subset of hearings for
which the combined confidence of the algorithms was above .8, finding no substantive
differences in the results.
Of the 950 hearings that were coded manually I counted 366, or 38.5 percent,
as being primarily concerned with oversight of a department or agency. Among
the hearings that were coded using the supervised learning method, 35.3 percent
were classified as oversight. That difference is neither statistically or substantively
important. Combining the two, I estimate that approximately 35.7 percent of the
Congressional hearing agenda is dedicated to oversight of federal agencies. There is
no standard for what constitutes “enough” oversight, but from this data we can see
8In previous drafts of this chapter I reported only using the first 200 lines of each hearing because
doing so was both more computationally efficient and had higher rates of agreement with my own
codes. While the computational efficiency argument holds true, the finding that the first 200 lines
were more accurate turned out to be a function of a data processing error on my part where I did
not weight the term document matrix by the length of the document. Once this was addressed, it
made no substantive difference whether the entire document or the first 200 words were used.
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that oversight makes up over 1/3 of congressional hearing activity, hardly a trivial
amount and certainly not enough to support the contention that Congress ignores its
oversight responsibilities.
2.2 Patterns in Oversight
I turn now to describing some basic patterns found in the data. My primary aim
here is not to provide explanations for patterns in oversight, but to show some ways
in which oversight differs across time and across units, which could potentially be
explained as part of a general theory of oversight. Figure 1 shows trends in oversight
over time. Year is on the x-axis and goes from 1997 to 2013, while the y-axis is
the number of oversight hearings in a given year divided by the total number of
hearings held that year. While hearings begin in 1993, the number of committees
reporting hearings at that stage is too small to have faith in the results produced
by aggregating across committees. Starting in 1997, most of the committees in the
sample have complete enough records on the GPO site that I feel confident in their
inclusion. The two graphs show the same time-series, but use background shading to
graphically highlight different patterns that have been proposed as influences on the
oversight agenda.
Clear from the figures is that oversight peaks early in the time series in the later
years of the Clinton administration, reaches a nadir in the middle of the Bush admin-
istration, and rises again during Barack Obama’s first term. The figure on the left
shades years where Republicans control the House in red and years where Democrats
control the House in blue. The intuition behind this relationship is that Republicans
may have an ideological predisposition toward oversight as it involves auditing ongo-
ing government programs. Instead of overseeing existing programs, one might expect
Democrats to focus on the legislative process to create new programs or use hearings
to highlight issues in markets that government should address. If, however, such a
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relationship exists it cannot be distinguished statistically and is not substantively
important. Oversight averaged 37.2 percent of the hearing agenda during Republican
controlled Congresses and 34.7 percent of the agenda during Democratic Houses (p
= .327).













































The graph on the right includes shading for years in which there was divided
control of government. It has been argued that, through their controls over com-
mittee chairs who themselves have control over committee’s hearing agendas, parties
will attempt to manipulate oversight for partisan gain (Mayhew, 1991; Kriner and
Schwartz, 2008; Parker and Dull, 2009). This would involve low levels of oversight
when co-partisan presidents inhabit the White House and higher levels when the op-
position party is in power. Looking at the second graph, the highest oversight years
are years in which Republicans control the House, but are also years in which control
of the House and Presidency are divided, meaning that any small differences are as
likely to be a function of divided government as a general tendency for Republicans
to carry out oversight. Indeed, it does seem to be the case that more oversight takes
place under divided government (39.6%) than unified government(33.3%), and the
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difference is statistically significant (p=.049) despite the small sample.
The sample here is ultimately too small to distinguish between the various mech-
anisms that would explain the differences in oversight observed under divided gov-
ernment and the role of divided government in oversight, though that is a topic that
has received too little attention in the literature. It may also simply be the case that
the later years of the Clinton administration are an outlier and that the results are
all driven by one context-specific event. Either way, while some have argued that the
majority in the House ramps up its investigatory activities under divided government,
the results here seem to demonstrate that any such differences are likely to be small,
raising the question of how and when parties matter in the conduct of oversight. It is
worth noting, however, that oversight activity does vary substantially over time and
never becomes less than twenty-six percent of the Congressional agenda. Oversight
may not occur enough to satisfy some, but is a non-trivial part of the Congressional
agenda regardless of which party controls Congress and the Executive Branch.































































































The literature in political science has largely ceded the point that oversight is
ignored and outside observers seem to agree. From the previous figure, however, we
see that this is not true. One potential reason for this disconnect between perception
and reality could come down to variance in the degree to which different committees
are active in oversight. The question of variance could inform perception as it could
be that some committees routinely fail to perform oversight or some agencies are
largely ignored.
Figure 2.2 shows the percent of hearings coded as oversight in each of the eight
committees, demonstrating substantial variance across committees in the sample, but
also that each committee dedicated a non-trivial percentage of their hearing activity
to oversight. The committees dedicating the largest portion of their hearings to
oversight are Natural Resources which focuses primarily on the Department of the
Interior and the Environmental Protection Agency, Agriculture which focuses largely
on the Department of Agriculture, the Commodity Futures Trading Corporation,
and the EPA, and the Armed Services Committee which covers the Department of
Defense. For each of those committees, oversight made up between 40 and 45 percent
of hearing activity Oversight was least prominent on the agendas of the Public Works
and Education and the Workforce committees, with each dedicating approximately
20-25% of their hearings to oversight. Oversight may be insufficient and unevenly
distributed across oversight units, but it does not appear that committees abdicate
their oversight responsibilities entirely.
Having established that oversight does occur and is prevalent across units, I turn
to briefly to a question of procedure, which is whether oversight is primarily carried
out in full committees or subcommittees. Subcommittees are a key point of power in
the classic “iron triangle” view of oversight and can serve a role in hiding oversight
from public view. According to this view, subcommittees occupy one corner of the
triangle and allow for small, unrepresentative subsets of the chamber to negotiate
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with bureaucrats and interest groups to bias policy outcomes in favor of the members
on the subcommittee. Oversight being carried out largely at the subcommittee level
would provide some support for the iron triangle view and could contribute to the
impression that oversight is being ignored. Of course, the same finding would be
consistent with a world in which oversight is delegated to narrow subcommittees that
have expertise in a small subset of policies or a world where party members specialize
and gather information at the behest of leadership.
It does seem to be the case that most oversight is carried out in subcommittees,
with 73.8 percent of oversight hearings being held by congressional subcommittees.
Oversight hearings are not unique, however, as 70.8 percent of non-oversight hearings
in the sample were held in subcommittee. Figure 2.3 shows the differences in venues
across the same eight committees, revealing some stark differences in how different
committees go about conducting oversight. While the Committee on Energy and
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Commerce conducts nearly all (97.2%) of its oversight in subcommittees, the Com-
mittee on Small Business holds only 45% of its oversight hearings in subcommittee.
2.3 Individual Members and Oversight
Next, I address the main question of the chapter, which is whether it it actually
the case that members avoid oversight. Scholars have suggested that oversight carries
little in the way of political benefits, leading members to neglect this activity. Yet,
the broad patterns demonstrated here and elsewhere (Aberbach, 1990) suggest that
oversight is a regular part of the congressional agenda. Of course, holding oversight
hearings need not mean that they are having their intended effect. Committee chairs
may choose to hold oversight hearings, but that says nothing about the degree to
which members are active in this domain. If it is actually the case that members
are unwilling to perform Congress’ oversight function, we should expect to see that
members are less inclined to attend and participate in hearings where oversight is
the primary purpose. Finding that it is not neglected would provide evidence that
members are engaging in a behavior that theory suggests they should not, creating a
research puzzle. That is exactly what I find here.
Testing whether oversight is neglected requires a measure of member activity
that captures the degree to which members are taking costly actions. I focus here
on participation, which occurs in a variety of ways. As the most basic level, the
member makes a choice about whether or not to attend the hearing. Given how
valuable time is to members (Hall, 1996), such a decision is not trivial. Even if the
member attends and says nothing they have the opportunity to shape the information
revealed in the hearing and they signal to agency observers that they have some
level of interest in the topic. If the member wants to invest more heavily in the
hearing’s proceedings they may bring staff members with them to assist and record
the proceedings which carries many of the same opportunity costs as the member’s
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time. If members want to increase their level of activity they can choose to make an
opening statement at a hearing communicating their thoughts on the subject of the
hearing. Members also have the opportunity to directly engage with hearing witnesses
by asking questions and conversing during the hearing. These communications are
sometimes trivial and aimed more at scoring political points, but members often come
prepared with highly technical questions and engage with bureaucrats on topics that
are surprisingly complex in light of the belief that members are generalists while
bureaucrats are highly specialized.
I focus on attendance instead of more nuanced measures of participation primarily
because my strategy depends on a comparison between oversight and non-oversight
hearings. Because I use this comparison, it needs to be the case that the types of par-
ticipation measured are actually comparable across those two groups. It is certainly
the case that attendance is comparable, as it is necessary for any further oversight
activity to take place. It is unclear, however, that levels of more active varieties
of participation are comparable across the two types of hearings. Participation in
oversight hearings generally involves a floor speech and/or active participation in the
five minutes each member receives for question and answer session with witnesses.
Legislative hearings are less constrained, often taking place over multiple days and
offering several opportunities for speeches, debate on amendments, and additional
floor time ceded to members by co-partisans. Instead of assuming that levels of
participation should look similar in oversight and non-oversight hearings, I simply
compare the number of members attending oversight hearings to the number attend-
ing non-oversight hearings to get a first look at whether oversight is neglected when
compared to different costly congressional activities.
To measure the differences in participation, I collected information on the members
present at each hearing9. Each hearing text begins with a list of members present,
9This information on which members are present also provides crucial information for a later
chapter in which I use the list of members present to identify which members actively participated
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providing their last names but little else to identify them. If the last name was unique
to one member, identifying the member present was simple. When more than one
member has the same last name, I used patterns in the format of the hearing text to
narrow down the identity of members. The first pattern is that the members present
section is split into members who are on the committee holding the hearing and
those who are not. In the case where the member sits on the committee holding the
hearing I cross-referenced the member’s last name with Stewart and Woon’s database
of committee membership going back to the 103rd Congress (Stewart III and Woon,
2011). If the attending member was the only member of the committee with that last
name, they were identified as that member. This means that if I observe a member
with the last name “Lucas” attending a hearing in the House Committee on Financial
Services and receive no indication that the member was coming from outside of the
committee, I assume it was Frank D. Lucas of Oklahoma, who has served on the
committee since entering the House, as opposed to Ken Lucas of Kentucky who has
never served on Financial Services. If the member’s last name could not be uniquely
identified on the committee, I turned to the text of the hearing and manually identified
which member was present. In some cases individuals with the same last name are
also identified by their state, meaning that one might see a member identified as
“Lucas of Kentucky,” making identification easy. When that marker was not available
I identified the member by looking for clues in the text such as a reference to the
member’s state, district, or party in the text itself. In the 4,902 hearings, I was able
to identify all but a handful of members, most of which were either George or Gary
Miller who could not be distinguished by name, party, or state, and could sometimes
not be identified using contextual clues.
Looking at attendance, it does appear that oversight hearings are slightly less
appealing to members than non-oversight hearings. Figure 2.4 shows the number of
at hearings.
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members attending hearings, with the second and third sets of columns splitting hear-
ings into hearings held in full committees or subcommittees. The clearest takeaway
from the figure is that oversight hearings are less well-attended than non-oversight
hearings regardless of the venue, but that the difference is substantively quite small.
The average oversight hearing in the sample was attended by 13.04 members while
the average non-oversight hearing is attended by 15.04, a difference that is statisti-
cally significant. This difference is not simply a function of the fact that oversight is
so frequently done in subcommittees, as the differences between oversight and non-
oversight full committee hearings are statistically significant, as is the difference in
subcommittee hearings.
What would qualify as neglect of oversight is unclear and requires one to adopt
their own standard of what “enough” oversight would be. If it is the case that both
oversight and legislative hearings are well-attended, but oversight hearings are less well
attended, it does not follow that oversight is being neglected. It appears that members
are less inclined to attend oversight hearings, but in each case those differences are
small. The difference is most pronounced in full committee hearings where non-
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oversight hearings are attended by an average of 3.5 additional members, but it is still
the case that full committee oversight hearings have an average attendance of 18.95,
which seems like a significant number given fears of abdication. The difference is
again significant in hearings held in subcommittee, the difference is a relatively minor
1.4 members. This evidence suggests that electoral incentives may make oversight
less appealing than alternative uses of time, but it is clear that a non-trivial number
of members make the choice to participate in this form of oversight.
























































































As Figure 2.5 shows, the fact that oversight hearings are less well attended belies
the fact that oversight hearings are quite well attended in some committees, even
when compared to non-oversight hearings. The only committee in which the dif-
ference in attendance is statistically significant is the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, but even that difference is substantively small. It seems as though
differences in hearing attendance are driven more by which committee is holding the
hearing than the subject of that hearing. Most importantly, Figure 2.5 demonstrates
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that not only is oversight on the agenda across a host of committees, but those hear-
ings are approximately as well attended as non-oversight hearings, making it even
harder to sustain the contention that oversight is neglected in a meaningful way.
2.4 Discussion
The purpose of this chapter was not to answer questions about oversight, but
to demonstrate that there are important questions about oversight needing to be
addressed. The lack of oversight in Congress is widely decried and has come to be
accepted as a stylized fact. These observations may not be empirically sound, but they
have a strong theoretical foundation behind them. The fact remains that oversight
helps provide a public good for the chamber, requires high costs in terms of time and
staff effort, and is unlikely to be electorally useful when it comes time for the member
to make their case to the average voter. In short, oversight is classic “work horse”
behavior.
Using a new source of data in the GPO collection of hearing texts, I subjected the
claim that oversight is neglected to a handful of tests, attempting to address various
reasons that there is a perception of insufficient oversight. The results suggest that
a critical re-evaluation of the literature on oversight (and by extension the literature
on delegation) is needed. Oversight is an important part of congressional activity.
It comprises between 25 and 40 percent of hearing activity in a given year, occurs
in all committees but some a large degree more than others, involves a wide variety
of agencies even within committees, and is no more poorly attended than any other
type of congressional hearing.
Why we observe these patterns is less clear. Has Congress simply found a way
to incentivize oversight? Over the past 50 years the chamber has instituted a set
of reforms aimed at clarifying committee jurisdiction and offering supplements to
oversight in the form of research agencies, which may have given Congress the boost
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needed to ensure active oversight. In the coming chapters I advance and test a theory
of oversight that suggests that active oversight not a function of members acting in
defense of legislative intent, but to advance the distributive needs of the organized
interests that support members’ campaigns. If we accept that Congress defending
its legislative prerogative is normatively desirable, understanding what oversight is
intended to accomplish is crucial for evaluating the degree to which the chamber’s
needs are being met.
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CHAPTER III
Signaling Agencies, Signaling Interests: A Theory
of Oversight
Chapter 1 outlined the problem faced by Congress in maintaining ongoing control
over agencies. The chamber needs oversight in some form to protect its institutional
authority, but lacks the capacity to perform regular and vigilant oversight. The past
30 years of scholarship have argued that Congress has designed a set of procedures
that allows the chamber to maintain control while engaging in oversight selectively,
challenging agency policies when they stray from what the chamber wants. This
story, however, glosses over a basic collective action problem in which the incentives
of individual members to not align with the best interests of the chamber. Congress
wants to protect its authority, but members face strong incentives to free ride and
shirk their oversight duties. The previous chapter shows that, nonetheless, members
often choose not to free ride. Oversight is a regular part of congressional activity,
suggesting that Congress has managed to solve the collective action problem.
Appearances to the contrary, this chapter argues that it has not. Individual mem-
bers do engage in oversight to signal discontent or agreement with an agency, but do
it because of incentives coming from outside the chamber, not within it. I argue here
that oversight is a response to electoral incentives provided by interest groups. The
longstanding stories for congressional attention to agencies are either distributive,
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with members acting so as to ensure a steady flow of pork-barrel benefits back to
their district (Ferejohn, 1974; Arnold, 1979), or based on detecting and remedying
disagreement between the agency and member (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). I
argue here that neither is sufficient to explain observed patterns in oversight. Mem-
bers do perform oversight on behalf of organized interests, but the demands of those
groups need not be distributive, nor must the group necessarily have a geographic
presence in the constituency. Likewise, members use oversight not to uncover bureau-
cratic malfeasance, but to signal their willingness to follow through with sanctions on
behalf of the affected interests.
The interest-driven signaling theory outlined here is based on simple assumptions
that are well-supported empirically and produces a set of implications that both line
up better with existing findings in the literature and provide clear predictions about
legislator, agency, and interest group behavior. This theory has implications for the
likely effectiveness of oversight in defending the chamber’s institutional authority
and calls into question long-held assumptions about what fixes need to be made to
incentivize rigorous oversight.
3.1 Why a new theory of oversight? Police Patrols Revisited
Oversight is generally thought of as a means by which Congress gathers informa-
tion that can be used to remedy violations of legislative intent. Congress passes a
law delegating authority to an agency, but is unaware of how that policy is being
implemented. If agencies know that Congress is not paying attention, they are free to
implement policies that differ from what Congress originally intended, work at sub-
optimal levels of efficiency, or both. If Congress can effectively monitor the agency,
such problems are less pressing. Agencies, knowing that they are being watched by
the chamber from which they derive authority to act, will curb their behavior so as
to ensure that they evade punishment. If Congress can be confident that agencies are
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responsive, they can delegate with a higher degree of confidence, potentially allowing
the chamber to work at higher levels of efficiency.
While Congress requires oversight, it depends on individual members to carry
out the task. There is no central organization forcing members to perform over-
sight. Oversight happens when individual members, sometimes acting collectively
in committees and sometimes completely on their own, make a choice to engage in
this behavior. Why they would choose to do this, however, is unclear. The ultimate
goal of oversight in the principal-agent framework is to provide a public good. The
chamber/committee/individual wants to know whether the agency has advanced the
goals of the chamber and to, if necessary, bring the actions of the agency back in line
with congressional preferences. All members benefit when this task is performed, but
they cannot be denied the benefits of oversight if they choose not to contribute to the
public good.
In a little cited pair of papers, Ferejohn and Shipan (1989) and Cameron and
Rosendorff (1993) provide a logic for oversight that differs substantially from the
conventional wisdom. For these authors, oversight need be a means of detection,
but a means of communicating information to agencies about about the overseeing
committee’s level of resoluteness. Agencies in this story are unaware of whether
threats from the oversight committee are credible. When oversight is sufficiently
costly the agency knows that they are dealing with the type of committee willing
to pay the costs associated with altering statutory authority, leading the agency to
be responsive to the committee. The general idea that oversight signals information
to agencies is core to the explanation provided below, but these theories cannot
resolve the problem of collective action. To borrow from Shepsle (1992), committees
are a “they” not an “it.” Committees do not perform oversight; individuals within
committees perform oversight and those individuals have the same incentives to pass
the costs of oversight onto their colleagues. Why would a member choose to signal
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on behalf of the committee when they can let their colleagues do it?
Solutions to collective action problems generally entail a selective benefit that in-
dividuals can only enjoy if they have contributed to producing the public good. While
neither Ferejohn (1974) nor Arnold (1979) address oversight directly, their works pro-
vide a logic based on selective benefits by which members could be incentivized to
perform oversight. Bureaucrats are charged with making a number of choices about
the allocation of distributive goods that potentially afford members valuable oppor-
tunities for credit-claiming. Ferejohn and Arnold focus on the decisions faced by
bureaucrats, but one can derive a logic for oversight based on the idea that want
to ensure favorable distributions of federal funds. If active performance of oversight
makes the provision of those distributive goods more likely, members may choose not
to free-ride. The problem faced by a strictly distributive theory, however, is that
this behavior is widespread, occurring regularly in committees that do not traffic in
pork-barrel goods. Oversight is not occurring only on public works or military in-
stallations, but complex regulatory policies and broad public goods programs (Minta,
2011). Oversight of distributive programs is likely to be popular among members,
but a theory of oversight should be able to contend with the reality that a great deal
of oversight is not explicitly distributive.
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) provide the most widely accepted explanation
for oversight in the principal-agent framework where opportunities to claim credit
provide the selective benefits needed for members to engage in oversight. In that the-
ory, members of Congress face a problem wherein they want to ensure that policies
implemented by bureaucrats are in line with their own preferences, but also want to
avoid paying the costs associated with oversight. The solution is to empower con-
stituents to provide information about instances in which an agency takes actions
that are inconsistent with the preferences of those constituents, and in turn the mem-
bers representing those constituents. Members, then, perform oversight to correct
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failures by agencies in exchange for electoral benefits. This ensures that members do
not waste their time looking for problems where none exist, helping them efficiently
allocate their legislative resources. Grateful for the help, those constituents then take
costly actions to return that member to office.
The notion of fire-alarms and police-patrols has an appealing parsimony and pro-
vides a theory of oversight that specifies a selective benefit, is pitched at the individual
level, and can explain non-distributive oversight. This is an important contribution
that is particularly impressive given that their piece is aimed more at development
of a concept than providing a full-blown theory. They identify the importance of
electoral rewards and recognize the need for oversight to focus on the incentives of
individuals instead of collective actors, and the paper is rightly considered a classic
in the field. At the level of development provided by the paper, however, there are
a number of questions to be answered about the theory, the degree to which their
predictions are borne out empirically, and whether the electoral mechanism in their
story is well-specified enough to generate clear and testable implications about the
behavior of individual members and interest groups. The paper has been extremely
important, but very little attempt to evaluate, critique, and expand upon the concept
as it was originally proposed.
McCubbins and Schwartz suggest that a system of fire-alarms is a win-win for
members and constituents alike. Members get to claim credit with a minimum of effort
and constituents have their problems with agencies dealt with. At the theoretical
level, however, it is unclear that this arrangement would efficiently serve the needs
of constituents and members. At its core, fire-alarms rely on “credit” as a selective
benefit and credit can be assigned only if members take costly actions to fix problems
for a group. This requires that members perform an action on behalf of the constituent
that is both costly and visible, allowing the constituent to discern the connection
between their legislator’s actions and a favored outcome. Absent a problem with the
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actions of an agency, the member has no means by which to gain electorally. Members
can claim that their actions were responsible for a lack of problems with an agency,
but without tangible actions and fixed problems such claims are likely to ring hollow.
Fixing bureaucratic problems as they occur, however, is costly for both members
and interest groups. Members, of course, must allocate resources to intervening with
the bureaucracy, all of which carry an opportunity cost. The member may hold and/or
attend hearings, introduce bills to alter statutory authority, attempt to delay rules
and regulations, or any number of additional acts to help the aggrieved constituent,
but these require foregoing other electorally beneficial activities. The problem from
a credit claiming perspective is that absent a fire-alarm, members have no credible
claim to have served the constituent. It is easy for the member to argue that they
warded off problems for the group, but absent some visible action by the member
such claims are impossible to evaluate. If members could be spared the cost of ex
post remedies and still receive credit for producing favored outcomes, they would
clearly be made better off.
Likewise, fire-alarm oversight imposes costs on the individuals or groups who pull
the alarms and is likely to be of questionable effectiveness in solving major problems
for constituents. In terms of costs, ex post response requires effort by those sounding
the fire-alarms as well as those responding to them. Aggrieved constituents and groups
often assist with paying that cost, helping members with much of the research and
expertise needed to produce the preferred outcome (Hall and Miler, 2008). Perhaps
the larger problem for constituents, however, is that while Congress does have tools to
respond to acts of bureaucracy, agencies are at a clear advantage by virtue of moving
first and the difficulties faced by Congress in actually using the tools at their disposal
(Potter, 2014). McCubbins and Schwartz do not contend with the transaction costs
associated with solving the problems that caused fire-alarms to be sounded in the
first place, but those costs are real and severely undermine the ability of the chamber
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to act ex post and provide the kind of service that fire-alarms rely upon. A system of
fire-alarms may work well for low-level problems like missing social security checks or
small grants at the discretion of agencies, but larger problems that ultimately require
changes to statute or budgets are extremely difficult to deal with once policy has been
put into place by an agency.
Further complicating a theory based on fire-alarms and credit-claiming is that,
at various times, Congress has taken actions to help institutionalize bureaucratic re-
sponsiveness with the intention of warding off problems before they appear. In their
highly influential series of articles, McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1987, 1989) argue
that control is achieved not through oversight and ex post remedies, but through a
set of administrative procedures like notice-and-comment or reporting requirements
that create incentives for forward-looking agencies to hew to congressional prefer-
ences. Because bureaucrats fear the consequences made possible by administrative
procedures, they simply choose not to run afoul of legislative preferences in the first
place.
Members of Congress, however, need violations to create opportunities to claim
credit. Fiorina (1977, 1989) argues that members can have a great deal of electoral
success by responding to constituent problems with the bureaucracy, leading Congress
to embrace a large and unruly bureaucracy that brings in a constant stream of prob-
lems to be solved. A similar logic comes out of the fire-alarms and police-patrols dis-
cussion, wherein members should actually want to see violations of legislative intent
as it provides them a low cost way to serve constituents. Administrative procedures
that incentivize adherence to congressional preferences ex ante can stem the flow of
problems to be solved and, by extension, credit claiming opportunities. These pro-
cedures are, of course, the product of collective choice, meaning that the outcomes
they produce should align with the members who created them. Why members would
choose to incentivize ex ante compliance when they benefit primarily from ex post
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corrections is unclear.
Perhaps most importantly, the fire-alarm theory is not well supported empirically.
The one clear implication of the fire-alarms and police-patrols framework is that over-
sight should be overwhelmingly fire-alarm in nature. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984,
p. 171) go out of their way to say that they “do not contend that the most effective
oversight policy is likely to contain no police-patrol features,” but do state that “fire-
alarm techniques are likely to predominate.” Despite the protests of McCubbins and
Schwartz, it is difficult to understand why police-patrol oversight should ever happen.
Members have no incentives to go out searching for problems because they are better
served waiting for the problems to arrive at their door.
While few studies have attempted to quantify the degree to which Congress en-
gages in one kind of oversight versus another, the evidence we do have suggests not
only that police-patrol oversight is not neglected, but that it is substantially more
common than fire-alarm oversight. Aberbach (1990, 2002) finds that the number of
hearings devoted to police-patrol oversight rivals the amount used for fire-alarm pur-
poses, suggesting that McCubbins and Schwartz understate congressional preferences
for this type of oversight. Further, Aberbach argues that the rate of police-patrol over-
sight has increased over time, which seems puzzling in light of an increasingly complex
and difficult-to-monitor administrative state. More recently, Balla and Deering (2013)
find that police-patrol oversight makes up approximately 75 to 90 percent of oversight
hearings in both the House and Senate. While both of these studies consider only
hearings which are an important but limited form of oversight, they are sufficient to
reject the idea that oversight is dominated by fire-alarms and suggest that a great
deal of the oversight we observe cannot be adequately explained by existing theory.
Finally, it is nott clear that McCubbins and Schwartz have an individual level
story that generates predictions about who will perform oversight and on what top-
ics. Their story is certainly about the incentives faced by members, but there is no
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attempt to differentiate between different groups and members. In a situation where
a group makes the choice to sound a fire-alarm, to whom will they direct that alarm?
Which members will and will not respond to a fire-alarm sounded by a given group?
The fire-alarm framework is useful in identifying the role of constituents and credit
claiming in the oversight process, but does not produce clear testable answers to these
fundamental questions that bear on the likely effectiveness of this form of oversight.
3.2 Signaling Agencies, Signaling Donors
In this section I present a simple theory of why we see members perform oversight
that hinges on the ability of oversight to signal information to both bureaucrats
and interest groups., The discussion of bureaucratic behavior is heavily indebted to
the classic works of Ferejohn (1974) and Arnold (1979), who argue that members
want distributive goods for credit-claiming purposes and that those goods are more
likely to provided if the member poses a threat to the agency. My argument is more
general. I argue here that members are not driven by a desire for pork-barrel projects
necessarily, but want to further policy goals of interest groups from whom they derive
support and that sending costly signals helps accomplish that. Member goals will
occasionally be distributive in nature, but need not be.
Likewise, the signaling aspect of the theory builds on a small and under-cited set
of works that have looked at oversight as a means to ward off violations as opposed
to detecting violations of congressional preferences ex post (Ferejohn and Shipan,
1989; Cameron and Rosendorff, 1993). According to signaling theories of oversight,
committees perform oversight to let agencies know that the committee is resolute
and will impose sanctions for unfavorable decisions. These theories, however, lack
the ability to explain away the collective action problem outlined earlier because they
treat committees as unitary actors. I argue that, like the committees in Cameron and
Rosendorff, individual members use oversight to signal the direction and intensity of
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their preferences, which in turn provides information about their willingness to impose
costs on or provide benefits to the agency. Interest groups want allied representatives
to signal a willingness to pay costs to affect the utility of the agency, and will provide
selective incentives in the form of electoral support (contributions, endorsements,
canvassing, etc) to members who perform oversight. Combining the two literatures
creates a different set of predictions than can be derived from either on their own,
resolving both the collective action problem inherent in defending legislative intent
and explaining observed patterns in oversight behavior.
3.2.1 Assumption 1: Members of Congress Want Electoral Resources
Members want to be re-elected and they do so by forming a coalition of support
that helps them win in both the primary and general election. This coalition includes
voters who provide votes and interest groups who provide some votes but primarily
affect re-election prospects by providing members with goods that can be turned
into votes (Denzau and Munger, 1986). Likewise, groups who are unhappy with the
performance of their incumbent can allocate these resources to challengers. Members
gather the support of groups by taking actions that help advance the policy goals of
those groups.
There are two primary classes of goods that interest groups can offer to members.
The first is electoral support, broadly defined. Interest groups can make endorse-
ments, canvass for a candidate or on the opposite end of the spectrum, do those
same things for a potential primary or general election challenger. These mechanisms
largely depend on the group in question having a presence within the member’s dis-
trict. Endorsements and canvassing are primarily aimed at providing information that
voters will use in their decision, but the effectiveness of that attempted persuasion
will depend on the degree to which voters believe the group to share their interests.
A group lacking a district presence is likely to be unable to cultivate the kind of
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trust necessary to effectively marshal these resources. Outside groups are welcome
to endorse or try to recruit a candidate, but absent some connection to voters in the
district it will be difficult for groups outside of the member’s geographic constituency
to credibly threaten to use these mechanisms.
The second option for groups is financial support, which is available to groups both
inside the constituency and out. Interest groups are free to form political action com-
mittees -and most do- and donate to candidates directly, promoting the electoral well-
being of supportive members. Increasingly, groups need not operate directly through
their political action committees, choosing instead to exploit campaign finance loop-
holes to give to organizations who engage primarily in electioneering activities like
issue advertising or ads vague enough so as to not directly endorse one candidate,
but give the distinct impression that one candidate is better than the other. These
means of providing electoral support are substantially less geographically restricted
by geography and are largely available to any group wanting to provide them.
3.2.2 Assumption 2: Interest groups reward members for their policy
support
Interest groups tend to have a small set of policies in which they are particularly
active. The AARP feels strongly about retirement benefits for the elderly but has no
particular position on telecommunications regulations. Likewise, AT&T cares a great
deal about telecommunications regulations but not at all about retirement benefits
for the elderly. Groups care about policy outputs in those areas and use the tools
at their disposal to ensure that their policy goals are met. They cannot themselves
make policy, so they are at the mercy of the agencies and members of Congress who
shape policy outcomes. The consequence of this assumption is that interest groups
want to ensure that members of Congress who help advance shared goals are returned
to the chamber while those who fail to deliver benefits or actively oppose the group’s
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policy objectives are removed from office
That interest groups offer support to members who are better able to produce
policy outcomes is well established in the legislative domain. Interest groups target
members of the majority party (Grier and Munger, 1993; Rudolph, 1999) members on
committees of interest (Grier and Munger, 1986; Munger, 1989), and generally mem-
bers who are more productive than their colleagues (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant,
1999; Hall and Miler, 2008). Simply put, interest groups not only want to support
ideologically aligned members, but those who are better at producing outcomes de-
sired by the group. The corollary of this is that members should want to ensure that
they are the types of members who can provide the kinds of benefits that incline
interest groups toward supporting them.
Most of the work on legislator effectiveness focuses on legislation, but the same
logic should hold for the bureaucracy. Since the new deal, the fates of interest groups
have increasingly become intertwined with the decisions of bureaucrats at the federal
level, to the point where a member could do very well to represent interests within
their district by focusing primarily on the actions of agencies as opposed to introducing
and seeing through new legislation. The federal bureaucracy has a range of powers,
making most key decisions regarding the distribution of federal funds, the standards
applied in regulatory policy, and to a lesser extent important redistributive policies.
One estimate of the size of the bureaucracy puts the percent of U.S. “laws” made
agencies at approximately 90 percent (Warren, 2004), with those decisions coming
from dozens of highly specialized agencies. Across a host of sectors, the well-being of
interest groups depends on favorable choices being made by the bureaucrats in charge
of determining the allocation of benefits and costs. Members who can influence the
decisions of bureaucrats and ensure that a group’s policy preferences are advanced
are extremely valuable.
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3.2.3 Assumption 3: Bureaucrats respond to pressure from members of
Congress
Bureaucrats generally enter public service with some set of beliefs and preferences
about what policy should look like in a given area and want the autonomy and budget
necessary to achieve those policy goals. Bureaucrats take into account the pursuit
of their own policy goals but need to curb that pursuit if they fear that actors who
control budgets, autonomy, and statutory authority will be displeased.
Inducements of bureaucratic behavior by Congress can be split into two groups
based on whether they require collective action or whether they can be employed by
individuals. The literature on congressional control of the bureaucracy has focused
decidedly on the former, with threats to budget and statutory authority being most
commonly cited. If Congress feels that an agency has stepped out of line, it can
respond by clarifying and narrowing the range of actions that an agency might take,
or it can alter the levels of resources available to carry out agency priorities(Huber and
Shipan, 2002). Likewise, if Congress is happy with the tasks an agency has performed
it can respond by delegating new authority or increasing budgets and programs to be
implemented by the agency. By either offering benefits or threatening sanctions, it is
thought that forward-thinking bureaucrats will take these inducements into account
(Weingast and Moran, 1983).
The statutory responses available to Congress are collective in the sense that
they require coordinated action within committees, within and across chambers of
Congress, and across the Legislative and Executive branches. If any number of actors
in the process from bill proposal to presidential signature oppose changes to statute,
those changes will not take place. While likely to be the most effective way to change
agency behavior upon passage, the fact that proposals for changes in statute must
make it through the legislative process also makes their use less credible. Absent a
completely unified government with little majority party defection, or a rare instance
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of widespread consensus about what should be done with an agency, these kinds of
policy changes are unlikely to take effect. So while bureaucrats may face harsh penal-
ties if such a statutory change does pass, the probability of such an event happening
will be so remote under most circumstances that bureaucrats have little reason to
respond to these collective measures.
The second class of congressional actions, which I will refer to as “individual
inducements,” are those that require little to no coordination across members or
branches to implement. While these lack the power of statutory means, their relative
ease of use may make them an even more effective inducement. Perhaps the most
credible threat members can make is not to reduce statutory authority, but to reduce
the effective amount of autonomy with which agencies act by attempting to delay
or increase scrutiny of an agency’s decisions. Members can hold or attend hearings,
order investigations or time-consuming analyses of proposed policies, hold hearings
on separate topics, or any number of other nuisances that draw attention to what an
agency is doing. Secrecy is one way in which the bureaucracy maintains a bargaining
advantage over the Legislative Branch, with agencies embracing and even acting to
enhance their informational advantages over members (Weber, 1947). Agencies ac-
tively pursue autonomy from Congressional overseers both for ease of carrying out
their missions, and to increase their own ability to make important policy decisions
(Carpenter, 2001). If members can individually threaten to make life more difficult
for agencies, those individuals may be able to induce responsiveness. Oversight may
accomplish this goal directly, as holding public hearings and issuing subpoenas to key
bureaucrats is something agencies would presumably rather avoid, but the important
point is simply that, even in the absence of a credible threat to invoke the chamber’s
ex post means of punishment, individual members can credibly threaten to act in
ways that affect agencies.
These non-statutory threats are important because they offer a mechanism for
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influence that does not require collective choice. If a member wants to change statute
they must navigate a byzantine legislative process beset by veto points. If the mem-
ber wants to take actions that publicize issues that the agency would rather remain
secret, they are largely unconstrained in their ability to do so. Thus, while Cameron
and Rosendorff (1993) focus on the signal oversight provides about a committee’s
willingness to pursue statutory changes, the more relevant signal may pertain to the
member’s willingness to pursue these kinds of individual inducements.
Discussions of congressional influence often invoke the language of sanctions with
agencies looking to catch and punish bureaucratic malfeasance. However, members’
influence on the bureaucracy need not be limited entirely to punishment. Members
can also choose to take actions that increase bureaucratic autonomy, going to bat for
the agency when it is threatened or attempting to focus congressional attention on
topics that are more favorable to agencies and allow them to build constituencies.
Members can hold favorable hearings, rally undecided colleagues, or simply publicly
advocate for the agency’s position. If they have agenda power (in the case of commit-
tee chairs), they can keep certain topics or programs off of the congressional agenda
entirely. Arnold (1979) argues that these considerations are an important part of
bureaucratic decision-making, with agencies providing services with the understand-
ing that key members of Congress will defend their autonomy if need be. Again, an
important part of this kind of response to agency policies is that they can be effective
even in the absence of a collective decision. It is up to individual members to dole
out these benefits, meaning that agencies should find it worth their while to consider
the preferences of members who can offer positive or negative inducements.
Bureaucrats, however, are unlikely to be equally responsive to each member. Sim-
ply put, some members are better at producing policy outcomes than others. Having
a privileged institutional position is one prominent pathway to influence. In his classic
work on public works grants, Ferejohn (1974) shows that the Army Corps of Engi-
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neers was more likely to locate projects in the district of members on the relevant
committee or Appropriations subcommittee. Likewise, Arnold (1979) shows that the
allocation of military bases, water and sewer projects, and model cities grants are
skewed toward institutionally powerful members. It is also the case that members of
the majority party (Levitt and Snyder, 1997) and members sharing a partisan affilia-
tion with the President (Bertelli and Grose, 2009; Berry, Burden and Howell, 2010).
The logic behind this influence is that threats from some members are more credible
than others. If the threat is statutory in nature, agencies need to be sure that the
individuals with the largest influence on the legislative agenda (committees and the
majority party) are happy with what the agency is doing.
The literature on legislator effectiveness has focused on members occupying key
positions because the legislative agenda is so closely guarded, but the fact that most
threats to the bureaucracy are not statutory in nature allows a wider range of members
the opportunity to impose costs on or provide benefits to agencies. Legislators from
the minority party or outside the committee of jurisdiction have little hope to advance
legislative proposals, but do have the opportunity to be active in oversight. While
committee and subcommittee chairs make the ultimate decisions about the topics of
hearings, they are generally quite open to the suggestions of members, meaning that
members on the committee of jurisdiction generally have as much opportunity as they
like to impose non-legislative costs (Aberbach, 1990).
Members not on the primary committee of jurisdiction are not locked out, however.
First, individuals can (and frequently do) attend hearings of committees on which
they do not sit. Second, committee jurisdictions are malleable and it requires only a
tenuous claim to some authority in order for a second committee to claim “turf” and
oversee an agency not normally thought to be in their purview (Talbert, Jones and
Baumgartner, 1995; King, 1997). Further, members have alternative means (direct
contact, reports on agency activities, etc) by which they can perform oversight where
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committee offers no constraint. Any member is able to make themselves an active
threat to agencies, and I argue below that oversight can provide a signal of the degree
to which the member is a threat.
3.3 Why Oversee?
With the assumptions in place we can begin to work through the logic of the
theory. When a member chooses to oversee an agency it provides information to
the agency about the degree to which the member is satisfied with the agency’s
performance and the degree to which the member has the motivation and ability
to take actions that could harm the agency or provide critical support when the
agency finds its autonomy threatened. Because oversight signals a willingness to
impose costs and can induce bureaucratic responsiveness, interest groups will want
to be represented by members who have engaged who have sent a credible signal
to agencies relevant to the group’s interests. Agencies are responsive insofar as they
believe the signal sent by the member to be credible. Politically active interest groups
lend credibility to the member’s message because their presence lets the agency know
that the member’s electoral fate is tied to following through to ensure that the group’s
policy demands are met.
Working backward through the logic of the theory, we begin with members who
face a decision about whether to impose costs on an agency. This will occur only
when the member disagrees with the policy set by the agency, though it may also be
the case that when agencies enact favorable policies the member will promise some
source of future benefits a la Arnold (1979)1. Imposing costs can take the form of
intensive hearings, delaying rules and regulations, attempting to mount a statutory
challenge to an agency, or any number of activities that inconvenience the agency
and may result in policy change. The decision faced by the member at this stage is
1For purposes of exposition, I will focus on costs imposed by members.
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whether to impose costs on the agency, and that decision will depend on the degree
to which their electoral fate depends on taking these actions. If support from key
interest groups depend on the member’s willingness to intervene with a given agency,
that member will attempt to intervene. If the electoral rewards are insufficient, the
member will simply choose to use their resources on another activity.
Interest groups would want to reward members for performing oversight for at least
two reasons. First, members paying costs at this stage is a further signal of policy
agreement and commitment that is valuable to the group going forward. Perhaps
a member cannot force the group’s preferred policy to be enacted now, but ex post
attempts to sanction provide information to the agency about the consequences of
their decisions going forward. Second, there is a chance that imposing costs at this
stage may lead to policy change. If a regulation or distributive decision is delayed
it may be reconsidered entirely, which could lead to the policy changing toward one
more favored by the group. If a member acts to impose the kinds of costs that lead
to policy change, they are a valuable asset to the interest group, leading the group to
want to ensure that member’s re-election. Groups and members would prefer to avoid
this, however, as it requires both to pay additional costs. In addition, challenges to
agency policy may end in no change to the status quo. If a member intervenes too
late in the rulemaking process, they may be unable to do anything about disfavored
policies that have already been set into motion. If that is the case, the member and
the interest group have incurred additional costs for no additional policy gain.
The decision faced by the agency is where to set policy, which is based on a
calculation including its own preferences, the preferences of the member, and the
likelihood that the member would act to impose costs on the agency in the next
stage. When their own policy preferences are aligned with the member there is no
conflict as the member has no reason to follow through with sanctions. The tension
comes when the agency wants to create a policy that is not sufficiently reflective of
56
the member’s preferences. The agency can choose its own preferred policy location
or shift policy content so as to make the member indifferent about following through
with sanctions. The agency has to make a decision about whether the degree to
which they value policy is outweighed by any costs imposed by the member in the
future. Agency beliefs about costs will depend not only on the size of the costs, but
the probability that they will actually be imposed. If the agency believes that they
are dealing with a type that will not follow through, the probability that any costs
are realized is low and the agency is free to implement their preferred policy. When
the agency believes that threats from the member are credible, their decisions may
be impacted by the member’s preferences.
The fundamental argument here is that performing oversight is a mechanism by
which members can signal that type. Oversight provides a signal along at least two di-
mensions. The first is that oversight signals the direction of the member’s preferences.
Hearings offer members the opportunity to communicate with bureaucrats directly to
inform them of the degree to which their actions are suitable. Political scientists and
journalists have focused on situations in which Congress uses these opportunities to
scold bureaucrats, though the opposite regularly happens. One of Aberbach’s (1990)
most striking findings is that oversight is overwhelmingly performed by the biggest
advocates of programs and tends to be positive in tone, serving to “boost” programs
more than signal displeasure. Thus, members use the oversight process to communi-
cate all kinds of preferences to agencies, giving the agency information about what
congressional support and opposition would look like.
As discussed above, preferences on their own are not enough for influence. If the
agency knows that members are unhappy but that they do not care enough to expend
the effort to impose costs ex post, it will be difficult for those members to influence the
agency. The second and perhaps more important signal carried by oversight is one of
intensity. Members may have preferences and expertise in an area, but to impose costs
57
they must also have a willingness to pay the costs associated with sending a signal and
taking additional actions ex post. Allocating time and staff to overseeing an agency
is exactly that kind of costly signal. The very fact that the member participates in
an oversight hearing, orders a CRS report, or contacts an agency directly suggests
that the member is invested in what the agency is doing. If members are unwilling to
use any of the means at their disposal to communicate their preferences to agencies,
the agency can be fairly confident that the member poses relatively little threat going
forward. By performing oversight members can signal to agencies that they are the
type whose preferences need to be taken into account by the agency going forward.
That brings us back to the decision faced by the member. The member faces
a choice about whether they want to pay the cost to signal an agency, which they
will choose to do only if they receive sufficient electoral benefits to outweigh the
costs. The problem of selective incentives is solved by the presence of interest groups
willing to use their resources to provide electoral support sufficient to compensate
for the costs incurred by the member. As long as the electoral goods provided by
interest groups are large enough to compensate for the costs of oversight, members
will oversee. The more that interest groups are willing to offer for oversight, the more
emphasis members will be willing to place on it relative to other activities.
From assumption 2 and the subsequent discussion, we know that interest groups
care about a subset of policies made by a subset of agencies, and want to be repre-
sented by members who are able to ensure favorable outcomes from those agencies.
This means that groups want representatives to whom the agency is responsive. Thus,
they want members who both agree with their positions and who pose a credible threat
to the agency. These members, by their very presence in the legislature, provide an
active threat to agencies. This will lead agencies to account for the preferences of that
member, which are presumably aligned with the groups in the member’s constituency.
Not only do interest groups want to be represented by this kind of member, they want
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relevant agencies to know that they are represented by this kind of member. If the
agency knows the group’s preferences and understands that they are represented by
a member who will act to affect the agency’s utility, the agency will be more respon-
sive to the policy demands of the group in the first place, saving the need for costly
fire-alarms in the final stage. In turn, groups will be willing to supplement the costs
members incur by sending these signals.
Oversight serves a second valuable purpose for the group in that it provides infor-
mation about the member’s level of commitment. Groups generally have a problem
wherein they find themselves uncertain about whether members simply espouse sup-
port the group’s preferred policies or will follow through and actively support the
group’s interests. If groups cannot confirm the member’s commitment they have in-
centives to be more circumspect in their giving, ultimately harming the member. By
performing oversight, the member has an opportunity to take positions and demon-
strate intensity to the group. Members who take a public position on an issue are,
to some degree, linked to that stance. This makes the member unlikely to go back
on their support as opponents could point out the member’s inconsistency in future
elections. Oversight signals intensity to groups in exactly the same way it does agen-
cies. If a member is willing to use some of their scarce time to perform oversight
advocating the group’s positions, that group has information about the likelihood
that the member is sufficiently committed to the group’s well-being.
Groups will be willing to support members for overseeing relevant agencies, and
the question for the member ultimately comes down to whether the group will be
able to marshal the kinds of electoral goods needed to affect re-election. If so, the
member chooses to perform oversight of the agency. If not, the member does the
opposite. If members choose not to actively oversee and establish themselves as the
type of member whose preferences should be noted before the agency makes decisions,
the interest group merely withholds support or actively recruits a challenger who will
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advocate on their behalf.
One important implication of this signaling framework is that it provides an ex-
planation for oversight even in cases where the agency is doing what the member’s
constituency wants. What Aberbach (1990) terms “booster” oversight is confusing
if the purpose of oversight is to detect and remedy violations of legislative intent.
If the purpose of oversight is to signal the direction and intensity of the member’s
preferences, such behavior becomes less puzzling, as the signal should serve to inform
future agency behavior. Members may not worry about what the agency is doing in
the present, but they may still wish to provide signals about the likely consequences
of future behavior. The fact that a member chooses to hold or attend a hearing and
say nothing but positive things about the agency’s performance should help to com-
municate that the member wants policy to remain similar going forward, and that
they care enough about those future policies that they are willing to forego alternative
uses of their time and energy in the present. This behavior also provides a signal to
the interest group of member commitment, as the group gets to observe the member
taking actions that should help ensure that the group’s preferences are acknowledged
forward.
An important question to ask in any kind of signaling interaction is whether the
signal is informative. If the agency sees that the member performs oversight, they
want to know if that implies that the member will follow through at the final fire-alarm
stage or if the signal was simply bluster. If the agency knows that the member is
bluffing, they will not be responsive to the member and policy demands of the interest
group, which in turn means that members will not be able to benefit electorally.
Thus, a signaling story of oversight must contend with the potential for members
to dissemble. One way in which this can be solved is through the cost of signals.
If members invest more at the oversight stage, holding multiple hearings or being
active over a long stretch of time, the agency can be more certain that the member
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is committed and will follow through. The presence of interest groups, however, also
provides information to the agency about the structure of the incentives faced by
the member. If, at the final stage, the group’s electoral support for the member is
conditioned on the member’s decision about whether or not to impose sanctions, the
agency has additional information about whether it is in the member’s best interest
to doggedly pursue sanctions.
Because interest group support is visible to both the agency and the member,
interest groups can cause a separation of behavior in different types of members.
Having visible interest group support can induce truthful behavior as long as the
agency knows the member’s potential gains from following through and the member
knows that the agency knows. If members know that the agency knows that the
member has no incentive to follow through on threats, the member simply won’t
bother paying the costs to make threats in the first place. When the agency sees a
member engaging in oversight, then, they know that member is unlikely to be trying
to mislead the agency and can be confident that the decisions affecting those members
are likely to have consequences, positive or negative.
One final question that comes up in situations with non-contemporaneous ex-
change is whether the parties will renege. If either party is uncertain about the
safety of the exchange they will choose not to hold up their end. What is to stop a
member from taking a campaign contribution and not following through to advocate
for the needs of the donating group? What is to stop interest groups from happily
accepting a member’s help with an agency but turning around and donating their
money elsewhere? In the case of the interest group, there is no temptation to renege
if they find themselves represented by the right kind of member. Members who have
engaged in this costly signaling in the past carry that reputation into the future, and
that reputation is valuable to the interest group. Interest groups will support the
member for the same reason they would support any other member: they want to see
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them returned to office. Members stick to their promises because the interest group’s
willingness to support or oppose the member is conditional on the type of member
they are dealing with. If the member takes actions suggesting that they are not likely
to be effectively advocates for the group’s policy positions, the group can withhold
support or actively oppose the member in the future.
3.4 Oversight and Congressional Institutions
The empirical portion of the dissertation focuses entirely on one, particularly
notable, form of oversight: hearings. Hearings are what most think of when they
consider congressional oversight, with patterns in hearings being responsible for most
of our stylized facts and empirical evidence on how oversight is conducted. The
individual-level theory presented above assumed that members were free to engage in
oversight of any agency that they wish, an assumption that is appropriate for many
kinds of oversight. Members are unrestricted in their decisions about whether to
contact individuals at an agency, order the CRS or GAO to perform an investigation
of agency practices, or review an agency’s casework, and their decisions about the
use of these tools should resemble the decision outlined in the theory.
Assuming that members have the ability to oversee an agency if they want to is a
less tenable assumption when it comes to committee hearings which, more than other
forms of oversight, are situated within a well-defined set of norms and procedures
in the congressional committee system. At the most basic level, committee hearings
require the use of committee and subcommittee time, both of which are controlled by
agenda-setters within those committees. If a hearing is never scheduled either because
there is simply a dearth of plenary time or if key decision-makers want to ensure that
the topic is not discussed in a public forum, the member lacks the opportunity to
engage in this form of oversight. Thus, even if members want to use hearings as a
means by which to perform oversight, there is no guarantee that they will be able
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to do so. For that reason, discussing the dynamics of and potential biases in the
formation of committee agendas is an important part of explaining and evaluating
the effectiveness of congressional oversight. Which agencies are subjected to public
oversight and which topics are discussed at those hearings may not reflect the interests
of members, but those of agenda-setters given power over plenary time.
The most direct investigation of the committee agenda process comes from Joel
Aberbach, whose classic book on congressional oversight contains a chapter in which
legislators and staff were given surveys about the primary determinants of oversight
activity (Aberbach, 1990). Members and staff were asked to name the factors leading
some agencies or programs to be overseen (scandal, general public concern, policy dis-
agreement with members, etc...), as well as which members priorities were reflected
in the oversight agenda. While members and staffers disagreed on the relative in-
fluence of some actors (staff unsurprisingly believing themselves to be much more
important), both groups agreed that committee and subcommittee chairs were the
primary influence on the oversight agenda. Ranking minority members were thought
to have little influence, as were rank-and-file members. While members believed that
the priorities of the committee chair did tend to line up with the priorities of ranking
members, they were unequivocal that in cases of disagreement, the unit chair was
ultimately responsible for deciding what did and did not make the oversight agenda.
If, as Aberbach argues, committee and subcommittee chairs do exert an outsized
influence on the oversight agenda, how should we expect them to use this power?
Aberbach is not explicit about whether the power exerted by committee chairs is
positive or negative in character, but both (or a mixture of the two) are plausible.
In terms of positive agenda power, the interest-driven perspective would predict that
chairs should use their position to stage oversight on topics for which they would
expect to receive electoral benefits. This does not mean abandoning all topics in
which the chair has little interest, as a number of factors, many of them exogenous to
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member preferences, put topics on the agenda. On the margins, however, we would
expect the agencies and programs chosen for oversight to reflect the interests of the
chair. If we assume that committee chairs have preferences that look similar to those
of their peers, their choice should be to emphasize oversight of agencies for which they
expect to receive an electoral return on their time. Because chairs benefit the same
as any other member by engaging in signaling to agencies, and may be able to derive
additional electoral benefits from groups wanting to see a specific policy put on the
agenda, they will use their agenda-setting power to give themselves opportunities to
engage in this behavior with electorally relevant agencies.
The question, then, becomes under what circumstances they should use committee
time to pursue oversight of interests relevant to their electoral supporters. That
decision is based on what the chair believes to be the likely outcome of allowing
oversight, which involves a consideration of what members are likely to do in the
hearing and what the likely response, either from bureaucrats or other members, is
likely to be. If the chair believes that allowing oversight is likely to provoke a response
that could undermine the provision of favored policies, they should choose to not allow
committee time to be used for oversight.
Oversight has the potential to produce negative outcomes for chairs in at least
two ways, both of which depend on the degree of opposition to the chair’s preferences
among fellow committee members. First, oversight can result in information being
revealed to the chamber that the committee chair would prefer not be revealed. While
a long literature outlines the value of secrecy to bureaucrats, that same secrecy is
important to members who benefit from policies that fly under the radar of most
of their colleagues. Publicizing certain agency practices and policies could lead to
increased scrutiny and creates the potential for support to rally around changing the
status quo. In a sense, oversight offers a venue for conflict expansion, as aggrieved
members can use their time to call attention to their problems with agency policy.
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Insofar as the chair disagrees with those members, allowing oversight may open the
chair to the risk of having their policy preferences undermined.
A second consideration is that a committee containing members who prefer policies
different from the chair can result in a set of mixed signals, ultimately undermining
what the chair set out to accomplish. In the individual-level theory, members en-
gage in oversight because it communicates information that they hope will result in
bureaucrats implementing the member’s preferred policy outcome. Attending and
participating in hearings communicates information about the direction and intensity
of preferences, which bureaucrats work into their own personal calculations about
the relative costs and benefits to a given course of action. Being opposed by fellow
committee members may blunt the effect of the signal sent by the chair to the agency
or the chair may even see the signal that they had intended to send overwhelmed
by the signals sent by their colleagues on the committee. If the chair fears agencies
being subjected to messages that would undermine the chair’s preferred policies, the
chair would face a strong incentive to avoid opening opportunities for the committee
to engage in this activity.
Opposition alone will not induce gatekeeping, however, as some members are
systematically less likely to engage in oversight of a given agency. Recall that the key
individual-level predictor of oversight is not the preferences of the member, but the
level of intensity induced by their re-election constituency. When members are backed
by a constituency with intense interests in agency policies, they will attempt to use
oversight to influence that agency. Absent sufficient intensity from their re-election
constituency, the member will choose to allocate their effort elsewhere, meaning that
they do not pose a credible threat in a way that would cause the chair to bypass
opportunities for oversight. Even given the opportunity to influence agency policies,
the low intensity member will choose not to do so.
Acknowledging the potential for gatekeeping raises the question of the degree to
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which the predictions made about the actions of members are dependent on assump-
tions about the oversight agenda. If members are routinely denied the opportunity for
public oversight of agencies of interest, the patterns uncovered by investigating pat-
terns of individual participation may not provide an accurate picture of how members
make choices about how they allocate time. While this may be a concern, it is un-
clear how the gatekeeping dynamics proposed here would alter the predictions about
individual behavior. Gatekeeping would certainly call into question the ability to
make broad claims about members of Congress not caring about oversight of a given
agency, as that could be the result of member neglect or a strategic chair actively
censoring oversight opportunities, but conditional on the chair making a choice to
conduct oversight, we should still expect to see only the most interested members
invest their time and effort. If chair strategically censor sensitive topics, we would
expect to see lower overall levels of interest, but still a pattern in which highly interest
members are the most likely to participate. Likewise, a chair inclined toward high
profile topics (either for partisan or policy reasons) might result in the benefits of
oversight outweighing the costs for a wider variety of members, but our predictions
about levels of investment in this activity would still be that highly intense members
are the most likely to attend and actively engage in oversight.
3.5 Implications
This section will begin with the implications from the theory that are tested in
subsequent chapters, followed by implications for broad patterns in oversight and the
behavior of members, interest groups, and agencies.
(H1) Effort allocated to oversight of a given agency or program will be
increasing in the program-specific interest of (outside) donors as well as
constituency groups.
This is the implication tested in Chapter 5, and is what I take to be the primary
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behavioral implication of the theory. Members make choices about how to allocate
effort based on whether the benefits outweigh the costs. The benefit to oversight
will increase as the ability of an interest group to affect electoral outcomes increases.
Therefore, the most politically attractive targets of oversight for members will be the
ones of interest to the strongest and most politically active groups. In cases where
the member’s electoral coalition does not contain groups interested in the policies of
a given agency, we should expect members to avoid oversight of that agency.
(H2) The oversight agenda will reflect the interest-group-induced priorities
of the members with control of the committee agenda.
Hypothesis 2 is the focus of Chapter 4. Oversight takes place in committees and
subcommittees whose agendas are determined, at least in part, by unit chairs. As
such, topics that are electorally important to those agenda-setters should be more
likely to be subjects for oversight.
(H3) Committee chairs will be less inclined to focus on agencies for over-
sight when fellow committee members have divergent and intense prefer-
ences.
Hypothesis 3 is also tested in Chapter 4. Recall from the discussion above that
the chair’s decision to exercise gatekeeping power should depend on two factors. One,
there must be a divergence in preferences between the member and fellow committee
members. Two, the members with preferences in opposition to the chair must have
preferences that are sufficiently intense such that they would credibly be a threat to
engage in oversight of the agency in question. In cases of low committee intensity,
chairs have no reason to avoid oversight of an agency. In cases where preferences do
not diverge, chairs have no reason to avoid oversight of an agency. Only cases with
divergence in preferences and intense opposition should result in gatekeeping.
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The following hypotheses also follow from the theory, but go untested in the
dissertation.
(H4) Members will not perform oversight of an agency unless the direction
of their preferences aligns with the organized interests in their electoral
coalition
So far I have ignored the preferences of members, assuming that members act
on behalf of the interest groups who support them. Relaxing that assumption, how-
ever, does little to the conclusions drawn. Imagine a member from an agricultural
district who is in favor of strong regulations on pesticides that are opposed by the
agricultural interests. The choice faced by the member is whether to send a signal
of their preferences to the agency. If the member chooses to advocate against the
group’s preferences, the group will oppose the member, with the level of opposition
increasing in the degree to which the member advocates. The member is, then, in
a no-win situation where if they pressure the bureaucracy to adopt their preferred
policy, they will suffer electorally. As such, if not willing to change their position
entirely, the member should avoid taking actions that actively harm the group and
avoid oversight.
(H5)The effect of organized interests will decrease when the preferences
of organized interests supporting the member are heterogeneous.
Hypothesis 1 states that members should be more active when politically orga-
nized interests reward them for doing so. That effect, however, should be conditioned
on the degree to which preferences in the member’s coalition are unified. If we imagine
that the same district described above also has a politically active group of environ-
mentalists, the member could find it in their interest to pursue their own preferred
policy or to avoid oversight altogether. At that point, the relevant calculation for
the member is whether the difference between the political benefits from the environ-
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mental group minus the political costs from the agricultural group and the costs of
performing oversight is greater than alternative activities. Similar to what Fiorina
(1974) describes in his study of congressional voting, preference heterogeneity makes
oversight a less appealing option as benefits coming from one group are offset by costs
imposed by the other. In a case where there is conflict among groups within their
constituency the member will avoid oversight of the agency entirely.
(H6) When only one side (supporters or opponents) of a policy are orga-
nized, oversight will be performed by a homogenous and unrepresentative
subset of the chamber.
Oversight will be performed by a homogeneous subset of members when only one
side can provide legislators with benefits for oversight. When both sides are politically
active, both sides should be represented in oversight, making it more representative.
In cases where both sides are organized but one fully encompasses the other (all en-
vironmentally minded district s also have organized agriculture but not all organized
agriculture districts have organized environmental interests), oversight will be homo-
geneous.
(H7) Members will perform both police-patrol and fire-alarm oversight.
The signaling logic makes clear why members would find it in their interest to
perform police-patrol oversight. Doing so sends a signal to the agency, who take that
signal into account when making future decisions. Interest groups whose positions
align with the member’s signal will benefit and those groups will provide the member
with electoral compensation in return. Fire-alarm oversight will still take place when
interest groups need it, but police-patrol oversight can help make the need for fire-
alarms less common. Instead of fire-alarms replacing police-patrols as in McCubbins
and Schwartz, the two work in tandem.
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(H8) Oversight need not be negative.
One of Aberbach’s most striking findings is that hearings often seem to serve a
“booster” function, with agency representatives brought in to have praise heaped
upon them. This behavior is consistent with a signaling story, as “booster” hearings
serve exactly the same purpose as those with a more negative tone. Members can use
these hearings to signal the direction and intensity of their preferences, just as they
could in hearings that are critical of agency policies. This behavior is inconsistent
with a fire-alarms story in which members perform oversight to respond to problems,
as responding to problems should always result in a negative tone.
(H9) Oversight will occur primarily on programs with strong interest com-
munities.
This follows from the fact that individuals will not perform oversight absent in-
terest group backing. Programs or policies without an organized set of winners or
losers will simply never be a priority for members.
(H10) Interest groups will reward/punish members electorally for over-
sight of group-relevant agencies.
Interest groups want to be represented in Congress by members who agree with
and have demonstrated a commitment to the group’s goals. Groups will condition
their decision about whether to provide or withhold support in part based on the
member’s decisions regarding oversight. The most enthusiastic support provided by




In this chapter I advanced a theory of oversight in which oversight serves as a
costly signal to agencies, sent by members on behalf of organized interests. This
theory can explain why oversight occurs at all, why it takes the form that it does,
and why some members perform oversight of a given agency and not others. In this
view, oversight is not intended to solve Congress’ problem of political control and
bring policy in line with majority preferences. Instead, oversight serves the policy
needs of interest groups while serving the electoral needs of members.
The subsequent chapters offer empirical tests of the theory’s implications. First,
I take on the question of how the oversight agenda is set. Before members face a
decision about whether they want to perform oversight, they need the opportunity.
Here, I have argued that unit chairs have the opportunity and incentive to shape
committee agendas to further their own goals and that there are conditions under
which chair preferences should be more or less important. Chapter four tests those
expectations and finds results largely consistent with the theory. The final empirical
chapter tests the implication that oversight will be dominated by members whose
electoral fates are most connected to pleasing organized interests, again finding the
pattern predicted in this chapter..
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CHAPTER IV
Setting the Oversight Agenda
The previous chapter introduced a theory of why members perform oversight that
centered on pressure received from the interest groups who make up the member’s
electoral coalition. Members, I argued, use oversight to signal to agencies and interest
groups the direction and intensity of their preferences regarding policies made by the
agency. While the theory made clear predictions regarding when members would
choose to actively oversee agencies, opportunities to perform oversight do not arise
randomly. Oversight, particularly the kind performed in public hearings that is the
empirical focus of this dissertation, is situated on a set of institutional procedures
and norms that determine how scarce committee time will be used. This raises
the question of what drives the oversight agenda and offers the rank and file these
opportunities to engage in signaling through congressional hearings. Here, I use the
interest-driven perspective to investigate a central question about agenda-setting in
congressional oversight that has received very little attention: Why are agencies the
subject of rigorous oversight at some times and largely ignored at others?
Building empirically on the theoretical discussion from the previous chapter, I test
the proposition that committee oversight agendas are affected by the interest-driven
preferences of unit chairs. I apply Aberbach’s (1990) finding that committee and
subcommittee chairs have the largest influence on the oversight agenda to a case study
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of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and its constituent subcommittees
and, using a panel-data design and a measure of constituency interest based on the
degree to which members received contributions from interest groups in sectors that
actively lobby a given agency, I show that committee and subcommittee attention
to an agency a at time t is a function of the constituency demands of committee
and subcommittee chairs. I test alternative explanations about the importance of
divided government and the level of regulatory activity in which agencies are engaged,
finding that each lacks explanatory power. Indeed, a (certainly too) simple model
of agenda-setting based on the interest-group induced constituency pressures faced
by committee and subcommittee chairs outperforms all of the more conventional
explanations outlined above.
In addition to the basic tests, I examine the degree to which individuals who
may plausibly influence the internal dynamics of committees see their preferences
reflected in the oversight priorities of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. The
results show mixed support for the proposition that subcommittee medians are able to
influence the oversight agenda, and no support for the idea that committee oversight
activities are affected by partisan concerns. Next, I test a conditional theory of agenda
setting in which the decisions of committee chairs are conditioned on the degree to
which they face intense opposition within their committee, finding little support for
the hypothesis that unit chairs engage in strategic censoring of the oversight agenda.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the scant empirical work on
when and why agencies choose to oversee agencies. Next, I argue that the most
plausible source of agenda-setting power in committees is the chair, and discuss how
we should think about the chair’s preferences for oversight activity in the interest-
driven framework. The following section outlines the strategy for measuring interest
group pressure faced by committee chairs, basic patterns in the data, and a research
design to investigate the effect of interest group pressure on committee oversight
73
activity.
4.1 When and Where to Oversee?
Empirical work on oversight has demonstrated a high degree of variation in the
amount of oversight performed over time and across units. Previous research demon-
strates convincingly that overall levels of oversight change over time, that certain
committees are more active in oversight than others, and that committees vary in
the amount of oversight they perform over time. Aberbach (1990) shows that the
overall amounts of oversight increased markedly from the 1960’s to the late 1970’s,
going from about 100 oversight days per year in 1961 to approximately 500 days by
1983. McGrath (2013) extends Aberbach’s analysis through 2006, showing a similar
increase in oversight activity in the post-war period. He finds, however, that the
rate of increase has slowed, with the number of hearing days in the House oscillating
between 400 and 800 per year since the marked increases in the 60’s and 70’s.
In addition to variance over time, there is strong evidence that committees and
subcommittees vary substantially in the degree to which they are active in oversight.
In Chapter 2, I showed that committees vary a great deal in the degree to which
they focus on oversight with some like the Committee on Agriculture or Committee
on Natural Resources focusing heavily on oversight with others, such as Education
and the Workforce and Financial Services doing less. McGrath (2013) demonstrates
that not only is there variance across committees, but within committees over time,
finding that ideological divergence between the sitting president and the members of
the committee leads committees to engage in more oversight.
Evidence of temporal variation in the degree to which certain agencies are targets
of oversight lacks a great deal of large-n support, but the collected evidence through
case studies and committee interviews suggests fairly convincingly that such variance
exists. In an early investigation of the dynamics of congressional oversight, Scher
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(1963, p. 530) uses interviews to understand what drives congressional attention to
agencies, concluding that monitoring is “a spasmodic affair marked by years in which
the agencies are virtually ignored followed by spurts of committee interest in agency
activity.” Aberbach’s (1990) adds more structure to Scher’s argument, finding that
staffers report increases in oversight of a given agency in cases of scandal, disagreement
with key committee members, and a number of additional factors, suggesting that
both actions by agencies and features of the congressional committee system produce
changes in the levels of scrutiny received by agencies. Finally, in their examination of
issue expansion and congressional attention, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) show that
oversight of nuclear and tobacco regulatory policies changed markedly in the post-war
period, with each seeing a large increase in the number of committees overseeing the
policies and the amount of attention paid by those committees before an eventual loss
of interest by the chamber. So while few empirical studies have attempted any kind
of systematic investigation of how attention to agencies varies over time, intuition
and the collected case studies suggest that such variation does exist.
The question to be answered here is how we can explain these patterns of variation.
More specifically, we want to know how committees come to prioritize oversight of
some agencies over others, and why those priorities change over time. Existing work
has largely focused on one or two of these dimensions of variation, but never all of
them at the same time. This omission is largely a function of data, as collecting
information on the targets of oversight beyond a broad description of the policy area
addressed is a substantial undertaking. Still, the fact that no large-n research has
attempted to answer this question is surprising, as understanding why committees
choose to oversee one agency and not another and why committees vary in their
oversight of a given agency over time would seem to be central to understanding
what oversight is intended to accomplish and whether oversight is having its intended
effect.
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Although the empirical work on oversight has not taken up this question, the
explanations proposed for why we see increases or decreases in oversight broadly are
useful for thinking through the committee-agency dynamics of interest. One set of
proposed explanations for variation in oversight behavior centers around partisan con-
cerns. In these explanations, committees work at the behest of the majority party in
Congress and use their control of the oversight agenda to perform rigorous investiga-
tions of opposition party presidents while ensuring that topics that may be politically
damaging to co-partisan presidents are avoided. Scher (1963, p. 541) is the first to
suggest partisan concerns as a determinant of oversight, stating that “when the leader-
ship of the majority party in Congress believes it can cause sufficient embarrassment,
with accompanying profit for itself, to a past or current opposition President who is
held responsible for the performance of his agency appointees, committee oversight
tends to be used for this purpose.”1 Mayhew (1991) was the first to test this link,
finding no connection between investigatory activity. Subsequent analyses (including
one by Mayhew himself), however, find that divided government is a strong predictor
of congressional investigations (Kriner and Schwartz, 2008; Parker and Dull, 2009).
These studies are limited only to investigations, a highly public form of oversight
that may overstate the degree to which oversight broadly is influenced by partisan
motives. These studies also fail to explain the fact that a large amount of oversight
and investigatory activity happen under unified as well as divided government, and
do not produce clear predictions about which agencies will be the targets of oversight.
Generally, however, an application of this logic would predict that agencies would be
more rigorously overseen under divided government.
A second explanation for oversight activity is based on policy considerations,
with congressional attention driven by increased agency activity. This explanation is
largely consistent with the principal-agent framework in which committees use over-
1Note that Scher does not actually state that overall levels of oversight should be increased, only
that the nature and tone of oversight performed will change.
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sight to gather information about changes to status quo policies. When a committee
sees that an agency is making major changes to policy, the committee’s need for
information increases and the committee should, in turn, increase its oversight ac-
tivity. Consistent with the hypothesis that oversight is driven by agency activity,
Aberbach (1990, p. 45) shows that the overall level of oversight tracks very closely
with the increase in the number of pages in the federal register, though it should be
noted that the federal register has continued to increase in size while the number of
oversight hearings has leveled off over the past 20 years. Dodd and Schott (1979)
emphasize pressures within Congress and the need to respond to concerns voiced by
interest groups, arguing that oversight should be unlikely in the absence agency out-
puts that conflict with interest group preferences. As regulatory activity increases,
then, we should see a corresponding increase in demands for oversight. Building on
this logic, McGrath (2013) presents a theory of oversight in which Congress’ need to
perform oversight is a function of the level of disagreement between the committee and
agency. Committees, he argues, have more of a need to pay the costs of investigating
agency behavior when those committees are under the control of ideologically diver-
gent presidents, suggesting that the effect of increased regulatory activity on oversight
is conditional on characteristics of the agency and committee. Unfortunately, due to
limitations in the ability to measure agency and committee preferences on any kind
of comparable scale as well as a lack of data on which agencies were the subjects of
oversight hearings, McGrath is unable to address the question of why oversight of a
given agency varies over time, focusing instead on the related but distinct question
of why committees vary in their oversight activity (aggregated across all agencies).
4.2 Committee Chairs and the Oversight Agenda
The theory outlined in Chapter 3 highlights a different process by which oversight
may come to be salient for members. That is, members perform oversight in order
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to signal to agencies their preferences and the intensity with which they hold those
preferences. This story clearly offers predictions about how members will go about
choosing to perform oversight of certain agencies, but requires an additional tweak to
produce predictions about agencies and committees in the time-series. What condi-
tions would give rise to high levels of scrutiny at one time and low levels at another?
In the previous chapter, I suggest that the preferences of committee and sub-
committee unit chairs may help explain this variation. Oversight, as performed by
congressional committees, does not occur in any kind of systematic fashion. While
Congress has occasionally directed committees to engage in “continuous watchful-
ness” of the agencies within their jurisdiction, oversight is not continuous and is the
product of choices of actors within the committee system. More specifically, over-
sight occurs when key agenda-setters choose to allocate committee time to holding
hearings and investigations. The question becomes who these agenda-setters are and
what drives their decisions. Aberbach (1990) does not go so far as to offer a theory of
oversight agenda-setting, but does give insights into who the primary agenda setters
might be. To address the question of which members have the largest impact on the
oversight agenda, Aberbach conducted surveys of top legislative staffers and mem-
bers of Congress. While the two surveys produced disagreement about the influence
of some individuals (members did not believe staff to be as influential as staff believed
themselves to), one unequivocal finding from the surveys is that unit chairs (commit-
tee and subcommittee chairs) are widely thought to have the primary influence over
the selection of agencies and programs for which oversight will be performed. Among
high-ranking staffers, 68% responded that the unit chair is the most influential, while
88% of members of the House and Senate who were not chairs reported the same.
Respondents also differed by chamber, with both staff and members being more likely
to report that chairs in the House were influential than chairs in the Senate.
The findings regarding the influence of chairs are particularly striking in light
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of Aberbach’s findings regarding the effects of other members. Aberbach finds that
it is rare for chairs to schedule oversight hearings in the absence of some kind of
discussion with other members, but that minority ranking members lack a great deal
of influence (between 4 and 7 percent of staffers mentioning ranking members as a
major influence), as do rank and file members. So while committee chairs rarely act
unilaterally, their desire to oversee an agency or program is, in effect, necessary for a
hearing to take place. Likewise, the lack of power ascribed to these other members
suggests that unit chairs have a great deal of leeway to use committee time and
resources to pursue topics of their own interest. Simply put, if there is an individual
with the capability to shape the oversight agenda, the chair is that individual. The
question, then, is to what degree do the chair’s preferences drive the actions of the
committee? First, however, one must consider what the utility function of the chair
looks like.
The interest-driven perspective outlined previously provides one potential expla-
nation for the components of that utility function. Simply put, if members have the
ability to choose topics for oversight, they will choose topics that advance their polit-
ical goals. Chairs, like any other member, face the reality of electoral demands. Like
their colleagues, they need to take actions that help attract support from organized
interests, which provides them with the same incentives for oversight as any other
member. The primary difference is that the chair has the ability to put topics of
interest on the agenda. If a unit chair’s electoral coalition is made up disproportion-
ately of one interest or another, the chair can focus attention on agencies of concern
to those interests and engage in the kind of signaling described in Chapter 32. This
is not to say that they will only allow oversight of the agencies most relevant to their
own interests. Chairs are, of course, agents of their party and have little to lose by
allowing oversight of agencies when preferences of the members on the committee are
2It may also be the case that the chair’s use of committee time provides another mechanism for
signaling
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homogeneous. Chairs can, however, conceivably tilt the scales and choose to empha-
size oversight of a specific agency or program if they so choose. They may be limited
by party demands or events exogenous to the agenda setting process, but if chairs
are the primary decision-makers and act as I have proposed that members do, they
should use their powers to emphasize agencies and programs that are of interest to
important constituency groups.
4.3 Measuring Constituency Pressure
Recall that the interest-driven account asserts that oversight activity is a func-
tion of the degree to which organized interests in the member’s electoral coalition
are affected by the policies created by a given agency. Thus, a member backed by
Agricultural interests will pay close attention to the activities of the USDA, while
members representing energy interests will keep a close eye on the Department of
Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. In some cases, identifying
the organized interests who care the most about agency outputs is simple. Narrowly
tailored regulatory agencies like the SEC or FDIC have a large affect on specific sec-
tors that are easily identified. In other cases, however, the identity of affected groups
is less clear. For example, which interests would we expect to drive member behavior
in overseeing the Department of Commerce or the Department of Labor?
To address this issue, I use federal lobbying disclosures to identify which sectors
actively lobbied which agencies, allowing me to focus on a wide range of agencies and
use the intensity of interest groups as revealed through their own actions to determine
the groups to whom a member should be responsive for oversight of any given agency.
These data are available through www.opensecrets.org, and cover all instances in
which an agency was lobbied from 1998-2014, totaling 888,303 observations. Each
entry in the lobbying data includes the entity doing the lobbying, the individual or
group on whose behalf that entity was lobbying, the agency being lobbied, and the
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amount spent on lobbying. This level of detail allows calculation of how much any
individual or group spent lobbying a given entity. Crucial for the application here is
that each entry also includes a unique identifier for each group engaged in lobbying
and an industry code for the lobbying client, allowing me to determine the degree to
which any given sector is active in lobbying a particular agency.
The next step was to link the political activities of those sectors to the electoral
well-being of members. This was accomplished using data on campaign contributions
from Adam Bonica’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME),
a collection of federal and state campaign finance records tracking contributions from
1980-2014. Each entry in Bonica’s data is a record of a contribution, whether that
be individual to candidate, individual to PAC, or PAC to candidate. The number
of contributions tracked ranges from 463,857 in 1980 to over 25 million in the 2012
election cycle. Crucially for the analysis to follow, contributions that involve interest
groups are coded using the same identifiers and industry codes that OpenSecrets uses
for lobbying. This allows me to observe the lobbying activities of a specific sector and
then track the campaign contribution patterns of that same sector to each individual
member of Congress, giving me a link between the measure of group intensity and
constituency make-up.
The assumption I make for the purposes of this analysis is that the political pres-
sure a member faces from a given sector can be captured by the degree to which that
member is funded by those groups. There is a long and heated debate about whether
campaign contributions shape congressional behavior or are shaped by congressional
behavior and I do not intend to wade into the debate on vote-buying. Using cam-
paign contributions is simply intended to capture the degree to which any individual
group is an active supporter of the member and the member would find it in their
interest to send signals to agencies and interest groups about the degree to which
they care about one issue or another. Thus, members who receive a large amount
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of campaign contributions from agricultural interests are, in this application, more
dependent on the activities of groups in that sector than members who receive none
of their campaign contributions from those same interests.
4.4 Data and Research Design
To analyze the dynamics of oversight agenda-setting, I use a case study of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce and its component subcommittees. En-
ergy and Commerce is active in a wide variety of policy areas, giving it a reasonable
claim to jurisdiction over a large and varied set of important federal agencies. An-
alyzing a committee with broad jurisdiction helps to ensure that the results are not
simply a function of one specific policy subsystem, and also allows for variation in the
constituency pressure variable that is harder to find in committees where member-
ship is more homogeneous. Energy and Commerce conducts oversight in areas such
as consumer protection and trade, health care and medical research, communications
and technology, energy, and environmental regulation. The subcommittees of Energy
and Commerce have remained largely unchanged over the past two decades and are
designed so as to align with these policy areas. In addition, the committee has a gen-
eral oversight subcommittee and can, of course, carry out business in full committee,
though in practice most of the committee’s activity occurs in its subcommittees.
I began by taking all hearings identified as oversight using the procedures in
chapter 2 and separating out the hearings conducted by Energy and Commerce.
Another advantage of using Energy and Commerce is that, compared to many other
committees, Energy and Commerce has very thorough records of its hearings available
on the Government Printing Office’s website going back to 1999. Given that the
question at hand involves a time component, these extra years are important for
reasons of statistical power. The period covered by the data is the 106th Congress
(1999-2000) through the 112th Congress (2011-2012), during which the committee
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conducted 254 hearings that were coded as oversight.
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Two things immediately jump out in Figure 4.1, which contains the number of
oversight hearings held by each subcommittee over the time period. First, almost no
oversight is conducted in the full committee. Only 9 hearings held in full committee
over the period are coded as oversight, suggesting that investigating subcommittees
as well as the full committee is necessary for an accurate picture of agenda dynamics.
The second notable feature of Figure 4.1 is that the subcommittee designated for
oversight and investigations is by far the most active in oversight, holding almost twice
as many hearings as the next closest subcommittee. The subcommittee on health is
the next most active, which is unsurprising given that both George W. Bush and
Barack Obama passed major pieces of legislation concerning health care. The least
active of the subcommittees is Commerce and Trade which has primary jurisdiction
over the Department of Commerce, the Federal Communications Commission, and
the Federal Trade Commission.
Having identified oversight hearings, the next step was to determine which agency
was the target of oversight. To identify the agency being overseen I use information
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about the witnesses at the hearing. Congressional committees have the power to
issue subpoenas compelling agency witnesses to testify, and a witness being called
from a particular agency is a strong signal that the policies of that agency are a
major topic of discussion at the hearing. This method for identifying agencies does
have a shortcoming, which is that some oversight hearings do not have any agency
witnesses. Committees sometimes wish to hear about the operation of a program
from only affected private sector interests or public interest advocacy organizations,
meaning that some instances in which an agency is being overseen will be missed.
A fruitful topic for future research would be to use the text of hearings to identify
the agency or agencies being overseen and to see whether these hearings differ in
substance from hearings with agency representatives, but as an initial attempt at
investigating oversight agenda dynamics I simply use the witness shortcut.
Information on the identity of witnesses comes from one of two sources. First,
each hearing file is accompanied by an .xml file that contains metadata on the hear-
ing including date, venue, and witnesses. Information on witnesses includes their
name, professional title, and the organization on behalf of which they are appearing.
Several hearings had witness entries missing from their metadata, which necessitated
an alternative solution. In those cases, I wrote a script to identify the portion of
the hearing transcript in which witnesses were identified and parse out the relevant
information. Each witness was coded for their agency affiliation, and if their entry
contained information about a specific office or bureau, that sub-agency. Of the 254
hearings, 54 had no witnesses from agencies, meaning that 78.7% of the hearings iden-
tified as oversight featured an agency witnesses. The hearings featured 350 agency
witnesses for an average of approximately 1.4 per hearing, with the largest number
of agency witnesses in a hearing being 7.
Given the breadth of the committee’s jurisdiction, it is unsurprising that a large
number of agencies were subject to its oversight at one point or another. In the data
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there are 29 different agencies represented at committee oversight hearings. When one
also considers bureaus or offices as separate entities, the number jumps to 60. These
agencies include the large agencies that obviously fall within the jurisdiction of Energy
and Commerce, but also feature small agencies like the Medicare Payment Advisory
Board and the Chemical Safety Board, as well as large agencies that do not obviously
fall within Energy and Commerce’s jurisdiction such as the State Department and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Figure 4.2 displays the number of witnesses
coming from each of the 10 agencies most frequently called to testify. As before,
we see a heavy emphasis on healthcare, with 110 witnesses coming from Health and
Human Services. The Department of Energy was the second best-represented in the
data with 88 witnesses, followed by a sharp drop-off to the Environmental Protection
Agency with 33. So while the range of agencies covered by Energy and Commerce is
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broad, most oversight occurs on a fairly small subset of agencies.
Because the object of this chapter is to test when a given agency will be overseen,
the next step is to define the range of agencies and bureaus to be considered. One
option would be to consider the full range of 29 agencies, but given the low intensity
of focus on many of these agencies, such an analysis would contribute little. While
Energy and Commerce has occasionally heard from witnesses from out-of-jurisdiction
agencies like Justice or State, it is unlikely that these appearances are determined by
anything more than chance. As such, I narrowed down the agencies under considera-
tion to only those which were the subject of somewhat regular or sustained oversight,
keeping only agencies or bureaus that were subjected to at least 10 days of oversight
by the committee over the period of consideration. Doing so narrowed the range of
oversight targets from 60 to 133.
Having described the committees and agencies to be analyzed, I turn now to more
concrete issues of measurement and research design. The dependent variable in all of
the analyses to follow is the number of hearings held by committee over an agency
in a given Congress. Consideration was given to further breaking down the data and
analyzing each year separately, but the fact that a key control variable (divided gov-
ernment) is unchanged within each Congress and the fact that contributions increase
(and hearings decrease) markedly in election years led me to combine the two years
of each Congress. The data contain 12 agencies, 7 committees, and 7 congresses.
Two committee-year combinations had to be removed. First, the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection did not have any of its hearings posted
3The agencies: Commerce, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Trade Commission,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, Transportation, Health and
Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (HHS), Food and Drug Administration (HHS),
National Institutes of Health (HHS), Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (DOE). Two
agencies that met the number of days condition were omitted. Homeland Security was omitted
because nearly all instances of oversight came in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, suggesting that
oversight was driven by a different process. The Centers for Disease Control were omitted because
they do not engage in any regulatory activity, meaning that a major control variable could not be
included.
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in the GPO database for the 106th Congress. Second, the Subcommittee on Environ-
ment and Hazardous Materials was subsumed by the Subcommittee on Energy and
Air Quality during the 111th Congress, though it was re-established as a separate
subcommittee in the 112th. With those committee-years removed, we are left with
564 committee-agency-year observations4.
The primary independent variable, Chair Intensity, is derived from the campaign
contribution data described earlier. For each of the agencies in the sample, I sepa-
rated out campaign contributions by the 15 sectors that spent the most on lobbying
that agency over the entire period. 5 The value of this variable is the log of the total
campaign contributions received by the committee/subcommittee chair from the top
lobbying sectors in the previous election, adjusted for inflation. The lowest value in
the data is $14,007, given to Karen Gillmor, chair of the Subcommittee on the Envi-
ronment and Hazardous Materials, by interests affiliated with the National Institutes
of Health leading up to the 107th Congress. The highest value is the $630,942.50 re-
ceived by Frank Pallone, chair of the Subcommittee on Health, by interests affiliated
with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid leading up to the 110th Congress. The
prediction for Chair Intensity is that it will have a positive and statistically significant
effect on the amount of oversight performed.
In addition to the measure derived from campaign contributions, two additional
variables were included to control for the two primary alternative stories outlined
previously. The first alternative was that oversight is a function of partisan concerns.
As such, we would expect to see oversight of agencies increase when control of gov-
ernment is divided. To test for this possibility, I include a dummy variable that takes
a value of 1 when Congress is divided and zero otherwise.
4All regressions were also estimated with the full committee omitted with no substantive change
in the results. Given the low amounts of oversight performed in full committee, the lack of effect is
unsurprising.
5The decision to use 15 was somewhat arbitrary and was driven primarily by my own evaluations
of the whether that group of sectors mapped well to the agency’s jurisdiction. The results, however,
are identical using the top 10 or 20 sectors.
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The second alternative was that oversight occurs in response to increased agency
activity. I measure regulatory activity as the number of rules promulgated by an
agency during a given Congress 6. To gather data on agency regulatory activity I
turned to the Federal Register, the daily digest containing proposed rules, final rules,
and public notices. The Federal Register’s website maintains an impressive collection
of information on proposed and enacted regulations going back to the late 1990’s.
In addition, the Federal Register maintains an API that makes it simple to retrieve
information about regulations, including the number of pages, using a simple script
in Python.
Finally, McGrath (2013) proposes a mix between the two explanations, which
is that agency activity will spur congressional oversight when the administration
and committee are ideologically divergent. This story calls for the inclusion of an
interaction between agency activity and preference divergence, which I capture with
divided government.
4.5 Estimation and Results
As described above, the dependent variable in the empirical test is the number of
days of hearings held by a committee involving an agency in a given congress. Because
the data are non-negative event counts and display a high degree of overdispersion, I
estimate the equations using negative binomial regression7. A positive coefficient for
any of the independent variables would indicate that they are associated with higher
levels of oversight. The primary independent variables are intended to capture the
effects of policy disagreement (divided government), and the level of activity in which
an agency was engaged (total pages of new regulations), with both expected to have
6I also collected the number of pages of regulations added to the federal register to capture
complexity, but the measures were so highly correlated (.847) that using one or the other made no
substantial difference.
7As a robustness check I also estimated the equations using OLS with logged hearing days as the
dependent variable. The results did not differ substantially.
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positive coefficients.
While these are the primary systematic explanations for oversight activity, the
decision to conduct oversight is obviously more complex that what is indicated here.
Oversight may occur due to external focusing events (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005),
certain committee-specific factors that make the conduct of oversight less likely8, or
features of an agency that make oversight of a specific agency more or less politically
fruitful. My strategy for dealing with these external sources of variation is to use
fixed effects to capture time-invariant features of agencies and committees, as well as
controlling for external events that shape the agenda across committees and agencies
such as the Clinton impeachment or 9/11. The fixed effects strategy has the benefit
of ensuring that unit-specific factors are not driving the results, but have the dis-
advantage that one is unable to estimate the effects of any time-invariant variables.
Given the fairly narrow focus of the empirical task in this chapter, I feel comfortable
addressing concerns about confounds with different sets of fixed effects and different
estimation strategies including analysis of specific subsets of the data and a set of
zero-inflated models, intended to address problems in the data.
A potential objection to the kind of design implemented here is that it does not
address potential sources of non-independence of observations. This could occur one
of two ways. The first is that by committing resources to overseeing one agency, a
committee may be unable to allocate resources to oversight of a different agency. A
central theme of the argument advanced in this dissertation is scarcity of legislative
resources enjoyed by members and it might be the same with committees, which are
limited in the time and effort of permanent staff and the amount of floor time available
for such hearings. While committee resource constraints may be pressing, for this to
be a large problem it would need to be the case that the committee or subcommittee
is operating at or near its full capacity. Given the low formal constraints on the use
8For example, the Energy and Commerce Committee’s norm of conducting oversight in subcom-
mittee, which is far from universal
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of committee time, this seems unlikely.
A second source of non-independence would be that multiple committees may be
constrained in how much they can oversee the same agency. If, as we see in the data,
several subcommittees at one time or another perform oversight of the same agency,
that agency may become less available for each of the committees attempting to per-
form oversight, effectively making agency time a common-pool resource. Oversight
undoubtedly imposes costs on agencies, pulling key bureaucrats away from work and
to the House and Senate floors, but it is also generally the case that agencies are
called to testify fairly infrequently, and costs can be distributed by sending different
bureaucrats to testify. More importantly, committees are able to compel attendance
through use of subpoenas, and bringing in an agency that has already been incon-
venienced with high levels of oversight entails no additional costs to the committee.
Several committees calling upon an agency may be deleterious to that agency’s ability
to perform their job, but that is unlikely to dissuade committees that wish to oversee.
Table 4.1 contains the results of the first set of estimations. In addition to coeffi-
cients and standard errors, the bottom of the table contains the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) to assess goodness-of-fit and θ, the overdispersion parameter from
the model. Column 1 presents the most straightforward test, with only Chair Inten-
sity and fixed effects for agency, congress, and subcommittee. We see strong initial
support for the interest-driven perspective, with the coefficient on Chair Intensity be-
ing positive and statistically significant. The second model includes controls for the
number of regulations passed by the agency, which we would expect to be positive, as
well as an indicator for divided government, which we would expect to be positive as
well. Neither prediction is borne out, as the coefficient on the number of regulations
is negative and statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on divided government
is statistically significant, but in the opposite direction of what we would expect. We
also see almost no change in either the coefficient or standard error on the coefficient
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for Chair Intensity, with the values of each differing by only 1 in the third digit.
Column 3 uses the same independent variables, but uses a different set of fixed
effects. In this equation, I included fixed effects for agency-year and committee-year 9.
This was an attempt to capture any time-specific trends with either the agency or the
committee that the time-variant variables included in the regressions do not capture.
These fixed effects would capture things like scandals or agencies suddenly becoming
presidential priorities for a limited amount of time. Because these fixed effects are
linear combinations of the fixed effects used in columns 1 and 2, I omit those fixed
effects. The first thing to note is the magnitude of the coefficients relative to the other
regressions. Each is substantially larger than in the previous estimation, and each
is statistically significant at the .1 level and in the correct direction. The coefficient
on regulations approaches standard statistical significance while the coefficient on
divided government exceeds it. Most importantly, the coefficient on log(contributions)
remains positive and statistically significant. While these results offer some support
for the alternative theories, it is worth noting that the AIC is substantially higher
in this model, meaning that it offers a worse fit of the data than the previous two
models.
As mentioned earlier, McGrath (2013) argues that the effect of regulatory activity
depends on preference divergence. According to his theory, regulatory activity should
spur more oversight when preferences diverge between overseer and administration,
suggesting a coefficient of zero on the constituent term for the regulatory activity
variable and a positive interaction with divided government. I include an interaction
between the number of regulations and divided government in Column 4, finding
that the expectation of a positive and statistically significant interaction is not borne
out empirically. The interaction term and its constituent terms are both statistically
9I also attempted to include committee-agency fixed effects, but the models failed to converge
and produced nonsensical estimates suggesting that no committee-agency fixed effects had any effect
on the level of oversight. I attempt to address agency-committee dynamics below.
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Table 4.1: Negative Binomial Estimates of Oversight Activity
Dependent variable: Committee-Agency Oversight Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chair Intensity 0.8755∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 1.604∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗
(0.1946) (0.195) (0.267) (0.196)
log(Regulations) −0.174 1.838∗ −0.215
(0.153) (0.968) (0.166)




Constant −13.256∗∗∗ −12.297∗∗∗ −13.069∗∗ −12.302∗∗∗
(2.444) (2.561) (5.818) (2.562)
Agency FE Y Y N Y
Congress FE Y Y N Y
Committee FE Y Y N Y
Agency-Year FE N N Y N
Committee-Year FE N N Y N
Observations 564 564 564 564
Log Likelihood −433.285 −432.680 −353.004 −432.550
θ 0.384∗∗∗ (0.066)0.385∗∗∗ (0.066)1.090∗∗∗ (0.231)0.384∗∗∗ (0.066)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 916.571 917.361 956.008 919.100
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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insignificant and the coefficient sizes on the other variables remain unaffected.
An issue that has, to this point, gone unaddressed, is the fact that multiple pro-
cesses can produce zeros in the data. The first reason that we might see no oversight
in a given Congress is simply a lack of interest by chairs in performing oversight.
This could be due to constituency pressures, desire to avoid overseeing a co-partisan
president, or lack of agency activity to which to respond. The second reason we
might see no oversight is a lack of jurisdiction. While committee jurisdictions are
highly fluid and there are examples of Energy and Commerce extending its oversight
to agencies we would not expect, there remain norms regarding which committee or
subcommittee will be tasked with oversight of specific agencies. The data includes
several instances of subcommittees and agencies whose jurisdictions make them an
odd pair for oversight. The inclusion of agency and committee fixed effects go some
way toward solving this problem, the agency-committee fixed effects that we would
ideally include result in nonconvergence of the models. An alternative solution may
be found in zero-inflated count models.
Greene (2008) describes the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression
in great detail, but the intuition underlying the model is quite simple. ZINB is a
maximum-likelihood estimator for count data where the zeroes in the data are in-
flated by some systematic process. The first step in the procedure is to estimate the
probability that an observation takes a value of zero, using some set of covariates
specified by the user. Following this first stage, another equation is estimated for ob-
servations greater than zero that incorporates parameters from the first stage. Given
no strong theoretical prior about why any of the explanatory variables used above
should be excluded from the first stage estimate, I include the same set of variables
in both equations.
Table 4.2 contains the results of three regressions that closely mirror the results
in Table 4.1. Column 1 contains the simple regression with Chair Intensity along
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Table 4.2: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimates of Oversight
Dependent variable: Committee-Agency Oversight Days
(1) (2) (3)








Constant −8.427∗∗∗ −5.899∗∗ −5.605∗∗
(2.262) (2.565) (2.666)
Agency FE Y Y Y
Congress FE Y N N
Committee FE Y Y Y
Observations 564 564 564
Log Likelihood −367.897 −394.915 −394.323
Akaike Inf. Crit. 837.795 875.831 878.646
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All variables used in both equations
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with fixed effects for congress, agency, and subcommittee. The coefficient on Chair
Intensity is smaller than in Table 4.1, but remains positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Column 2 adds the control variables, again finding a positive and statistically
significant correlation between constituency pressure and oversight. Unlike before,
this regression includes only agency and committee fixed effects. The reason for this
is that the ZINB estimator was unable to converge when both congress fixed effects
and divided government were included.
As before, there is no demonstrated connection between regulatory activity and
oversight, and the coefficient on divided government is significant but in the wrong
direction. Column 3 includes the interaction between divided government and regu-
latory activity, again finding no evidence of a conditional relationship between regu-
latory activity and oversight. Worth noting is that the coefficients on Chair Intensity
are usually about half of the size of the same coefficient in the equivalent regression
in Table 4.1. While the levels of statistical significance did not change, this change in
coefficient size suggests that the choice of estimator is important and that something
systematic is happening in the observations with counts of zero.
Table 4.3 contains another attempt to deal with the potential problem of jurisdic-
tion. In these regressions, I replicate the regressions in Table 4.1 with a subset of the
original sample. Here, I keep only committee-agency pairs that, at some point during
the period of study, produced positive counts. This helps eliminate pairs like the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Subcommittee on Health, which has no
obvious reason to concern itself with FERC. By doing so, I ensure that only pairs for
which some minimum level of jurisdiction is established are included. This reduces
the number of observations from 564 to 285.
The findings in 4.3 look surprisingly like those in Table 4.2. In the regressions
that include congress, agency, and committee fixed effects, the coefficients on Chair
Intensity is approximately .48 which is much closer to the equivalent regressions
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Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Estimates of Oversight Activity, Split Sample
Dependent variable: Committee-Agency Oversight Days
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chair Intensity 0.474∗∗ 0.478∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗
(0.190) (0.189) (0.291) (0.190)
log(Regulations) −0.162 1.170 −0.148
(0.148) (1.365) (0.158)




Constant −8.249∗∗∗ −7.399∗∗∗ −8.150 −7.408∗∗∗
(2.357) (2.459) (8.182) (2.459)
Agency FE Y Y N Y
Congress FE Y Y N Y
Committee FE Y Y N Y
Agency-Year FE N N Y N
Committee-Year FE N N Y N
Observations 285 285 285 285
Log Likelihood −366.469 −365.917 −285.202 −365.871
θ 0.700∗∗∗ (0.128)0.706∗∗∗ (0.129)2.927∗∗∗ (0.830)0.706∗∗∗ (0.129)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 782.938 783.834 820.403 785.741
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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in Table 4.2 than those in Table 4.1. Most importantly, the same patterns hold.
Chair Intensity is consistently positive and statistically significant, while divided
government and regulatory activity appear to have little or no impact on oversight.
Alternative Agenda Setters?
So far, the tests in this chapter have assumed that it is committee and subcommit-
tee chairs who have the authority to determine set the oversight agenda. Committee
chairs, however, are hardly the only individuals with the ability to influence com-
mittee activity. Indeed, one of the primary topics of interest in the literature on
congressional organization is the degree to which different actors influence the com-
position of committees and the rules by which they operate so as to influence policy
outcomes. The partisan theory of organization suggests the most severe constraints
on chairs, going so far as to suggest that committee chairs are the direct agents of
their colleagues in majority party leadership. The degree to which decisions about
what committees are overseen is dominated by committee chairs, then, is ultimately
an empirical question. Members themselves seem to believe that chairs are the most
important actors, but that may simply be a matter of perception. Fortunately, these
questions can be addressed empirically within the research design used throughout
this paper by measuring the preferences of potentially influential members and seeing
if chairs still appear influential.
To test the robustness of the results above, I replicate those tests and include
measures of campaign contributions received by alternative potential agenda setters.
Doing so allows me to ensure that the results for unit chairs are robust, and that
there is something unique about responsiveness to committee chairs. The first indi-
vidual considered is the median member of the majority party. In a series of articles
and books, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins develop an explanation for congres-
sional institutions based on the power of parties (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2005).
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In their view, parties exist to overcome collective action problems and ensure that
congressional institutions work to advance goals of majority party members. Key to
their story is that committee chairs are, in effect, direct agents of the majority party.
Chairs serve in their posts at the pleasure of their party, and should a majority of the
majority party decide that a committee chair is not effectively serving party goals, the
party median has the power to cast the pivotal vote to remove the chair from power
in a subsequent Congress. Because the majority party median is the pivotal vote on
whether a chair continues to hold their post, we might expect that their priorities
might come to be reflected in committee activity. Thus, while members may believe
that committee chairs are the key actors in setting the agenda, the decisions of chairs
may also be influenced by internal party dynamics.
A second member that I consider is the median member of the committee or
subcommittee in question. Aberbach (1990) explores the possibility that rank and
file committee members are highly influential in committee agenda setting, finding
that members and staff believe that the influence of the unit chair far outweighs
that of other members on the committee. While Aberbach’s findings suggest that
individual members perceive themselves to be less powerful than unit chairs, those
results are far from conclusive. Aberbach simply finds that chairs are perceived to be
the most influential, but such a perception may arise more from the title and stated
responsibilities of the chair than actual power wielded in practice. Unit chairs may be
making decisions and scheduling hearings, but that does not proclude the possibility
that their decisions are informed by pressure from other important members.
While committee medians are obviously important in voting, it is less clear why
they should be influential in oversight decisions. The committee median does not have
the power to sanction committee chairs in cases where they disagree with the chair’s
priorities, and decisions regarding whether or not to conduct oversight are not the
product of a majority vote. McGrath (2013) uses the ideological distance between
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the committee median and president to predict oversight activity, but offers little
explanation as for why the median should be expected to be influential. Focusing
on the committee median does, however, offer a readily identifiable individual from
the committee rank and file to test against the chair. So while there is not an
obvious committee-median agenda setting story, this does offer a means to evaluate
the influence of a fairly typical member who should theoretically have little in the
way of influence.
A second reason for focusing on internal committee dynamics is that it can of-
fer insight into potential reverse causality. One possible explanation for the results
presented above is that, anticipating a high degree of oversight of a given agency,
interest groups offer campaign contributions to try and convince members to take
their preferred position. If this is true, we should expect to see rank and file members
receiving contributions in anticipation of hearings, just as we would expect to see
chairs receiving contributions, as each member, but particularly a member who may
be pivotal in voting should oversight lead to a proposed change to the status quo,
would make sense as a target for persuasive campaign donations. Insofar as we see
contributions to chairs, but not contributions to the committee median, predicting
committee oversight activity, we can be more confident that there is something special
about the priorities of the chair as opposed to a more general strategy by interest
groups of donating more when agencies of interest are expected to be on the agenda.
Table 4.4 contains the results from six estimations, with two each employing the
strategies used in tables 1-3. The primary independent variables of interest are the
level of contributions to the chair, ChairIntensity, the level of contributions to the
majority party median, MajorityMedianIntensity, and the level of contributions to
the committee/subcommittee median, SubcommitteeMedianIntensity10. The first
two columns are estimated by negative binomial regression on the entire sample of
10Medians are identified using DW-NOMINATE scores.
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committee-agency pairs, the second two are estimated by zero-inflated negative bi-
nomial regression, and the third two are estimated by negative binomial regression
on only the subset of committee-agency pairs for which there is a non-zero entry in
the sample. The first estimations in each of the three groups contain only the cam-
paign contribution variables, while the second estimations also contain the variables
for agency regulatory activity and divided government11. Each estimation contains
fixed effects for Congress, agency, and committee/subcommittee.
The first clear pattern to emerge is that the correlation between campaign con-
tributions received by the unit chair and oversight activity continues to be positive
and statistically significant. Different estimation strategies produce notably different
coefficient sizes, but all six estimations produce coefficients that are positive and sta-
tistically significant at a .1 level of significance, with five of those coefficients being
significant at the .001 level. Thus, it appears that even when accounting for the
potential influence of other important actors within the chamber, the relationship
between chair intensity and oversight activity remains.
Evidence for the oversight agenda being influenced by other members of the cham-
ber is decidedly more mixed. The intensity of the majority median consistently has
a coefficient in the wrong direction, with one estimation producing a coefficient that
is significant at the .1 level. There is mixed evidence for the proposition that the in-
tensity of the subcommittee median influences the committee oversight agenda, with
the coefficient on contributions received by the subcommittee median being positive
across all estimations and statistically significant in three of the six estimations. It
should be noted, however, that the fully specified zero-inflated model and the nega-
tive binomial models estimated only for committee-agency pairs with some established
level of jurisdiction return no statistically significant effect. Given good reasons to
11I exclude the interaction between regulatory activity and divided government to conserve space.
The interaction term was insignificant when included in all of these estimations and had no important
effects on the other variables
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believe that the estimates produced by the negative binomial model on the full sam-
ple of committee-agency pairs are the least reliable of the three, this result should be
met with some caution and treated as largely inconclusive.
So while members other than the chair may be influential in setting the committee
oversight agenda, it appears that the oversight agenda is, in fact, influenced by the
preferences of the chair. Across a variety of estimation strategies carried out on the
full sample or relevant subsamples, the coefficient on contributions to the committee
chair is consistently statistically significant and in the direction one would expect if
chairs are biasing the oversight agenda.
Strategic Considerations in Oversight Agenda-Setting
The discussion thus far has focused on establishing that unit chairs enjoy some
kind of positive agenda power within their committees and use that power to empha-
size oversight of agencies that are of interest to the interest groups in their electoral
coalition. The benefit to unit chairs of doing so is that it creates opportunities for
that chair to engage in the kind of costly signaling described in the previous chapter.
In addition, chairs may be able to derive additional benefits from groups seeking the
opportunity to testify or simply draw attention to a given issue for purposes of bol-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Left unconsidered to this point have been any potential costs associated with
scheduling oversight of a constituency-relevant agency. The decision faced by the
chair so far has been thought to be a simple calculation regarding the benefits received
from scheduling oversight weighted against the opportunity costs of using committee
time for other purposes. In reality, conducting public oversight hearings and opening
agency policies to the scrutiny of committee members carries with it a set of benefits
and risks, all of which stand to make the choice to schedule oversight of a given
agency more or less appealing. The purpose of this section is to investigate potential
conditions under which we would expect to see chairs not pursue oversight of agencies
relevant to their electoral constituency, allowing a more nuanced view of the choices
made by unit chairs.
The major risk faced by the chair when choosing whether or not to engage in
oversight is the possibility that the hearing will serve as the catalyst (or simply con-
tribute in some way) to an unfavorable policy change. Whether in a more traditional
principal-agent framework in which members are looking for deviations from preferred
policies, or a signaling framework in which members act to provide information to
bureaucrats about the likely consequences of their actions, oversight is ultimately
aimed at making sure that agencies create policies in line with the preferences of
their overseers. If there are conditions under which oversight is likely to backfire
and produce changes to the status quo that harm the unit chair and their campaign
backers, we should expect oversight to be avoided. Oversight can produce changes to
policies in several ways, but the primary mechanisms would be to reveal information
that was previously unknown to the chamber, to draw attention to some previously
ignored policy, or for members to signal dissatisfaction with status quo policies such
that bureaucrats find it in their interest to alter their behavior. The question, then,
is when these mechanisms are likely to produce negative outcomes.
The previous chapter contained a discussion of these conditions, with the chair’s
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decision taking into account both the preferences of fellow committee members and
the degree to which those individuals care about the policies produced by a given
agency. The logic underpinning opposition is simple, as a committee made up of
opponents would be more likely to undermine the preferences of the chair either
through communicating divergent messages to agencies or by drawing attention to
agency policies that the unit chair would prefer not be emphasized. In cases where
preferences among committee members are similar, concerns about members trying
to provoke a disfavored policy response are largely irrelevant, allowing the unit chair
to proceed as they see fit.
The second factor informing the choices of chairs is the degree to which these
actors care about the policies made by the agency. Recall that the primary theoreti-
cal variable determining individual member participation is not preferences, but the
degree to which interest groups would like to see their member active in a given pol-
icy area. In cases where this kind of political incentive does not exist, members will
choose not to engage in oversight regardless of any preference divergence with either
the chair or the agency. Preference divergence is not, therefore, a sufficient condition
for unit chairs to curb their oversight activity. For chairs to avoid oversight, there
must opposition that is sufficiently intense to as to provide a credible threat to the
chair.
Previous tests have introduced a means by which intensity can be operationalized,
but capturing preference divergence is less straightforward. The most common strat-
egy for capturing preference divergence is to simply take the difference between the
DW-NOMINATE scores of the actors being compared, which in this case would be the
unit chair and unit median. One set of tests uses this measure, though one should
exercise caution when treating DW-NOMINATE scores as measures of preferences
applicable across policy areas. While appealing in its simplicity, DW-NOMINATE
scores are, of course, highly aggregated measures of preferences that need not map
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onto the kinds of issue-specific preferences that are more relevant to the question
at hand. Indeed, distributive theories of organization emphasize that committees
tend to bring together individuals who are homogeneous in both their intensity and
preferences on the specific issues handled by that committee, even when their pref-
erences on other issues diverge sharply. Using a measure like DW-NOMINATE or
even collections of seemingly more relevant subsets of votes can, therefore, overstate
the degree to which preferences among committee members actually diverge on the
issues considered by that committee (Hall and Grofman, 1990).
As a check on the results derived from DW-NOMINATE scores and an attempt to
more accurately capture the concept of policy-specific preferences, I include a second
measure based on the sources of campaign contributions to individual members. The
basic logic underpinning this measure is that divergence in preferences will be cap-
tured by the degree to which members receive campaign support from different groups
relevant to a specific agency. Differing patterns of campaign contributions may lead
to divergent preferences through vote buying, or they may simply reflect that groups
want to support members who share their own preferences, but the assumption I am
making with this measure is that, given a set of members and a set of interest groups,
members who receive campaign support from similar sources have preferences that
are more similar than members who receive their support from a different subset of
those interest groups.
As an example, take the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA is
lobbied by a wide range of interests, including but not limited to environmental
groups, business groups, and energy producers. Each of those groups have different
policies that they would like to see enacted by the EPA, Some, like business group
and energy producers, are mostly in agreement, advocating primarily for deregula-
tory policies or specific regulatory policies aimed at gaining a competitive advantage.
Others, like environmental groups and energy producers tend to be at odds with each
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other, with environmental groups advocating for stricter regulations on pollution than
energy producers. The basic strategy employed here is to take each member and see
how much of their support among sectors interested in the EPA comes from each of
these groups, creating a measure that would capture the degree to which members
differ in their support received by different sectors. Therefore, when we see that two
members receive most of their support from energy and business interests and little
from environmental groups, we would conclude that those two members have similar
preferences on policies relevant to the EPA. A member receiving most of their support
from environmental groups and little from energy producers would have preferences
that are very dissimilar from the two individuals who rely on business and energy
and interests.
To create this measure, I used the campaign contributions from the intensity mea-
sures used previously. Recall that the intensity measure is the sum of contributions
received by an individual from the fifteen sectors most active in lobbying that agency.
For this application, the contributions were left unaggregated and were turned into
percentages of the total received by individuals from the groups in this sector. There-
fore, if the agency in question is the EPA and the individual received $1,000 from
energy interests, $1,000 from business interests, and no money from any of the thir-
teen additional sectors, that individual would have values of .5 for business and energy
interests, and 0 for all other sectors. This vector of proportions is then compared to
that of the committee chair, with the absolute value of the difference summed across
all fifteen sectors to calculate the total difference in sources of support.
Table 4.5 provides a useful illustration of how the variable is calculated. In this
case, there are two members, a chair and a median, measured across three sectors
in two congresses. The ultimate measure we want to create is the sum of differences
across the three sectors for each Congress. In the 110th Congress, we see that the
median receives most of their support from the second sector, while the chair receives
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Table 4.5: Example of Preference Divergence Variable Calculation
Chair Median Sector Congress Difference
.6 .1 A1 110 .5
.1 .8 A2 110 -.7
.3 .1 A3 110 .2
.6 .6 A1 111 0
.1 .1 A2 111 0
.3 .3 A3 111 0
more from the first and third. When taking the absolute value of and summing the
differences for the 110th Congress, we get 1.4 (.5 + .7 + .2). In the 111th Congress,
the two individuals receive the same percentages of support from each of the three
groups, indicating that their support coalitions are highly similar. Summing their
differences returns a value of zero. Thus, this variable takes a higher value when
differences in support coalitions are larger, going as high as 2 when two members
receive support from none of the same groups, and has a lower bound of zero when
the levels of support for each group are the same.
The hypothesis being tested here states that chairs increase oversight of agencies
on which they are highly intense, unless it is the case that they face potential opposi-
tion that is both intense and has divergent preferences. This hypothesis suggests an
interactive model, but one that is substantially more complex than usual. Because
the effect of chair intensity depends on two variables in tandem, the appropriate es-
timation strategy is to use a three way interaction between the intensity of the chair,
the intensity of the alternative actor being considered, and the preference divergence
between the two. In expectation, the three way interaction term should be negative,
as higher levels of the interaction between preference divergence and intensity should
reduce the effect of chair preferences. We would expect the two way interactions to
be statistically insignificant, as preference divergence and intensity of the alternative
member should have no effect independent of the way in which they condition the
chair’s decision.
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To test the conditional nature of chair use of positive agenda power I estimate
the a set of negative binomial regressions with the same variables included above but
also including the three way interaction and the constituent two way interactions.
Preference divergence as measured by a difference in DW-NOMINATE scores is used
for the first two estimations, while the measure derived from campaign contributions
is used in the second two. Because of the relatively small number of observations,
large number of fixed effects, and complex nature of the interaction terms, attempts
to estimate the equations via zero-inflated negative binomial regression were unsuc-
cessful. As such, I report only the standard negative binomial results, though it
should be emphasized that the zero-inflated results and results analyzing the split
sample did tend to produce similar results in previous estimations as much of what
the zero-inflation picks up is the lack of jurisdiction enjoyed by subcommittees over
a given agency.
Table 4.6 contains results from the regressions with the various interaction terms
and shows some support for the conditional hypothesis, though the nature of the rest
of the results suggests that any conclusions should be extremely guarded. Unlike
before, we see that the effect of ChairIntensity is either statistically insignificant
or statistically significant in the wrong direction. In fact, the only variable that
shows up as statistically significant in the regressions using DW-NOMINATE based
preferences is divided government, though it is still in the opposite direction of what
was predicted. The regressions using differences in patterns of campaign contributions
to measure preference divergence show the opposite pattern, with all variables other
than regulatory activity and divided government being statistically significant. The
three way interaction is significant and in the predicted directed, but contrary to
expectation, the other interactions also show up as significant.
Easily the most noteworthy feature of Table 4.6 is the outlandish size of the
coefficients. Because of the complex nature of the interaction terms, it is difficult
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Table 4.6: Negative Binomial Estimates of Oversight Activity with Interactions
Dependent variable: Committee-Agency Oversight Days
DW-NOMINATE Preferences Contributions Preferences
Full Sample Split Sample Full Sample Split Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chair Intensity −1.022 4.659 −35.722∗∗∗ −39.288∗∗∗
(6.879) (6.179) (13.096) (12.889)
Subcommittee Intensity −2.464 3.685 −39.687∗∗∗ −42.456∗∗∗
(6.932) (6.206) (13.487) (13.209)
Preference Divergence −440.793 121.934 −507.208∗∗∗ −527.451∗∗∗
(353.982) (332.939) (156.594) (158.752)
log(Regulations) −0.140 −0.159 −0.090 −0.151
(0.160) (0.148) (0.153) (0.143)
Divided Government −1.127∗∗ −0.878∗∗ −1.132∗∗ −0.690
(0.466) (0.429) (0.451) (0.430)
Chair Intensity * 0.193 −0.338 3.324∗∗∗ 3.546∗∗∗
Subcommittee Intensity (0.597) (0.535) (1.136) (1.116)
Chair Intensity * 32.454 −14.385 42.494∗∗∗ 44.274∗∗∗
Preference Divergence (30.469) (28.744) (13.344) (13.578)
Subcommittee Intensity * 37.228 −10.791 45.726∗∗∗ 46.871∗∗∗
Preference Divergence (30.510) (28.688) (13.696) (13.844)
Chair Intensity * −2.728 1.268 −3.837∗∗∗ −3.942∗∗∗
Subcommittee Intensity * (2.629) (2.480) (1.167) (1.184)
Preference Divergence
Constant 12.064 −53.301 424.488∗∗∗ 469.217∗∗∗
(79.799) (71.616) (155.268) (152.493)
Observations 564 285 564 285
Log Likelihood −363.194 −312.154 −348.325 −299.444
θ 0.476∗∗∗ (0.088) 0.860∗∗∗ (0.173) 0.578∗∗∗ (0.115) 1.028∗∗∗ (0.225)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 788.388 686.307 758.650 660.888
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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to cleanly interpret the effect of the subcommittee median on the chair’s decisions.
This is further complicated by the fact that many of the values of the independent
variables are never realized, for example either full preference divergence or agreement.
One way to check the validity of the estimates produced, however, is to look at the
predicted counts from the regression. If the models are producing expectations that
seem unusually large or small, we should increase our level of skepticism regarding
the model outputs.



















Figure 4.3 displays the predicted hearings from the model using the campaign
contribution derived measure of preferences estimated on the subset of the data used
for previous estimations. Despite the seemingly outlandish predictions, the predicted
number of hearings looks very much how we would expect. By far the most com-
mon prediction is between zero and one hearings (split about evenly between those
predicting less than .5 and those predicted more), with the frequency of predictions
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decreasing as the predicted number of hearings goes up. There are rare instances in
which a large number of hearings are predicted, but mostly what we see is consistent
with what we actually observe in the data.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to better understand the process by which over-
sight occurs in the House of Representatives. While the focus of this dissertation is
primarily the factors the lead individual members of Congress to perform oversight,
we know little about what governs the process by which opportunities for oversight
arise. I argue that the individual-level perspective on oversight presented in the the-
ory chapter yields a set of predictions about how committees will use their time. Unit
chairs, I argue, have incentives to bias the focus of committees toward agencies of in-
terest to their constituents in order to achieve electoral gains. In addition, previous
research argues that chairs enjoy primary authority over how oversight is prioritized
within their committees, suggesting that the oversight agenda within committees
should change along with the constituency-induced preferences of their chairs.
This chapter provides the first empirical test of the question: Why does committee
c oversee agency a at time t? In so doing, it introduced a means of identifying the
interests relevant to particular agencies and provided a set of empirical tests aimed at
addressing various shortcomings in the data. In keeping with theoretical expectations,
it is consistently the case that committees engage in more oversight of agencies when
chaired by members whose electoral coalitions are interested in the policies made
by that agency. Equally as important, there is no evidence that partisan concerns
or the level of agency activity affect oversight in any meaningful way. In addition,
the results turn up limited evidence that members who could theoretically impact the
oversight agenda exert influence over committee proceedings. There is, however, some
preliminary evidence that chairs are strategic in their agenda-setting. When chairs
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face opposition within their committee and the members opposing the chair having
increasingly intense preferences, the effect of constituency pressure decreases for the
chair. This suggests that chairs are strategic. While they want to engage in oversight
of constituency relevant agencies, they may restrict opportunities for oversight when
they fear potential negative consequences.
This research is not without its shortcomings, however, and these should be ad-
dressed in future research. First, the analysis here considers only the House Commit-
tee on Energy and Commerce. While the evidence for the interest-driven perspective
is consistent, it may not be the case that the findings are as strong for other commit-
tees. In addition to increasing generalizability, including additional committees may
provide the statistical power needed to overcome problems of non-model convergence
that necessitated omission of what may be important fixed effects.
While this chapter provides support for the interest-driven theory, the primary
implication of that theory concerns the decisions of individual members in attending
and actively participating in oversight. I turn to this question in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
Interest-Driven Oversight in the Financial Services
Sector
Having offered an examination of the ways in which individual incentives faced
by committee chairs shape opportunities for members to engage in oversight through
congressional hearings, I turn now to the question of what members do when given
those opportunities. The evidence in Chapter 2 demonstrated that, despite the strong
incentives faced by members to shirk their oversight responsibilities, oversight is an
important part of congressional activity. Chapter 3 introduced a theory of oversight
suggesting that regular oversight need not mean effective legislative defense against
bureaucratic drift and inefficiency. The primary purpose of oversight, I argue, is not
to gather information about what the agency is doing and why, but to demonstrate
the member’s interest in what the agency does and signal that the member is likely
to respond to unfavorable decisions with actions that agencies would rather not see.
The crucial link in the story is interest groups who want policy benefits from agencies
but lack the means to impose costs on bureaucrats and credibly threaten negative
consequences if their preferences are not accounted for. As such, interest groups
rely on their representatives in Congress, providing electoral benefits in exchange for
performing oversight.
The primary behavioral implication of this theory is that members will engage in
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higher levels of oversight when there is an organized interest group willing to provide
electoral benefits in exchange for doing so1. As such, we should expect to see that
oversight of a given agency will be dominated by members whose electoral fates are
most strongly affected by groups with an interest in the policies produced by that
agency. I use a case study of oversight of financial regulatory agencies to validate this
implication empirically. Decisions made by agencies like the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission have the potential to
impose substantial costs on some of the most politically active and powerful interests
in the United States. At the same time, these agencies make highly complex policies
with most members unable to match wits with the regulators, making this a policy
where we should expect to see shirking in the classic principal-agent framework.
Using a novel measure of within-district interest group activity derived from ge-
ographically identified campaign contributions, this chapter demonstrates that over-
sight of financial regulatory agencies is dominated by members representing districts
with a concentration organized financial interests. The members who select into
oversight on this topic are extreme outliers relative to the chamber, but also outliers
when compared to the House Committee on Financial Services. Because these mem-
bers represent high-demanding constituencies, they have the weakest incentives to
protect majoritarian policy outcomes, creating a situation in which agencies receive
pressure only from the highest demanding constituencies. This kind of oversight does
create incentives for bureaucrats to be politically responsive, but only to the demands
of a handful of unrepresentative members.
5.1 Data and Research Design
Evidence for the theory’s primary implication comes from a case-study of financial
regulatory agencies. In selecting a case, three features stand out as particularly
1This implication is H1 in the theory chapter.
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important. First, it must be the case that the policy area has politically active interest
gropus. Financial regulation is particularly well suited to the questions at hand due
to the political salience of financial regulation and the political power of the financial
industry. The major financial regulatory agencies have a wide set of missions, ranging
from the Securities and Exchange Commission which oversees the operation of the
stock market to the Commodity Futures Trading Corporation which is charged with
regulating futures markets and complex financial instruments. Most importantly,
the financial services sector is highly politically active and thought to be extremely
powerful. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, financial interests have
spent over $6 billion on lobbying since 1998 and spent more than $70 million on
campaign contributions in each of the 2012 and 2014 electoral cycles. In turn, it
has been argued that financial interests have a great deal of power in determining
regulatory policy (Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998; Kroszner and Strahan, 1999).
Second, Congress should be at an informational disadvantage. It is the focus on
the value of information that separates distributive oversight from models in which
Congress attempts to use oversight to gain information. The areas regulated by these
agencies are highly technical, meaning that the average member of the chamber is at a
severe informational disadvantage compared to the agency. Because the informational
disadvantage faced by the members of Congress is so steep, attempting to investigate
and evaluate the performance of these agencies is difficult for most, if not all, members.
Becoming informed about the policies made by these agencies and their consequences
is likely to be extremely costly. It is situations where informational advantages are too
costly to overcome that Lowi (1969) suggests should be the most prone to legislative
abdication of oversight, making this a case that traditional approaches are poorly
suited to explaining.
Finally, we want a policy area that involves targeted benefits and costs as we need
to be able to identify winners and losers and make predictions about who is likely to
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be active. Regulatory agencies are tasked with imposing a set of targeted costs with
diffuse benefits and the identity of those who bear the costs are fairly well defined,
allowing me to assume that the financial industry generally has preferences regarding
financial regulation that differ substantially from the chamber median. In cases where
regulation aids a group, they will want aid above and beyond majorities are likely
to support. In cases where a group is harmed by a regulation, they are likely to be
more concerned with the costs of policies than the chamber median. Important for
this case is that, in general, opponents of financial regulation are highly organized
while proponents are not. This means that cross-pressure of the kind described in
chapter 3 is unlikely. The potential downside to using financial regulation is that the
performance of the financial industry affects nearly every district indirectly and crises
in the financial sector could be attractive opportunities to be seen publicly scolding
bankers and bureaucrats. In that sense we might expect the members performing
oversight to be more representative of the chamber than in other, less politically
salient, policy areas.
The dependent variables are two measures of individual-level participation in over-
sight hearings - whether a member was present for a hearing and how many times they
spoke during the hearing if they were present. These are meant to proxy for effort
allocated to oversight, as showing up for a hearing diverts resources toward oversight
and away from other activities and additional participation imposes costs above and
beyond the decision to attend. In effect, this measures the member’s willingness to
send all of the different types of signals outlined in Chapter 3. Showing up demon-
strates intensity to a degree, but active participation allows for a stronger signal of
intensity and for the member to communicate a set of policy preferences. Members
who do all of these should be of particular concern to the agencies implementing these
programs.
The participation measures are derived from the Government Printing Office’s set
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of hearings outlined in Chapter 2. The process for identifying members who were
present for hearings was outlined in Chapter 2, but I turn here to the much thornier
problem of determining degree of participation. The first option for determining levels
of participation is to simply hand code the hearings, which is what most scholars using
hearings in their research have done. One can go through the hearing, identify who
was present, and count the number of times they spoke or the number of lines that
their speech took fairly simply for a small set of hearings. For larger sets of hearings
this strategy is infeasible. In PDF form many of these hearings are several hundred
pages, and hearings over 1,000 pages are not uncommon. To code any significant
number of these manually would require large numbers of research assistants and
substantial training in how to code the hearings.
Even more difficult with this approach would be extracting content of what mem-
bers are saying. Research assistants would have to manually scroll through pages
and copy/paste excerpts from the hearings, making the endeavor extremely costly if
one intents to analyze anything above a small number of hearings. To address these
problems I choose instead to develop an algorithm that takes hearing texts, uses pat-
terns in the text to identify unique pieces of speech, and uses the previously collected
and cleaned data on who is present to identify speakers. Identifying who is present
and assigning individual pieces of speech to specific members or witnesses results in a
data set of which members attend oversight hearings, who testifies at hearings, how
much all of those individuals spoke, and what exactly they said.
Having identified all individuals attending a hearing, I could then begin to assign
individual pieces of speech to people attending the hearing. Identification of individual
pieces of speech is accomplished using patterns in the text. The texts of hearings
vary a great deal in their formatting, particularly across committees, but the one
commonality is how individual speakers are recognized. Each new piece of speech can
be identified by the start of a new line beginning with multiple (usually between 3
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Figure 5.1: Raw Hearing Text
and 5) blank spaces, a title (i.e. Mr., Mrs., Secretary), a word (or multiple words in
the case of members like Chris Van Hollen or Mary Bono Mack) denoting the last
name of the speaker, and a period2.
A piece of speech begins when the pattern is detected, and ends when that pattern
is detected again, with all text between being attributed to the individual identified as
the speaker. Figure 5.1 contains the raw text of a recent hearing in which Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton was being questioned about her knowledge regarding the attacks
on the United States embassy in Benghazi. We see three unique pieces of text in the
excerpt, one by Secretary Clinton and two by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Thus, the first two
lines would be attributed to Representative Ros-Lehtinen, the next two to Secretary
Clinton, and everything after to Ros-Lehtinen. Because the final paragraph does not
begin with one of the selected titles (“Madam”) and does not have a period in the
first line, the algorithm is able to recognize that that paragraph is a continuation
of Representative Ros-Lehtinen’s earlier statement. Separating the speaker from the
text and stripping the title left me with pieces of speeches and associated last names,
allowing for analysis of how much individuals participated and what they said.
After breaking down the text and associating each line of speech with the last
name that began the excerpt, the final step is to use the speaker’s last name to
2The regular expressions used to identify these patterns generally take the form: “ˆ {3,5}Mrs\.
([A-Za-z]*|[A-Za-z]* [A-Za-z]*)”. Several different titles were included as well as modifications to
allow for hyphenated names or other less common names
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identify which of the individuals present was responsible for the speech. Because
speakers are not identified by their first and last name in the text, matching speech
to individuals present needs to be accomplished using only last names. This step
begins with compiling the names of members present and comparing it to the names
of witnesses. In cases with no overlap, assigning speech to a member or witness is
trivial. Because there is no other Ros-Lehtinen in the House and no Ros-Lehtinen
called to testify, the only person it could be is Ilana Ros-Lehtinen. If two members
with the same name are present or a member shares a last name with one of the
hearing witnesses, identification is more difficult. In most cases where two individuals
have the same last name the text will generally identify the member by including the
member’s state, meaning that if a witness named “Lucas” was present at the same
hearing as Frank Lucas, Frank Lucas would be identified as “Mr. Lucas of Oklahoma.”
If I could not distinguish between the two, those lines were dropped from any analysis.
Such instances were rare and deletion of lines was not required for any of the hearings
used in this chapter.
To identify hearings concerned with oversight of the financial services industry I
narrowed the list of hearings coded as oversight to those featuring a witness from any
one of seven agencies involved with banking or finance 3. In addition, I looked for
any hearings coded as oversight that were held by the House Committee on Financial
Services to identify any hearings that might qualify as oversight of the actions taken by
the financial regulatory agencies despite not having an agency representative present.
The scope of the data covers the 107th through 111th Congresses and features a
total of 45 oversight hearings, an average of 9 per Congress. As one would expect,
the lion’s share of hearings took place in the Committee on Financial Services, but
the sample also includes hearings held by Agriculture, Small Business, and Energy
3The agencies: Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Asso-
ciation, Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
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and Commerce. Given the short time period, the data cover a surprising variety
of government configurations. Republicans controlled the House for three of the five
Congresses covered (107-109) and party control of the House and Presidency was split
only for the 109th Congress. George W. Bush was the President for the first four
congresses in the sample with Barack Obama in power for the final Congress.
The most important independent variable identified by the theory is the degree to
which members derive support from organized interests within a sector. Those inter-
ests can come from inside or outside of the member’s district, but I focus on strength
inside the district for this application. To measure the strength of organized interests
I employ a new measurement strategy based on the geographic location of campaign
contributions from individuals to political action committees. When individual make
campaign contributions over a certain amount, whether that be to a candidate, party,
or PAC, they are required to report that information to the Federal Election Com-
mission. Included in that report is the address of the individual, meaning that the
congressional district from which the donation came can be identified. The FEC
releases that data and various third party sources have cleaned and categorized the
data for their own use.
To create the measure, I count the total number and amount of campaign con-
tributions from individuals living in a given district to political action committees
coded by the Center for Responsive Politics as being any of: commercial banks, sav-
ings & loans, credit unions, finance/credit companies, securities and investment, or
miscellaneous finance 4. For example, if we saw that an individual in New York’s
10th district gave donations of $5,000 to Morgan Stanley’s political action committee
and the Securities Industry & Financial Market Association, that would count as
two donations and $10,000 for the summed variable. Powerful financial interests are
nearly all represented either through their own political action committee or as part
4Data on campaign contributions and the locations of individual donors comes from Adam Bon-
ica’s recently released DIME dataset.
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of a larger association and make up a large portion of who is primarily affected by the
decisions of financial regulatory agencies. For each district running total is created
using contributions from the two years before, the two years after, and the two years
of a given Congress. The running total is intended to get around election-specific
idiosyncrasies in campaign donations, but using only the most recent election does
not make an important difference in the results.
Campaign contributions from individuals to groups are useful here because they
indicate either membership in that group or a certain level of intensity in supporting
that group’s positions. The hypothetical individual giving to Morgan Stanley is
unlikely to do so unless they agree with the organization’s positions and want to see
them advocated enough so as to become politically active. If nothing else, looking at
these individuals provides an estimate of individuals who are more likely to become
campaign donors and provides an indication of what their issue priorities are. A full
list of members of these organizations as well as their location would be ideal, but
such a list is unavailable and the measure derived from campaign contributions maps
quite well on to what one would expect to be the districts with the most intense
interests in the financial sector. Two districts from New York City covering the Wall
Street area and mid-Manhattan are by far the most intense on this measure with
districts in southern Connecticut, the western Chicago suburbs, and Staten Island
being the other top districts. The distribution is heavily skewed to the right, with a
few highly intense districts and a large number of low-intensity districts.
Previous studies attempting to measure constituency interest in the financial sec-
tor have primarily used the number of people employed in the financial sector as
measured by Census records (Adler and Lapinski, 1997). I use individual contribu-
tions instead of census measures for two reasons. First, it captures an element of the
level of the sector’s organization. We want to capture the degree to which groups
can impose electoral benefits or sanctions on a member, but simply having a large
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number of employees does not capture this. If many employees in a sector inhabit a
district but all are low-level and unorganized politically, we would not expect their
opinions to carry as much weight when it comes to oversight.
The second and more important reason is that individual contributions allow me
to focus on more narrowly defined groups within the financial industry. The Census
assigns each employed person a code based in the sector in which they work and the
code for finance workers includes any person above age thirteen working in finance,
insurance, or real estate. For this case we certainly want people working in finance,
but do not want people working in insurance or real estate. While both sectors are
affected by the decisions made by the agencies examined here, their primary interests
are in other agencies that focus more narrowly on their own sectors. Using campaign
contributions allows the researcher to focus only on industries directly related to to
the agencies being overseen, or any subset of those industries (investment banks,
venture capital, stock exchanges, etc..) if one uses the industry codes provided by the
Center for Responsive Politics. The fact that this data can be so narrowly tailored
also makes it easily transportable to other policy domains as long the groups in that
policy are active in giving campaign contributions.
Because this measure is new, validating that it captures the underlying concept
is crucial. I do so here by comparing the contributions to financial groups in a
district to number of employees in the sector as defined by the census. In Figure 5.2
I compare the measure derived from campaign contributions to data from Adler’s
collection of district constituency characteristics derived from Census data, which
includes real estate and insurance employees (Adler, N.d.). We would expect a strong
correlation as part of the census measure should be highly correlated with donation
activity, but the insurance and real estate employees in the census measure should
result in a less-than-perfect correlation. Each dot in the figure represents one district
in an electoral cycle. Adler’s data ends with the 105th Congress so I compare the
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census measure to the campaign contributions measure from the 103rd Congress to
the 105th, meaning that there are 1605 observations. Unsurprisingly, the two are
highly correlated (ρ = .542), suggesting that the two capture a similar underlying
concept, though the correlation is not so high that one is obviously a substitute for
the other. Due to the time period in which the two measures overlap, the correlation
may understate the relationship, as well. The amount being donated to and donated
by PACs has grown markedly over the past 20 years and now there are relatively few
major firms in the financial sector that do not offer campaign contributions through
their political action committee. As the number of finance PACs grows, more workers
in the finance industry have the ability to donate to their company’s PAC which is
a focal landing spot for individuals planning to put their contributions money in the
hands of industry groups.
An alternative strategy to counting contributions to PACs would be to simply
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count campaign contributions from financial interests to each member. Whereas
I use campaign contributions to create a measure of the degree to which interest
groups are organized an active in a given geographic area, others have suggested that
the actual money transferred from group to member is the source of influence in
legislative politics (Hall and Wayman, 1990). Such data is readily available via the
Center for Responsive Politics and would seem to map well to the idea of interest
groups providing carrots and sticks for members performing oversight. As discussed
in Chapter 3, while any group is free to offer support to a member, those with a
presence in the district are advantaged in that they have non-monetary means to
support candidates that are likely to be more effective than when those same means
are used by groups without a strong presence in the district.
Groups with an active organized presence in the district, however, offer a set of
electoral benefits (or penalties) that affect the member much more directly than a
small percentage of their campaign warchest. These groups can offer endorsements,
get out the vote operations, and can choose whether or not to actively support or
even field a primary challenger for the incumbent. Because the group has an actual
presence in the district, things like endorsements or primary help are more likely to be
incorporated into the decisions of individual voters when it comes time to cast a vote.
A group with no presence in a member’s district is free to endorse the incumbent or
not, but without individuals sympathetic to the group’s cause in the district, that
endorsement is unlikely to impact the member’s electoral fates in any important way.
The role of outside contributions is interesting and deserves additional attention, but
conditions in the district are likely the bigger determinant of legislative behavior.
5.2 Research Design and Results
Testing the primary implication of the theory requires evaluating the degree to
which oversight is performed by individuals with unrepresentative and uniquely in-
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tense preferences on the issue. To do this, I perform a set of monte carlo simulations
that allow me to examine whether the distribution of members performing oversight
is, in fact, different from the overall distribution of the chamber. One potential prob-
lem with using the chamber as a comparison is that it could be the case that oversight
is performed by an unrepresentative subset of the chamber due to committee selec-
tion. If all of the extreme members select onto Financial Services and only Financial
Services oversees these regulatory agencies, the distribution would be unrepresenta-
tive even if the process was simply a random draw from the committee. If we think
that oversight is aimed at serving members representing particularly intense electoral
coalitions, we would actually expect to see a pattern in which intense members try to
select onto relevant committees, making it difficult to uncover a difference from the
committee even if distributive oversight is taking place. I report comparisons to the
committee but focus primarily on the chamber for several reasons. First and fore-
most, the problem being addressed here is one of whether institutions are set up in
a way that provides members with incentives to accurately reveal information to the
chamber. If the committee system is funneling members with incentives to dissem-
ble into positions where they are the only ones tasked with oversight, the chamber’s
problem is not being solved. If we really believe that the purpose of oversight is
informational, the chamber should have developed means by which to prevent these
preference outlying members from dominating oversight.
In addition, oversight is not necessarily restricted to committee members. It may
operate that way in practice, but there is no formal or even informal norm about
leaving oversight exclusively to committee members. In fact, there is a norm of
accommodation in which members are generally allowed to attend and participate
in whatever hearings they like. Members not on the committee holding the hearing
regularly attending hearings with a particular constituency interest and are given
the right to participate and question witnesses. If participation is not restricted
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to committee members, the patterns of participation may still break down along
committee lines, but are not dictated by them. A third objection is that committee
jurisdictions are malleable and that members interested in conducting oversight of
a given agency could simply decide to hold a hearing regarding the effects of the
agency’s policies within their jurisdiction. Committee jurisdictions are not set in
stone, and committees regularly hold hearings to attempt to claim jurisdiction over
policies of interest to their members (Talbert, Jones and Baumgartner, 1995; King,
1997). Most hearings in the data are conducted by the House Committee on Financial
Services, but there are also hearings conducted by the Committee on Small Business,
the Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Science and Technology. If
a topic like financial regulation is of interest to members outside of the Financial
Services committee, the formal barriers to conducting oversight are low.
The first set of tests involve a broad look at participation, simply comparing
the distribution of intensities of members attending to the chamber and committee.
Figure 5.3 contains four plots. The x-axis on each plot is the measure of constituency
intensity derived from campaign contributions. Higher values correspond to more
contributions, meaning that we should expect the observed data to be skewed to the
right relative to the chamber and committee. To create the distribution of attending
members I simply included each member attending each hearing. This means that
if one member showed up to all 45 hearings in the data they would show up in the
distribution 45 times. If they showed up zero times they would not enter into the
distribution at all. The first shows the distribution of the members attending in
red, with the overall median of districts being the vertical dashed line. The skew in
participation is quite striking. Of the 909 members attending these oversight hearings,
714 (78.9% of the total) are above the median in terms of constituency intensity in
the policy area. What this shows is that not only are relatively extreme members
showing up to hearings, but members whose constituencies more closely match the
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Figure 5.3: Comparing Intensity of Members Attending Hearings to Committee and
Chamber
8 10 12 14 16
Chamber






8 10 12 14 16
Chamber
Logged Total Dollars Contributed
Attending
All
8 10 12 14 16
Financial Services Committee and Chamber





8 10 12 14 16
Financial Services Committee and Chamber





overall distribution of districts are not.
The second plot compares the distribution of intensity in the members attending
hearings to the overall distribution of district intensities. The overall chamber distri-
bution is calculated using each district in each year of the data as an observation, and
the comparison to the members attending reveals a similar, if less visually striking,
pattern. Members attending hearings featuring witnesses from the financial regula-
tory agencies are skewed substantially to the right of the chamber. While the visual
pattern is less striking, it is worth noting that the data are logged for no particular
theoretical reason, but to assist in visualizing the distributions. Unlogged, the data
are so right-skewed that comparing the two distributions visually is nearly impossible
as most of the area is uncovered with a large percentage of the data on the far left
and a small amount on the far right. Taking this into account, it should be noted
that divergences between the lines on the right side of the plot represent a larger
difference in amounts than divergences on the left side. The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff
test comparing the cumulative density functions of the two distributions is sufficient
to reject the null hypothesis that the two distributions could be the same at a level
well below .001.
Comparison to committee membership is clearly a tougher test than compari-
son to the chamber, as the same factors that I argue lead members to engage in
oversight are the ones that lead members to seek committee membership (Shepsle,
1978; Adler and Lapinski, 1997). If we imagine an extreme case where only the most
extremely interested members selected onto Financial Services, finding a difference
between committee membership and oversight attendance becomes nearly impossi-
ble. Fortunately, that is not actually the case. For the two plots at the bottom of
Figure 5.3 I restrict the measure of members attending to only the hearings taking
place in the House Committee on Financial Services. This allows a more natural
comparison between committee intensity and the intensity of those attending. The
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bottom-left plot reveals that 62.5% of members attending The bottom-right plot in
Figure 5.3 adds the distribution of members of the Committee on Financial Services
and restricts the members attending only to those in hearings of the Financial Ser-
vices Committee. Immediately, one can see that the Financial Services Committee is
generally unrepresentative of the chamber, particularly in the furthest right portion
of the distribution, though not nearly as extreme as is often thought. Even taking
into account that the Financial Services is unrepresentative of the chamber, the mem-
bers that attend oversight hearings held by that Committee are skewed to the right.
Participation in this domain is dominated by preference outlying members.
To further establish that oversight activity is driven by interest group pressures,
I move from analyzing the overall distributions of members attending hearings to
analysis of attendance at each of the 45 hearings hearings. These tests involve Monte
Carlo simulations in which I draw a random subset of either the chamber or committee
depending on what comparison is being made and compare the outcomes observed
in the simulated hearings to those that actually occurred. From this set of simulated
hearings one can compare what was actually observed to an unbiased system in which
oversight is performed by a representative subset of members. For each hearing in the
data I record a number of distributional statistics about the hearing (minimum, 25th
percentile, median, 75th percentile, maximum) as well as the number of members
that attended that hearing. I report only the comparison of medians here, but using
different percentiles produces the same results.
For each iteration of the simulation I randomly select the number of members
that actually attended the hearing from the Congress in which that hearing was held,
recording the same summary statistics about the random draw. So, if twenty members
attend a hearing in the 109th Congress, the each round of the simulation draws
twenty members and saves that distribution to compare to the hearing we observe.
This procedure is repeated 5,000 times for each hearing, offering a distribution of
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5,000 simulated test statistics that are comparable to the observed test statistics. All
results reported here are the natural log of the three Congress running total of dollars
donated, though the results would be identical with the unlogged variable as the order
of observations is what matters for percentiles as opposed to the magnitude.














The points in Figure 5.4 each represent one hearing. The x-axis of the figure is
the percentile of the median constituency intensity of the members attending each
hearing as compared to the simulated versions of that hearing. Thus, if the median
that we actually observe is higher than that of any simulated hearing the point in the
plot would be in the furthest right portion of the plot. If the observed median is in
the middle of the distribution of simulated medians the point would be at the 50th
percentile. If it is the case that oversight is primarily being conducted by preference
outlying members it should be the case that the dots are to the far right of the plot,
which is largely what we observe. The three dashed lines represent the 50th, 75th
and 97.5th percentiles respectively. When interpreting these simulations it is helpful
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to think about the percentile as a p-value. In standard t-tests we reject the null
hypothesis when our test statistic is above some percentile, usually the 95th for a
one-tailed test or 95th for a two-tailed test. If we see that the median falls above
the 95th percentile we can be fairly confident in rejecting the null hypothesis that
the median we observe is the same as the median under the null hypothesis. The
75h percentile is marked to help guard against type 2 errors. As argued in Hall and
Grofman (1990), testing a hypothesis of no difference requires a different standard
of statistical significance to ensure that scholars do not overstate their confidence in
non-findings. They suggest that finding that α > .25 (one-tailed) is sufficient to reject
the hypothesis of a statistical significance. Given the interpretation of percentiles as
p-values, the appropriate percentile is the 75th.
The first set of comparisons concerns the chamber as a whole. Of the 45 hearings
we can reject the null hypothesis of no difference in medians for eighteen and fail to
confirm the hypothesis of no difference for an additional sixteen, leaving ten hearings
for which the null hypothesis appears to be confirmed. Taking the numbers of hear-
ings for which the distributive hypothesis is confirmed (or not rejected) offers support
but not overwhelming support for the distributive hypothesis. However, taking these
results together suggests a strong bias in favor of highly interested members. It is
telling that the median member attending these hearings is below the 50th percentile
only once. If we take seriously the idea that oversight activity is unbiased we would
expect some kind of distribution in test statistics that centers around the 50th per-
centile. If we throw out the magnitude of the results observed here and assume that
the probability of the observed median ending up on one side of the median is .5,
the odds of observing this distribution of test statistics is 45/245 or well under 1 in a
billion.
Next, I perform the same set of simulations, but sample members only from the
committee. As discussed above, this provides a substantially more difficult test.
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The distribution of members attending financial oversight hearings is much closer
to the distribution of members on the Financial Services committee. This increased
similarity is likely to be driven by the same factors that influence oversight, effectively
creating a problem of collinearity. This makes distinguishing between committee
membership and oversight intensity difficult even if the distributive explanation is
what is truly driving members. To perform this comparison I reduced the sample to
only hearings held by the Financial Services Committee and sampled members only
from that committee.
Figure 5.5 shows that the comparison of medians is less successful uncovering
bias, which is to be expected. Five hearings have values above the 95th percentile,
eleven are between the 75th and 95th percentiles, nine hearings are between the 50th
and 75th percentile, and thirteen hearings fall below the 50th percentile. While less
striking than the comparison to the chamber, the distribution of p-values we observe
is still highly unlikely under the null that attendance is driven only by committee
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membership. Thirteen hearings are lower than the 50th percentile and 25 are above
the 50th percentile, and the skew of percentiles toward the right is much stronger
than the skew to the left. While this is not overwhelming on a hearing-by-hearing
basis, the probability of 25 medians to the right of .5 and 13 to the left of .5 is .02
if we assume that ending up on one side or the other of .5 is truly random. Taking
into account that hearings above the median are much more skewed to the right than
hearings below the median are the left, the probability of these results under the null
is well below .02.
The first set of results shows fairly strong support for an interest-driven perspec-
tive. The members attending hearings in which financial regulatory agencies are
being overseen appear to have a substantially higher levels of constituency interest
in financial policy than the chamber and the Committee on Financial Services. Hav-
ing established that attendance in hearings occurs primarily among high-demanding
members, I turn to analyzing the degree to which activity in these hearings is driven
by those members. For the second set of results I count the number of times each
member spoke in a given hearing, giving me a kind of weighted attendance measure
wherein members who attend hearings and participate at higher levels are counted
more heavily than those that did not.
Recall that oversight is supposed to serve an informational purpose. Individuals
in the chamber need information about policies and active participation in oversight
offers a way to provide that. Attendance alone can provide some, but not a great deal
of, information about what the agency is up do. Participation is where the primary
revelation of information occurs. The quality of that information, however, is going
to be linked to who contributes to providing it. Choosing to emphasize one activity
at the expense of another or presenting an agency representative with a set of softball
questions produces a biased set of information about the agency’s activities. In a
classic signaling game where we have individuals conducting oversight to provide a
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signal to the remainder of the chamber about agency activities, the degree to which
the chamber can use the information produced through oversight is going to be a
function of the preferences of the individuals sending the signals. Members who are
heavily biased in favor of an agency’s policies are going to want to produce signals
that lead the chamber toward supporting policies that they would otherwise oppose.
The best thing for the chamber, then, is an unbiased, or at least heterogeneous, set
of members. The interest-driven perspective emphasizes a different set of signals
and produces different expectations about who should be active. In this perspective,
members participate to communicate their preferences as well as their willingness
and ability to impose sanctions on an agency. If interest group demands are the
mechanism underlying oversight, activity within hearings should be dominated not
by the individuals who are likely to be most informative, but those who have the
strongest incentives to mislead chamber majorities.
The dependent variable for the analysis of participation is effectively a weighted
measure of attendance. Using the method outlined earlier to parse texts, I counted
the number of times each individual at the hearing spoke. Members present were
then weighted by the number of times that they spoke at that hearing. If a member
spoke 10 times, their constituency intensity enters into the participation distribution
10 times. If information is produced disproportionately by extreme members the
distribution should be skewed to the right relative to the distribution of members
attending. In principal this information allows me to also analyze the content of text
or the total number of lines spoken (as opposed to number of pieces of unique speech).
Due to complexities in how hearings are formatted however, the measure of number of
times a member spoke is substantially more reliable than the number of lines spoken
or the exact content of their speech.
Somewhat surprisingly, the results from this set of distributions look extremely
similar to those from the previous sets. Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of speech
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Figure 5.6: Comparing Intensity of Participation to Committee and Chamber
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compared to the median district and the overall distribution of districts. The distri-
bution in Figure 5.6 peaks substantially closer to the overall median, though similar
to the previous results 81.0% of the data is to the right of the median. The plot
on the right of Figure 5.6 shows the weighted distribution of attendees against the
unweighted distribution of districts, again showing a statistically signficant (p < .001)
difference in distributions according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test. Comparing the
distribution of participation to the committee in the bottom two plots, one finds
slightly stronger evidence for bias than simply looking at attendance. 65% of the
data is to the right of the committee median and the tail of the participation distri-
bution clearly extends to the right of the committee, suggesting that the results are
not simply the result of committee composition.














Turning to individual hearings, we again find strong evidence of bias relative to the
chamber and even stronger evidence for bias when compared to the committee. As
above, I include dot plots of the percentile of constituency intensity of participating
members in each hearing. Figure 5.7 contains the percentiles of the simulated medians
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with the committee holding the hearing denoted by the shape and color of the point.
Unlike members present, there are eight hearings that fall below the 50th percentile.
However, 37 of 45 hearings are above the median, nineteen above the 95th percentile,
and another six above the 75th percentile, suggesting that the hard work of oversight
is being performed by an unrepresentative subset of the chamber. Using the standard
outlined above, this distribution of medians is clearly not a matter of chance.















































Figure 5.8 shows the results of sampling from both the committee and chamber. As
one would expect, the distribution of medians shifts to the left when sampling from
the committee. However, the distribution of medians still shows substantial bias
toward high intensity members and the results more closely track the comparison
to the full chamber than with attendance. As with attendance, twelve of the 38
hearings fall below the 50th percentile, a number well below what random chance
would predict. Only three of the hearings have medians above the 95th percentile,
but another fourteen are above the 75th percentile. The remaining nine fall between
the 50th and 85th percentile. Simply put, oversight activity is not being driven from
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a coalition representative of the chamber, not is it representative of the primary
committee of jurisdiction. There is a considerable degree of self-selection involved in
oversight and it is overwhelmingly high-intensity members selecting into the activity.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter I set out to test the primary behavioral implication of the theory
proposed in Chapter 3, which is that members will be more active in oversight of
a given agency when their coalition of support contains a politically active interest
group constituency affected by that agency’s policies. The patterns predicted are
hard to reconcile with a story based on oversight serving an informational purpose
for the chamber, as the members I predict will perform oversight are the ones with
the weakest incentives to provide accurate information to the committee. If congress
has successfully created a set of institutions to incentivize the defense of legislative
intent, information coming from untrustworthy sources is a fundamental problem for
the chamber to address.
Evidence for the theory comes from a case study of oversight of financial regulatory
agencies. These agencies make decisions that have the potential to impose substantial
regulatory costs on businesses or entire sectors, affecting the balance of competition
within an industry and having major implications for consumer welfare. The groups
affected by these policies are extremely politically active and thought to influence the
behavior of members. The question that I address here is whether that perceived
influence is real. Do members perform oversight on behalf of organized interests or
out of concern for the needs of the chamber?
I find that it is decidedly the former. Using a novel new measure of constituency
intensity derived from campaign contributions I show that oversight is primarily per-
formed by members backed by powerful organized interests. These uniquely intense
are more likely to get on the committee of jurisdiction and attend and participate in
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hearings conditional on being a member of that committee. Oversight is driven by
self-selection and the decision to select in to this activity is dominated by a small but
extreme subset of the chamber. Congress may not have solved the problem of shirk-
ing oversight, but interest groups have, suggesting that oversight can create political




The purpose of this dissertation was to address what I take to be a fundamental
question in democratic theory: Is Congress able to act collectively to protect its con-
stitutionally prescribed place in policymaking? Doing so, I argued, requires individual
members of the chamber to take costly actions to further collective goals, a situation
ripe for Olsonian free-riding. I began in Chapter 2 by introducing a means by which
oversight could be identified and member participation evaluated. In that chapter, I
show that oversight makes up a substantial portion of congressional hearing activity.
Moreover, oversight is common across units within the chamber. Every committee
in the sample allocated at least of 20 percent of its hearing activities to oversight,
with several committees allocating well over 40 percent. Most importantly, Chapter
2 presented the first systematic evidence that oversight is not neglected by members
in any meaningful sense. While oversight hearings are a slightly less popular use
of member time than some alternatives, a substantial number of members actively
participate in oversight of federal agencies.
Chapter 3 introduced a theory aimed at explaining the conditions under which
members would choose to engage in oversight. The theory differs sharply from the
common treatment of oversight in principal-agent models, but is at heart, still a
principal-agent model. While most principal-agent models treat oversight as a means
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of investigation, I build on a largely ignored set of oversight theories that emphasize
the ability of oversight to provide a costly signal of intensity to bureaucrats. Bu-
reaucrats, I argue, are responsive to members from whom they perceive an active
threat and costly oversight activities signal the degree to which the member provides
a credible threat to an agency. Interest groups want to be represented by members
to whom agencies are responsive, and offer electoral benefits to help re-elect mem-
bers who engage in this costly signaling. In turn, members decide to allocate their
scarce time selectively, focusing on oversight of agencies that are of interest to key
constituency groups. The primary normative implication of this theory is that over-
sight is aimed not at helping the chamber maintain control broadly, but for members
to make themselves a valuable representative for organized interests.
In Chapter 4, I apply the theory to the question of how the oversight agenda is
set, providing the first quantitative large-n test of why committee c oversees agency
a at time t. The theory in chapter 3 provides a general utility function for members,
and I suggest that committee chairs should use their scheduling powers to maximize
that utility, focusing committee oversight on agencies of interest to key constituency
groups. Using a case study of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, I find
consistent evidence of an effect. In so doing, I introduced a new means of identifying
which politically active groups are the most interested in policies made by a specific
agency using publicly available lobbying records.
Chapter 5 tests what I take to be the primary implication of the theory, providing
a test of how individual members of Congress allocate effort to oversight of agencies.
In the process of conducing these tests, I introduce a general strategy both for eval-
uating the degree to which individuals active in oversight differ from the chamber
and committee of jurisdiction, and measuring the interest group pressures faced by
members in their geographic constituency. Evidence for the theory comes from a
case study of oversight of financial regulatory agencies, showing that the members
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who choose to engage in oversight of these agencies are uniquely dependent on sup-
port from financial interests both compared to the chamber and the Committee on
Financial Services.
6.1 Discussion
6.1.1 Interest-Driven Oversight and the Prospects for Congressional Con-
trol
Showing support for the idea that oversight is driven by interest group demands
provides strong support for the theory, but does not rule out the possibility that the
collective good is being served to some degree. As Gailmard (2009) argues, must
oversight occurs in ways that can be viewed by any member. Hearings are held
publicly and are quickly available both in text and video formats for for any member
who wishes to check up on the status of a program. In addition, members have access
to a vast repository of Congressional Research Service reports that help to summarize
complex issues and make recommendations. Even if oversight is driven by organized
interests, it may be the case that useful information is created as a “by-product” of
this unrepresentative oversight (Olson, 1965).
While I cannot say anything definitively, I doubt this to be the case. Oversight
is useful to the chamber when it produces a set of informative signals, whether that
be about efficiency, fidelity to legislative principals, or any number of other types of
information. Members can affect those signals in two primary ways. First, they can
choose whether or not to have a hearing. If there is something that a member wants to
bring to the attention of the chamber they can devote committee time and resources
to a hearing. If the member wants to keep information private they can choose not
to hold a hearing. If a hearing is being held, members have choices about what they
want to discuss and who they wish to ask questions of, each of which affects the
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quality of signals received by non-participating members. Members can dig in and
ask tough questions that reveal useful information, they can ask leading questions
that serve to get across the impression that the chamber’s needs are not being met,
or they can choose to ask nothing at all and reveal no additional information.
The question is whether the high-demanding legislators who actually choose to
perform oversight are likely to reveal information that helps the chamber reach an
informed decision. If members are acting as the agents of interest groups they will
want to ensure that policy benefits going to that group are maximized. When a
group in the member’s constituency is being served inadequately the member will
attempt to send a signal that the programs insufficient in its current form and try
to get Congress to alter policy so as to provide more benefits to the group. Such
an arrangement is fine from the standpoint of the chamber because their intention
was to provide higher benefit levels. The problem from a signaling standpoint is that
high-demanding members always have an incentive to send these signals. Even if
legislative intent is being perfectly adhered to or is overly generous to the group in
question, the uniquely intense members performing oversight will want to convince
the chamber that more resources are needed. In the parlance of signaling games, the
members that we observe performing oversight pool in their responses, making their
signals uninformative. When benefits going to a group are higher than intended by
Congress, members have incentives to avoid revealing this information. If reporting
such a state of the world the member faces the possibility that Congress will choose
to act and alter delegation so as to provide fewer benefits.
The outcome of interest-driven oversight, then, is largely unhelpful in helping the
chamber solve its informational problem. Members only reveal information when their
constituencies are being underserved and when they report that their constituencies
are being underserved the chamber has a difficult time discerning whether their signal
accurately depicts bureaucratic outputs. If oversight were to be performed by a more
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representative subset of the chamber with varying preferences and intensities the
informational problem would be less acute. Members with relatively little stake in
a policy would have incentives to accurately reveal when benefits going to high-
demanding constituencies are too high and could confirm or disconfirm the signals
sent by high-demanding members. Unfortunately for the chamber, that is not what
we see
6.1.2 Oversight and Bureaucratic Responsiveness
The results here call into question the feasibility of “congressional control” of
the bureaucracy, but do not suggest that members are powerless in attempting to
influence bureaucrats. What exactly is meant by congressional control varies among
scholars. Here, I take it to mean that an agency faithfully implements the preferences
of the enacting coalition. Control need not be absolute, as an agency choosing to
implement a policy close to Congress’ stated preferences could reasonably said to be
more “controlled” than one setting policy far away. The key to this definition is simply
that congressional intent serve as some kind of binding constraint on the actions of
agencies. “Influence” is not the same as control. Influence occurs when the threat
of reaction from Congress causes an agency to choose policies that are different from
what they would have chosen in the absence of those threats. Control and influence
overlap when threats from Congress compel the agency to enact policy that better
mirrors legislative intent but can diverge when bureaucrats are incentivized to pursue
policies that differ from legislative intent.
In the theory outlined above, bureaucrats must be uniquely responsive to the de-
mands of their active overseers. Members who, backed by organized interests, can
credibly threaten to take costly actions affecting the agency must be accommodated
more than other members. This basic intuition was introduced and demonstrated
empirically by Arnold (1979), who showed that distributive goods tend to flow to
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members who can credibly threaten to become coalition leaders. Given that this
threat is communicated through oversight, bureaucrats will need to be responsive to
the coalition who choose to oversee. If that coalition wants to defend legislative in-
tent, influence works toward control. The distribution of preferences and intensities
in the oversight coalition examined above, however, makes it unlikely that the over-
sight coalition has any particular interest in protecting the interests of the chamber.
Because the members performing oversight are extreme and bureaucrats need to keep
those members happy, they have incentives to design policies that provide benefits
above and beyond the relatively moderate preferences of the chamber. Bureaucrats
can, in effect, make side-payments to members in order to make the member satisfied
enough so as not to pursue the possibility of sanctioning the agency. If oversight of
policies other than financial regulation operate in a similar fashion, the outcome is a
wide variety of unrepresentative policies.
A long and prestigious literature has been devoted to finding instances of “con-
trol.” In these pieces, preferences of some member or subset of members serve as
the independent variable while some bureaucratic output that maps onto those pref-
erences is used as the dependent variable. Weingast and Moran (1983) were among
the first, showing that the FCC responded to changing preferences on the commit-
tee of jurisdiction. Subsequent scholars have found evidence of responsiveness in the
NLRB (Moe, 1985), OSHA (Scholz, 1991), the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice (Wood and Anderson, 1993), and the FDA (Shipan, 2004). These stud-
ies are often taken as evidence that Congress controls the bureaucracy. The results
presented here suggest a subtle but important alternative. Individual members of
Congress influence agencies, but that does not mean that the agency is controlled by
the preferences of the chamber more broadly. To whom bureaucrats are responsive
within Congress and how that affects policy outputs is an important topic that should
be taken up in future research.
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6.1.3 Institutional Design and Interest-Driven Oversight
The explanation presented here does downplay the effectiveness of administrative
procedures as a means to protect congressional intent. More broadly, any solution that
focuses only on reducing costs to oversight will not be enough to compel the actions
of members on its own. For members to willingly contribute to congressional control
their utility must be somehow connected with the needs of the chamber. Absent
that connection, no amount of cost minimization will make informative oversight
an attractive option for members. It does not, however, mean that administrative
procedures and congressional research agencies are unimportant to members.
Oversight of a given agency is desirable to some subset of members, and those
members would be willing to perform it even in the absence of measures to reduce
the costs of oversight. If Congress had not developed institutional means to subsidize
oversight we would still see oversight, it would just be more resource intensive and
likely less frequent. The purpose of administrative procedures may have been to help
convince members to contribute to chamber goals, but their real effect may be to
subsidize members’ use of oversight to acquire policy benefits from agencies. The
presence of administrative procedures and research agencies helps members perform
the type of oversight that they find useful and leads to more of the activity than would
otherwise take place. Members who are disinclined to perform oversight will continue
not to perform it, and those who want to perform oversight for constituency reasons
have the costs of doing so subsidized by the procedures set up to ensure political
control. Ironically, the institutions designed to automate political control of the
bureaucracy may contribute to additional agency loss for the chamber. Research on
administrative procedures largely focuses on when Congress adds ex ante controls and
which controls are used, but the importance of constituency motivations in oversight
suggests that scholars should also pay attention to how administrative procedures are
used by individual members.
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6.1.4 Why Unrepresentative Oversight?
Demonstrating that oversight is performed by an unrepresentative subset of the
chamber raises positive as well as normative questions. If theory based on interest
groups can answer the question of why members would want to engage in oversight, it
cannot answer the question of why such a system would survive in equilibrium. Key
congressional agenda setters have an interest in a system of oversight that produces
accurate information about the functioning of federal agencies. Given their ability
to shape the internal organization of Congress it is not clear why they would allow a
system that seemingly fails to provide this outcome.
One possibility is that unrepresentative oversight is simply part of the trade-
off identified by Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987). If congressional agenda setters want
members to specialize they may need to incur a distributional loss in order to get any
information at all. The trade-off in this scenario is the value of unbiased information
against the cost of the side-payments needed to induce that information. Instead of
paying disinterested members who lack expertise to specialize, the chamber may sim-
ply have to make due with committees as they exist currently. Such an arrangement
may not be feasible and even if non-specialists who will tend to be the desirable low-
intensity signalers do provide less biased information, it is likely that they would also
produce less accurate information as they are less able to overcome the informational
disadvantages held by agencies. Regardless, a further examination of how specific
congressional practices may aid in eliciting information, even if that information is
biased, is key to understanding the question of why this practice would be allowed to
persist.
6.1.5 Where’s the Party?
An issue pushed largely to the side in this dissertation is the influence of parties
in the conduct of oversight. The fundamental puzzle addressed was one of collective
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action, and it is well known that parties have some degree of expertise in dealing with
this class of problems (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2005). Parties have the potential
to affect the conduct of oversight both through the selection of committee chairs,
forcing chairs to focus on one issue and not another, and maybe even by compelling
member participation in these activities. I cannot rule out either possibility. What I
can say is that it is not obvious how the results presented here would be subsumed
by a partisan theory of oversight. The measure of interest group measure in Chapter
5 was completely uncorrelated with the party of the representative, and Chapter
4 explicitly included a variable for divided government, finding no evidence that it
mattered. There is strong evidence elsewhere that parties affect how investigations
are conducted, but less that they matter for more programmatic oversight. Future
research should attempt to derive a partisan model and conduct more thorough tests
of that explanation than the one presented here.
6.1.6 Individual Incentives and Interbranch Relations
The primary focus of this work was to understand the incentives that individu-
als have to take costly actions to protect their constitutional prerogative. Madison’s
famous treatment of the question in Federalist 51 argued that actors in government
would naturally wish to protect the power they have and encroach upon the authority
of others. Madison’s exhortation that “Ambition must be made to counteract ambi-
tion” needs no further examination, but the following line, “The interest of the man
must be connected to the constitutional rights of the place,” deserves more attention.
While it is generally assumed that the interest of political actors is tied to the mainte-
nance of their powers, the findings here call into question whether that is the case. An
extensive literature examines the ability of Congress to defend its legislative author-
ity, but the problem of free-riding has not been sufficiently addressed theoretically or
empirically. We know a great deal about how courts, Congress, the president, and
148
the bureaucracy bargain with artificially anthropomorphized committees, chambers,
branches, etc... The analysis here suggests that the inter-personal dynamics within
those bodies have an important effect on bargaining between branches and that those
dynamics need to be considered in our theories of separation of powers. Or to put it
in Madison’s terms, we need to think more about how the interest of the man affects
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